Global Conflicts Loom for Fresh Potable Water Sources

For centuries war and conflict has been tied to the protection of water resources. With the risk of water shortages around the world becoming more and more of an issue, water has become the fuel of certain conflicts in many regions around the world. “Water Wars” are becoming inevitable in the world’s future as the misuse of water resources continues among countries that share the same water source. International law has proven itself inadequate in defending the equal use of shared water supplies in some parts of the world (Darwish, Middle East Water Wars). The rapid population increase has greatly affected the amount of water readily available to many people.

Water as a resource is very comparable to oil; it is essential to all daily human activities. Water is becoming a very valuable commodity, yet freshwater resources are unevenly distributed among developing countries. This scarcity in water has triggered desperation in countries that already have little access to water, let alone reliable water supplies. This desperation usually cannot be resolved by negotiations. If governments or rebels want water badly enough, they resort to force to obtain it. Water has very rarely been the main ingredient in international conflicts, but it is often factored into the problem due to its economic importance. (Peter Gledick, Water Conflict Chronology)

“Conflicts over water arise form the fact that under conditions of increasing scarcity, competition levels also increase.” Anthony Turton

The Potential Causes

There has been much speculation over what causes conflicts over water. The conflicts arise over who has the power to control water and therefore control the economy and population. By breaking it down into categories, we can begin to understand the causes. Conflicts can be caused by water use which includes military, industrial, agricultural, domestic and political uses. Through the military and political uses, conflicts can be exacerbated by the use of water systems as a weapon and as a political goal. In relation to industrial and agricultural uses conflicts may arise from the overuse and degradation of water resources, and the insufficient amount that is left over for communities.

Conflicts can further be a result of pollution affecting the quality of the water supply. The military is already most likely the number one producer of wastes in the world, and the leftover chemical and weapons used in times of war can have an effect on water supplies. Wastes from industries and agriculture can contaminate groundwater resources if not disposed of properly, and cause frustration for those who must travel to obtain sufficient daily water supplies. This lack of water quality can cause a conflict to arise regarding the distribution of water. Not having water evenly distributed among people and countries creates an imbalance among those who share supplies, particularly in developing countries (Cause of Conflicts, Haftendorn).

The increase of urbanization has increased the demand for water. However the supply cannot take care of the demand. With the problem of uneven water distribution future conflicts can occur. As societies become more developed they tend to use more resources such as water (Klare).

Regions of Conflicts

Many regions around the world deal with shortages of water. However, some areas deal more with conflicts over inadequate water supplies and disputes over shared water supplies. In regions where countries compete for access to water, the relations between the countries are likely to be unstable. In regions where water supply is scarce, combat sometimes seems to be the only way to resolve the problem. It is estimated that there are 1,250 square kilometers of freshwater remaining in the world’s semi-arid and arid regions and this supply is not evenly distributed among two or more countries sharing the same water source. Severe water scarcity is strongest in the Middle East and Northern Africa. The need for water in these regions is essential for food production used in irrigation farming (Klare).

Water systems usually arise in one country and pass through others before reaching the sea or oceans. The rivers and lakes that come off these larger water systems are typically shared by more than one country. The states where these systems originated tend to try and gain the most control over the water. This is the case along river systems like the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Jordan River (Klare).

The Middle East

Middle East conflicts are usually tied in the media to religion or oil, but water has become a major factor in recent disputes. In prominent watersheds such as the Jordan River Basin and the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, water supplies can be critical especially when they are being shared among multiple countries. These rivers play a very important role in the agriculture and economic development of these states.

Jordan River Basin

The area of the Jordan River Basin, including parts of Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank, is primarily an arid region. The river originates in Lebanon and has a total average flow of 1,200 million cubic meters per year. This river system consists of the Jordan and Yarmuk River, which flows from Syria. With the arid climate and low precipitation in this region, water has become the most valuable resource (Klare). Most countries in the Jordan River Basin are among some of the poorest countries in the region. Groundwater aquifers are the principle source for water supplies to the states that rely on the Jordan River. Water use varies throughout the region. Israel uses the greatest amount of water available in the basin, and next in line is Jordan. The Israeli-occupied West Bank uses the smallest amount. The daily amount of water per person in the Jordan River Basin is the lowest in the world (Water Scarcity in Jordan River Basin).

The patterns of water use, overuse, and political territorial issues are resulting in disagreement over water distribution. The increase in population (both through natural increase and Israeli settlements) has led to significant challenges in managing limited water supplies. Without the existence of a legitimate water sharing agreement, the countries of Syria and Israel have taken over the water supplies. The construction of reservoirs on the Yarmuk River has caused the reduction of discharge into the Jordan River (The Jordan River Basin).

The Mountain Aquifer underneath the West Bank is a point of contention between Israelis and Palestinians. Issues include the domination of groundwater supplies by the Israeli state and settlers, and the walling off of Palestinian access to water supplies. Compared to Israeli settlers Palestinians are charged three times the cost for water that comes from under the West Bank (Villiers).

Map and Satellite picture of the Jordan River Basin

The Tigris-Euphrates Basin

The scarcity of water supplies in the river basin of ancient Mesopotamia has long fed disagreement among neighboring nations. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers originate in Turkey, and their watershed covers a much larger area than the Jordan River basin. The river system is shared by several countries and ethnic groups who regularly disagree on water issues. Like the Jordan River Valley, rising population in these areas is heavily affecting the availability of water. The Tigris and Euphrates are especially important to Syria and Iraq. Syria obtains approximately 85 percent of the renewable water supply while Iraq obtains 100 percent from the combination of both rivers (Klare).

The Turks (and the Kurds who live in southeastern Turkey) are less dependent on the rivers, yet they still have plans for irrigation schemes to increase their utilization of both rivers. Along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, conflict arises from north to south. The downstream states of Iraq and Syria depend heavily on these two rivers for their water supply. Dams along the rivers installed by Turkey have prevented some of the water from flowing downstream to these warmer, drier countries.(Haftendorn). All three countries (but mainly Turkey) have constructed dams on the rivers for purposes of agriculture, hydroelectric power and industrialization.

Turkey and Syria have increased hostilities towards one another over the use of the Euphrates River. Turkey’s plans to utilize its portion of the Euphrates have affected the share going to Syria for irrigation purposes. Hostilities between Syria and Iraq escalated due to the filling of Lake Assad by Syria, resulting to the reduction of downstream flow in the 1970’s. Iraqi’s began accusing Syria of holding back water supplies. Among all three countries, the water supply conflict is equated with their national security (Tigris Euphrates Dispute).

Tigris-Euphrates River

Warfare in Iraq

The 1991 Gulf War brought on water crisis in Iraq due to the bombing of water treatment facilities in Iraq by the U.S., triggering water shortages in the country. Out of the seven major water pumping stations, four were destroyed. The targeting of sewage and water treatment plants contributed to the mass contamination of the Trigris River, and triggered many waterborne diseases. The bombing during the 2003 Iraq invasion agian targeted civilian infrastructure, and left many southern Iraqis with little or no access to water in the first weeks of the occupation. (See Iraq water crisis.)

Iraqi women waiting for incoming water supplies while confronted by British troops

Africa

In many parts of Africa, water shortages are a part of everyday life. Many countries share one water resource for the use both of their populations. A large percentage of these countries are very dependant on the weather to provide proper irrigation to the agricultural industry, since water resources are so scarce.The major areas being shared among countries are the Nile River, Volta River, Zambezi River, and the Niger Basin. Conflicts rage from the privatization of the water resources to the many people displaced by dams along the rivers, and the unequal distribution of water supplies amongst neighboring countries.With the growing demand for water resources, conflicts seems almost inevitable, especially with many African governments’ history of poor management of resources and inadequate conflict resolution mechanisms.

The Nile River Basin

The Nile is the longest river in the world, stretching for 4,130 miles. The Nile River for centuries has been the source of sustaining human life in Egypt and Sudan. The Nile’s tributaries, lakes, and rivers collect and disperse water in nine African countries before it reaches the Mediterranean Sea. The Egyptians have used military force to ensure their control over the headwaters of the Nile, because the country has no other water source. Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda have constructed various river projects to increase their annual water withdrawals, affecting Egyptian control over the Nile (Klare). However, in some cases national governments have agreed to share water that flows between their countries. For example, the leaders of Uganda, Sudan and Egypt signed a pact to share the waters of the Nile River. Such solutions can potentially prevent water shortage and head off conflict.

Nile River

Volta River Basin

Niger River Basin

Zambezi Water Basin

School children crossing contaminated river source

Asia

South Asian countries deal with conflict over the sharing of river water supplies both in downstream and upstream regions. The distribution of water resources throughoutSoutheast and Central Asia is increasingly becoming a political issue, with the tensions amounting over the control of water supplies (Biliouri). The idea of shared water supply has not been easily understood by the nations of this region. The growing populations come with the increase in demand and could be a catalyst for conflict to arise out of the ethnic and political disputes (Water and Conflict).

In India and China water shortages pose both a social and economic threat. Throughout India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh, water shortages are increasingly triggering conflict. Although the freshwater resources are abundant, they are not well distributed to drier regions in dire need of water. With the immense amount of pollution being dumped in the freshwater supply, clean water is becoming scarce to the mass of people and tensions can easily escalate.

The Indus River Basin has been an area of conflict between India and Pakistan. Spanning 1,800 miles, the river and its tributaries together make up one of the largest irrigation canals in the world. The basin provides water to millions of people in northwestern India and Pakistan. Dams and canals built in order to provide hydropower and irrigation ha dried up stretches of the Indus River. Water projects have further caused the displacement of people and have contributed to the destruction of the ecosystem in the Indus plain.

The divisions of the river basin waters have created friction among the countries of South Asia, and among their states and provinces. Accusations of overdrawing made by each central region or province has resulted in the lack of water supplies to coastal regions of Pakistan (Controversy over Indus River Water). The Ganges River has long been disputed over by India and Bangladesh. The two regions share a common river system, formed by the joining of the Bhagirathi and the Alaknanda.

Water Supply in Bangladesh

Map of the Indus River Basin

Ganges River System:

The Ganges River possesses strong economic and religious importance. The Ganges River as a water source has been strongly disputed between India and Bangladesh. With increasing demands of water in Calcutta for industrial and domestic use, and irrigation use in the Indian state of West Bengal, water conflicts between the two countries have increased. With large amounts of pollution in this river system, the available water is unsanitary and can increase illness, as well as trigger mass migration.

Ganges River pollution makes it an unsanitary water resource

Understanding The Nile River Water Conflict

Introduction

 

Perceptions and Realities

Perceptions and realities of water and conflict in basins such as the Nile vary widely. The river continues to be brought into debates about “water wars” by writers on the subject.^[1] Visions of future conflict continue to capture the imagination of the international media. ^[2]As recently as 1999, a BBC report on Africa’s waters could still state that:

The main conflicts in Africa during the next twenty-five years could be over that most precious of commodities – water, as countries fight for access to scarce resources … the possible flashpoints are the Nile, Niger, Volta, andZambezi basins. ^[3]

Problems with portraying Africa’s waters – and the Nile especially – in this light have always existed, but continuing to do so increasingly contradicts evidence that the contrary process is at work, namely moves towards greater cooperation rather than conflict.

One of the major problems with the “water wars” thesis is that it includes only a cursory understanding of “scarcity” issues, and of the actual facts and figures that underlie much of the analysis. Commonly, a threshold figure of 1,000 cu m per person per year is provided as the level below which states are said to be “water scarce.” In the case of Nile Basin states, this ranks Burundi, Rwanda, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Kenya all as water “scarce” by 2025, and depending on population growth, they may possibly be joined by Tanzania.

The continuous growth of the population of the Nile Basin is one of the factors dominating these calculations. Population growth has already encouraged abstraction of groundwater, especially for domestic water supply, in both rural and urban areas without any corresponding increase in surface water resources. More than 5 percent of the water used in Egypt is groundwater. The groundwater in the Sudan is pumped from the aquifers underlying wadi beds such as the Gash, Howare, and Nyala. For rural communities, in particular, these are essential sources for domestic purposes. Safe abstraction of groundwater can provide a quick solution for small-scale projects, but in the long term will not provide basin-wide solutions to shortages in key sectors such as agriculture.

Categorizations of scarcity are usually based on an assumption about water use in each country that rarely receives careful attention. Most critical in this respect is that the threshold figure should include water for all uses, that is, including food production.^[4] In fact, many states – and Egypt is an important example – no longer rely on actual water resources in combination with land and other natural resources to achieve food security, but instead import large quantities of food, and in so doing come to rely on trade in “virtual water” to sustain national food security.^[5]

Another key problem is that notions of scarcity are based on a static view of the internal capacity of states to change in response to dwindling resource availability – what has been termed their “adaptive capacity.” For this reason future projections of scarcity – such as those given for the Nile Basin states above – presuppose that states will not adapt effectively in the meantime, and that there are not major differences in capacity to cope with change between different states, either economically, socially, or both (the work of Ohlsson, Turton, and others takes the argument further).

For other authors, the notion of scarcity itself is sometimes part of a construction used by particular interest groups in order to legitimize certain development processes, including, for instance, the construction of major water management schemes and dams ^[6]. Taken together, these conceptual challenges demand a more careful reading of current and future scarcity of water resources, and militate against drawing overly simplistic conclusions about growing scarcity causing future conflict.

Notwithstanding these conceptual challenges, the water wars thesis is used by decision makers and by political leaders in order to focus attention on global resource issues – and their particular basin concerns. In the main, these serve immediate political ends. Boutros-Boutros Ghali is on record as stating in the mid-1980s that “The next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics.” And in the mid-1990s Ismail Serageldin of theWorld Bank warned that “If the wars of this century were fought over oil, the wars of the next century will be fought over water – unless we change our approach to managing this precious and vital resource.” Such concerns and warnings rarely attempt to interrogate the realities of conflict over rivers such as the Nile, but instead feed on widely perceived notions of insecurity and vulnerability within domestic populations. These feelings are often driven by public perceptions of the challenges facing shared river basins and their societies, and the political actors are feeding on and responding to those perceptions. Some of these wider perceptions will also have resulted from external factors such as the impact of drought in the Horn of Africa and on Nile flows during the 1980s.

Nevertheless, confounding much of this skepticism, in the 1990s the countries of the Nile Basin in fact moved towards greater cooperation and joint development rather than conflict. In spite of tensions often being raised by political rhetoric within the basin, a broader vision of future cooperation constructed by the basin states has established unprecedented political cooperation in overcoming past rivalries and uneven development of co-riparian states. This article examines the context and development of this process, and draws out key lessons emerging for the future development of the basin and, more broadly, for global attempts at shifting other basins from conflict to cooperation, and then to joint development.

 

Initiatives and Challenges

Addressing the challenge of moving towards greater cooperation and joint development has been central to theNile Basin Initiative (NBI), a riparian-led process of joint decision making and cooperative development that emerged during the 1990s. In the last five years nine of the ten Nile Basin states (with Eritrea observing) have been exploring the development of the NBI in partnership with key external agencies, including the World Bankand bilateral donors.^[7] The NBI has both built on and added to a basic underlying set of enabling relations between states and the willingness of key basin states to move from “unilateralism” to “multilateralism” in resource development.

The development of this process was premised on two major assumptions: that the basin states could agree on a common vision “to pursue,” and that they would agree to form two distinct sub-basin entities. The common vision (discussed later in the article) brought about a broad target for the process of subdividing the basin and developing two distinct yet interrelated basin development programs: the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program. This process has subsumed national-level decision making beneath a broader basin-wide framework, but with national level objectives built into the range of future development options and projects. The process involved is discussed in more detail later in this article. The political feasibility of the 1990s enabled much of this process to take place, and provided the basis for its mainstreaming within national-level political processes.

The end of the cold war and the problems of “satellite state” politics in the region were major contributory factors in greater feasibility; another was the actual realization amongst basin states that in order to manage the river in the future, greater joint development of the resource would have to take place under a broader cooperative framework. The drought experience in a key part of the basin during the 1980s helped to form this perception.

 

From Cooperation to Socioeconomic Development

Developing cooperation on the Nile is a major achievement of international diplomacy within the region. It has created an environment of joint cooperation, and political will to move development processes forwards. However, the generation of support and effective development processes at all levels of society is the next major challenge. In moving a step beyond development of cooperative institutions and processes to the creation of effective developments that derive benefits at all levels within the basin, the NBI has set itself a new challenge in river basin management, and one that embeds basin-level processes in far wider African development issues.

The socioeconomic development framework requires that the benefits can be generated and shared within the basin (and within the basin states – the two not being synonymous), and that the benefits can be targeted to local-level socioeconomic developments that address very real problems of poverty reduction. Under the Shared Vision Program (SVP) of the Nile Basin Initiative the Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing Project document states that:

The development objective of this project is to support the SVP by enabling the riparians to form a range of basin-wide development scenarios, and specify the benefits accruing from the implementation of such scenarios (together with some notion of how benefits will be shared). Fundamentally, the project aims to provide an opportunity for riparian dialogue that can include a wide range of society and that will develop common visions of cooperative development in sectoral or thematic areas. (NBI SDBS, 2001)

One of the key concerns mentioned in the document is the extension of involvement in the Nile Basin Initiative beyond the state – that is, to include a wide range of society. In the process to date, and the wider construction of new political environments, the main actors in the NBI have worked at the state level. Two key issues arising out of this process are first, how to incorporate the visions and beliefs of society at all levels within this wider basin vision in order to ensure that ownership has both depth and breadth; and second, how to ensure that non-state, civil society actors also have a voice in the kinds of program that are being established.

In Figure 2, “A” represents the spectrum of national views incorporated within the core NBI vision. (See originalpublication). On either side are “peripheral” visions, or the wider thinking and views present in society on development options, the sharing of benefits and issues of governance, including participation, representation, and accountability. Key concerns in Figure 2 are the “wider” periphery where basin developments have regional or even continental-scale repercussions, and the narrower, lower-level visioning of the process. In effect, whose process are we talking about: a national broad-based vision, or the vision of local communities whose needs and concerns are more narrowly defined by the need to survive and develop within frequently adverse socioeconomic, political, and natural environments? Both the breadth of the vision and the depth require careful linkage. In this the NBI can build very strong developmentled processes that, in the final analysis, are rooted in the wider African political economy.

 

The Nile Basin

 

Geography

The geography of the Nile Basin is both distinct and varied. From the most remote source at the head of the River Luvironzo near Lake Tanganyika, to its mouth on the Mediterranean Sea, at 6,500 km the Nile is the longest river in the world. Some 2.9 million km² in extent, overall the basin drains about 10 percent of the continent. But the geographical and political linkages go beyond the basin itself – the ten Nile Basin states embed Nile Basin processes within the wider social and economic development of Africa across all major parts of the continent.^[8]The ten Nile countries link processes in southern Africa to northern Africa and the Mediterranean, development inCentral Africa to the West African Atlantic coast, and the regional systems of the Middle East to the Indian Ocean.

From the highest point at 5,120 m above sea level in the Ruwenzori mountain range, to the Quattarah Depression, at 159 m below sea level, the river channel consists of flat reaches in certain sub-basins presently linked by steep channels. Within this basin the topography is diverse. The highlands of the Ethiopian Plateau and the “Mountains of the Moon” in Central Africa give way to the lowland pastoral plains of Sudan and the deserts of Egypt. Tropical vegetation, snow-capped peaks, and some of the driest areas in the world, as well as some of the largest bodies of inland waters, can be found along the basin’s length and breadth.

The huge Congo–Nile watershed is home to internationally important rainforest areas. The Lake Victoria basin and southwestern Ethiopia include key areas of genetic plant diversity, and important dry lands and arid zone habitats emerge as rainfall decreases to the north (NBI TEA, 2001). One of the most dramatic natural features is the globally important wetland area of the Sudd in southern Sudan, which at 30,000 km2 is one of the largest wetland areas in the world.

One of the key geopolitical features of the basin is the large number of national borders that traverse it. This is largely the result of European colonial or condominium occupation in the nineteenth century. With the exception of Ethiopia, whose border definition was itself a response to European colonial expansion in and around the state, border issues remained contentious in a number of places even up to the late twentieth century. The criss-crossing of borders ensures little congruence between state boundaries and the basin’s physical or human geography: as a result, the proportions of basin area within each state and the extent of state contributions to the basin area vary widely, as depicted in the Figure bellow.

Most major basins spanning such areas include highly diverse environments, so the Nile is not exceptional in this respect. Nevertheless, the complexity of the number of states, combined with the uneven distribution of the basin between states and the complex hydrology of the system, poses significant technical and institutional challenges both for the management of shared waters and, in the future, for ascertaining where and how benefits can and should be shared within and outside the basin.

 

Hydrology

The Nile’s hydrology has preoccupied basin residents for thousands of years, and with good reason. A large portion of the basin flows is highly seasonal, and the overall flow range is susceptible to major inter-annual and decadal fluctuations. Since the end of the nineteenth century – and in particular following British control of a key part of the Nile Basin – major hydrological investigations were undertaken to try to devise methods of controlling the river system in order to facilitate its exploitation. The flows of the Nile have been measured for thousands of years, and the origins and reasons for variations preoccupied many of the Nilotic societies. The Nilometers at Roda Island in Cairo and elsewhere along the river are testament to the huge task of trying to grapple with the fickle flows of the Nile.

Major supply structures and approximate extent of basin

Of particular concern for downstream riparian societies in the most arid parts of the basin were the seasonal and inter-annual peaks and troughs. These would effectively control the prosperity of the riparian societies, almost wholly dependent on river flows for agricultural production. For up to eight millennia, the very unreliability of the flow has preoccupied communities.

That the flow could vary from year to year as well as seasonally has been recorded for many thousands of years and the awareness of Egypt’s cycles of lean years followed by years of plenty was part of the way of life of people residing in the lower Nile valley before the filling of Lake Nasser/Nubia in the 1960s. (Sutcliffe and Lazenby, 1994, introduction)

The key hydrological characteristics of the river are its two major origins: in the highlands of Ethiopia and Eritrea, and in the Nile equatorial lakes region. The former provides the major flow of the Nile north of Khartoum – the Blue Nile – and the latter the far lower and slower flows of the White Nile. While the catchment of the Blue Nile is small relative to that of the White Nile, high rainfall from June to September means that it is by far the greatest contributor to main Nile flows – some 60 percent of the total. The White Nile, by contrast, is derived from rainfall in the equatorial lakes region around Lake Victoria – at 69,500 km² the world’s second largest lake – but provides a mere 30 percent of flows as measured at Aswan.

The second major feature of the hydrological system is the huge seasonality of the Blue Nile’s flows, concentrated from July to October in a spectacular flood.

From the point of view of basin development the main interest in the hydrology of the Blue Nile within Ethiopia is for flood forecasting for reservoir operation and to give warning of possible inundation in Khartoum and in the agricultural areas downstream.(Sutcliffe and Lazenby, 1994)

This massive spate is roughly equivalent to seventy times its low season discharge, and brings with it huge quantities of silt. These have literally provided the building blocks of downstream Nilotic societies for millennia.

The difference in the two major river regimes is marked: while the White Nile’s average monthly maximum (October) and minimum (February) discharges vary only slightly from 1.4 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 1.2 bcm, theBlue Nile and associated rivers (Atbara – which joins the main Nile at Atbara north of Khartoum – and the Sobat which joins the White Nile just as the river emerges from the Sudd) vary greatly from a high of 15.6 bcm in August to just 0.3 bcm in April.

This seasonal variation has posed a key challenge to river basin planners and agriculturalists alike: how to capture and store the river’s waters for more gradual release. At a more fundamental level, but one that has been beyond the capacities of societies within the basin for the greater part of their history, has been the challenge of how to overcome the (sometimes) disastrous inter-annual variations in flow as well.

Over the years, fluctuations in the flow of the Blue Nile have contributed changes in mean annual discharge of plus or minus 20 percent, with very severe consequences for water management in Egypt and Sudan (Conway and Hulme, 1996). The mitigation of major inter-annual variation was the task of the “Century Storage” scheme developed as a concept during the first half of the twentieth century. The idea was to capture a whole annual flood in order to fully control and regulate the river’s flow. This would enable states to maximize resource use efficiency. In part the idea was realized in Aswan High Dam, constructed in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but with some major human and environmental costs.

A third major feature of the river system is caused by virtue of the river’s situation in hot, arid areas whereevaporation losses are high. By far the most significant losses are in the Sudd in southern Sudan. Between entry and exit the river loses up to 50 percent of its original flow. This loss to the system for Egypt and Sudan has meant significant shortfalls in summer months, when flows from the Blue Nile reach their lowest point. Therefore, enabling greater White Nile flows during this period has important economic consequences, even though it is only a relatively small proportion of annual flows. Reducing this loss was at the heart of attempts to speed up the flow through the Sudd via the Jonglei Canal Scheme.

The figure bellow illustrates the variance between “export” and “import” of water. The major production of water by Ethiopia – but low capture of the resources – is contrasted with Egypt’s low internal renewable resources. This marks the nature of dependence on water from upstream catchment to downstream states in the Nile Basin. It goes a long way towards illustrating the reason the Egyptian claim on historic or acquired rights to the waters became its main stated position on the Nile waters for so long.

Similarly, for Ethiopia, the massive amount of water generated by the huge annual rainfall, but the fact that nearly all of the 111 bcm flowed to neighboring states, prompted (until the last decade) the “sovereign right” position to use the waters within its territory for its own national development. For Ethiopia the loss of huge volumes of soil in the annual flood also underlined the fact that it could be resource rich and poor at the same time unless the resources could be harnessed more effectively. The nature of dependence on resources received externally against internal renewable resources is illustrated in Figure 6. (See original publication)

Not surprisingly the huge dependence on external flows in Egypt and Sudan has driven major supply-side developments, seeking to both capture and regulate the river’s flows. This has progressed throughout the twentieth century, and now constitutes the main system of regulating the river’s flows. They are, as well, largely constructed to suit a particular set of demands and legal and institutional structures established between Egypt and Sudan, in particular. The future challenge of ensuring that cooperation leads to development in the future may require changes in the way supply structures are used, as well as the inclusion of new structures in upstream countries.

 

Climate

The north–south orientation of the River Nile on the African continent ensures extreme variability in climate between the extremes of the basin. The Nile Basin receives annually an average rainfall of about 650 mm, or a total of about 1,900 bcm per year. Long-term mean annual flow at Aswan is about 85 bcm per year, making the annual runoff coefficient of the basin around 4.5 percent. This figure is small and, for example, is just 10 percent of that of the Rhine. The reason for this is found largely in those parts of the basin belonging to the arid and hyper-arid zones that are large in surface area, and contribute only negligibly to basin runoff. With losses from major swamp areas as well, up to 30 percent of the rainfall the Nile Basin receives in an average year is lost before being used for any purpose.

The Nile Basin’s climate range varies between extreme aridity in the north (Egypt and Sudan in particular) to tropical rainforest in Central and East Africa and parts of Ethiopia. On the Ethiopian massif, the key contributor of Nile flows, the kiremt rains produce the main June to November spate. This spectacular phenomenon is the combination of three mechanisms: the move of the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) (summer monsoon) over the highlands, before retreating again, the tropical “upper easterlies,” and local convergence in the Red Sea coastal region. The resulting rainfall is often intense, and causes rapid runoff leading to major soil loss.

Changes to the pattern and movement of the ITCZ cause major shifts in rainfall across Ethiopia and neighboring countries, particularly in association with the varied topography in the region. In some years the northeastern highlands of Ethiopia are particularly badly affected by low and unpredictable rainfall patterns, contributing to severe crop failure, and at times major famine.

One of the key factors affecting this rainfall variability is the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO), the occurrence of positive anomalies in sea surface temperatures over the Central and Eastern Pacific Ocean, which can have dramatic global impacts on regional weather systems. In the case of the Nile, studies have shown significant correlation between the ENSO index in May and Ethiopia’s Kiremt rainfall. Whetton and Rutherford (1994, cited by Conway et al., 1997)showed that Nile floods were significantly lower than average in all El Niño years, but that the strong relationship develops only after 1830 and continues up to the 1980s.

These variable rainfall patterns in recent years have prompted major efforts at better forecasting in the basin. In particular, the successive years of low rainfall during the mid-1980s, with floods in some years barely half a “normal” year, led to a decline in the level of Lake Nasser/Nubia to such an extent that by the time a major rainfall event occurred in August 1988 the turbines were just short of being turned off.

This experience had the dual impact of illustrating how vulnerable Egypt could be to successive low flows in the absence of the High Dam, but also the importance of a more integrated basin-wide management regime for Egypt’s water security. Successive low-flow years would require more than one massive structure to help achieve greater water security in the future; upstream augmentation of flows would also be important.

 

Demography and Society

Given the large number of countries, the reach of the basin across Africa, as well as the range of agro-ecological zones, the human geography of the Nile Basin is extremely diverse. The ten states that comprise the basin cover some 300 million people, of which about 150 million live within the Nile Basin itself. The basin also boasts some ofAfrica’s major cities, from Dar es Salaam, Kampala, and Nairobi to Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Cairo. The latter alone accounts for probably in the region of 10 percent of the basin’s total population.

The rich human geography is characterized by great ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity, cutting across national as well as basin boundaries with neighboring watersheds. This increases the complexity of the Nile’s interrelationships with wider African social, political, and economic systems. For decision makers and managers this adds layer upon layer of complexity to the ways in which the Nile Basin Initiative will develop and implement projects based on the equitable sharing of benefits between states and the ethnic groups which they comprise and, in many cases, share. Even a single state can have great diversity: Ethiopia alone, for instance, has over fifty languages and is roughly split between Muslims and Christian populations, with significant animist minorities.

Equally as important as ethnicity is the range of livelihoods associated with the demographic characteristics of the basin. For many populations within the basin, subsistence production is the mainstay of their survival, whether through pastoral livestock production in the lowlands of Ethiopia or the Sudd region of southern Sudan, or highland agriculture in countries including Rwanda, Burundi, Eritrea, and Kenya. In many cases these livelihoods are linked to particular ethnic and/or religious identities, and changes wrought externally in policy decisions over resource management can therefore have important socioeconomic as well as political consequences. In the case of Ethiopia, balancing the needs of particular ethnic regions and wider national development goals has led to the creation of a federal system based on ethnic regions.

Given the human heterogeneity of the basin, the achievement of a socially stable, politically benign environment for river basin development will always be challenging. However, there are important ways in which the development of benefits from the river’s waters can form a positive feedback loop, assisting national development processes in adding advantage to deprived regions, increasing successful national integration and economic development, and eventually broadening the elimination of poverty within the basin.

 

The Development Context

 

History

The historical development of the Nile Basin has left a legacy of cultures and societies with a rich archaeological record. This has ensured that the basin remains one of the most distinct and visually identifiable regions of the world. The global importance of the Nile valley’s archaeology has generated some of the most important international efforts at protecting archaeological sites, including the huge operation undertaken in the mid-1960s to rescue sites being inundated by Lake Nasser, following construction of the Aswan High Dam.

Beyond the archaeological significance of the river’s history, it has also played an important part in early European contact with Africa, drawing explorers and adventurers from Europe as far back as the fifteenth century, many of whose exploits paved the way for future European expansionism and, eventually, colonial control.^[9] With the exception of Ethiopia, a country never colonized, but occupied for five years by Italy, much of this European control was not relinquished until the mid-twentieth century.

The recent historical development of the Nile Basin includes three major phases over the last 150 years. The first phase from the late nineteenth century to after the Second World War was an era of almost total social and economic domination by European powers. From after the Second World War to the late 1980s there was a period of colonial “unbundling” of control and exploitation, giving way to ideologies and political systems influenced by the state ideologies developing within the cold war bipolar world. Frequently, the legacy left behind was one of competing nationalisms between newly independent states, and within the more centrally controlled states, challenges to state legitimacy by rebel groups.^[10]

The third major shift has taken place from the end of the 1980s onwards. As the cold war gave way to a new system of global political control dominated by one superpower, realignments, regime change, and new policy directions emerged during the 1990s. In particular the economic situation of many basin states shifted to more open, free-market economic systems causing major social and economic wrenches. It is within this era of substantial social, economic, and political change that the emergence of the Nile Basin Initiative has taken place and the major ideas and concepts of the Nile Basin Initiative have been framed.

 

Contemporary Politics

This era of superpower “satellite” politics in the basin witnessed key state development processes including, in the case of Egypt, heavy reliance on an “import substitution” model up until the end of the 1960s. In other states including Sudan,Tanzania, and Ethiopia, the command-led approach to economic development was supported at various points by strong trading links with the Soviet Union. Many states continued interventionist economic policies up until the late 1970s. Ethiopia remained an exception until the late 1960s, and went in the reverse economic direction to many other basin states during the 1970s, increasing its level of centralized, state-led development under Mengistu Haile Mariam. Indeed, as Egypt under Anwar Sadat approached a new era of“infitah” – or the “opening up” of the economy – Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile Mariam undertook major nationalization of capital assets, including land.

During the 1980s conflicts in key Nile states re-emerged, including civil conflict in Sudan, and in Ethiopia a new intensification in the civil war, with rebels emanating from northern parts of Ethiopia and Eritrea (a province of Ethiopia at that time) fighting to overthrow Mengistu’s government. The military support provided by different sides based on regional and international cold war allegiances – in particular the role of the Soviet Union in providing concessionary oil and huge amounts of military hardware to Ethiopia – helped to fuel and prolong the conflicts. Many of these arms remain in the area and help to fuel smaller conflicts at the local level.

Because of this reliance on external support, with the rapid collapse of the Eastern bloc in the late 1980s major political changes took place in Ethiopia, and by 1991 the government had fallen to the rebel groups.

In parallel with statist ideological development at this time, there were other strands of thinking developing more widely in the region that challenged both secular concepts of socialist and capitalist development, namely the emergence of a form of political Islam. By the late 1980s this had influenced the formation of a new government in Sudan, and for most of the 1990s has shaped both external, international relations between Sudan and key states in Western Europe and the United States, and regional-level relationships.

Under this shifting mosaic of ideological and political developments, the contemporary politics of the region have frequently been extremely violent, from local to national to international level. In recent years major wars have been fought between co-riparian states and/or their proxies, including the Ethiopian–Eritrean “Border War” in the late 1990s, the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and conflict in Southern Sudan. While the River Nile is a single physical unifying factor, its broader socioeconomic and political capacity to unify has yet to be developed.

 

Legal Issues

The legal regime on the Nile is in theory governed by rules and norms of international law on the sharing of international waters that emerged during the twentieth century, partly in response to the untenable “Harmon Doctrine.” Until the middle of the nineteenth century this doctrine had inferred absolute sovereignty of the state over its territory, and by extensions, a freedom to do what it wished with waters flowing in international rivers through that territory. Subsequently both the Helsinki Rules of 1966 and the ILC rules brought in concepts of cooperation, equitable distribution of waters, due consultation over proposed projects, and adequate compensation. By the latter part of the twentieth century the International Convention on the Non- Navigational Uses International WaterCourses (UN) brought in a substantial body of international law that included principles on sharing benefits, as well as waters. To date the Convention has not been ratified by any Nile riparian state.

Specific to the Nile Basin itself, there have been a great number of legal documents and diplomatic exchanges on the sharing and use of the Nile’s waters since the latter part of the nineteenth century. (The major instruments are tabulated in Table 2 of original publication). They illustrate clearly the ways in which competing interests on the Nile have vied to assert control, if not sovereignty, over the access to the waters of the Nile, largely through bilateral agreements – and often between very unequal negotiating entities.

One of the key challenges underlying development of the current initiative is the need to move beyond bilaterism in the achievement of future agreement on legal principle, while not starting full renegotiation of existing treaties. In many ways the process has moved beyond the need for future treaties. This “backgrounding” of legal issues in managing and allocating the Nile waters reflects an important shift in the way such issues are perceived and used by the riparian states themselves. They have moved from an earlier era of bellicose assertions of prior, historic rights and national sovereignty over water courses, to a “common vision” of development of the Nile that seeks: “to achieve sustainable socioeconomic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources.” The significance of this joint statement lies in its emphasis on equitable usage and socioeconomic development. It demonstrates a shift to a view of sharing between states based on maximizing shared benefits, rather than focusing on the water resources themselves. There is a significant reflection of the UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of Watercourses in the vision, namely the usage of the term “equitable.” For downstream states this represents acknowledgement – albeit implicit – of the need (if not the right) to upstream water resources development which at some point will impact on shares as currently allocated under the 1959 Agreement (See Table 2 ). For upstream states this also implies the redundancy of insisting on renegotiations as a starting point if, in many senses, the NBI has taken their position beyond the negotiating table and directly to the implementation of actions on the ground within a cooperative framework.

None the less, the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement remains the point of departure for Egypt and Sudan, certainly in terms of their bilateral relationship, and under it, they form in effect a “joint position,” on the NBI. It is also important to see the Agreement in the context of regional political development at the time. For both states – but in particular Egypt – it represented important new expressions of independence that were extremely politically symbolic.^[11] For Egypt, the Aswan High Dam represented a historic solution to its perceived water insecurity, namely the capture of an entire annual flood under one structure lying wholly within its territory (although the reservoir stretched far into Sudanese Nubia). The 1959 NWA for Sudan also represented a major improvement in its share of the Nile waters (See Table 2 in original publication for a comparison with the 1929 Agreement).

The NWA effectively divided all the Nile waters between the two riparian states on the basis of an assumed annual average discharge as measured at Aswan of 84 bcm. The division – 55.5 bcm to Egypt and 18.5 bcm toSudan – took into account anticipated losses to evaporation in the soon to be constructed Lake Nasser/Nubia of some 10 bcm per annum. The key legal principle within the Agreement was expressed as “present acquired rights.” Historic patterns of usage took precedence, in effect, over the future need of other upstream states.Ethiopia took exception to the Agreement and refused to recognize its legitimacy.^[12] Nevertheless, until very recently the NWA remained the basis of the position taken by the two key riparian states (See Table 2).

Ethiopia’s position was strengthened at the time by the strong connection to US foreign policy interests. With Egypt moving towards the Soviet sphere of influence, the United States took advantage of Ethiopia’s reaction to the NWA by proposing a study of the development of the upstream Nile waters in Ethiopia. By 1964 the US Bureau of Reclamation had produced the Blue Nile Waters Study, which included proposals for a series of huge dams and irrigation schemes in Ethiopia. These projects never came to fruition, yet helped to stoke Egyptian fears surrounding the actions of upstream riparians.

 

Socioeconomic Development

The hydrological and geographical variability of the Nile Basin are matched by socioeconomic differences between countries. The range of income levels and the structural differences between national economies spans Egypt – a middle-income, industrializing nation – at one end of the scale, to many upstream states that in an economic sense are a fraction of the size of Egypt and are weighed down by debt, static or declining economies, and huge externalities caused, amongst other things, by internal conflict and the impact of diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria.

The significance of agriculture in the different economies also varies widely as a proportion of GDP, which is of key significance in terms of water usage. Workers engaged in agriculture constitute 80 to 90 percent of the total workforce in the Equatorial Plateau and East African countries. This drops to between 70 and 75 percent in Congo and the Sudan and to 42 percent in Egypt. Similarly, the proportion of hydropower produced by the various states is related in many cases to the seasonality of flows, the capacity to capture the resource, and the relationship of water storage to irrigation potential. Internal food production as opposed to import dependency varies in both type (staple foods) and quantity (proportion purchased externally and/or provided in the form of food aid).

The key issue arising out of this diversity of contexts, which is of relevance to turning cooperative frameworks into long-term development processes, is that the solutions to benefit sharing have to begin with the actual needs of people. At the most basic level the ten states vary hugely in population terms, from over 60 million in each of Ethiopia and Egypt, to under 10 million in Rwanda, Burundi, and Eritrea. Half of the states have populations of over 20 million, ensuring that the development needs vary hugely in qualitative and quantitative terms.

There are also great variations in livestock populations and in area and population density, from just 26,300 km²in Burundi to Sudan, which at 2,505,800 km2, is the largest state (by area) in Africa. There are implications for the integration of remoter areas of the basin within new development processes.

At a macro level, Egypt’s economy dwarfs all the other economies (see Figure bellow). GNI per head ranges widely, from only US$100 in Ethiopia to more than fourteen times that amount –US$1,490 – in Egypt. In addition, the proportion of the amount that accrues to agriculture in Ethiopia is substantially more than in Egypt.

The concept of “benefit sharing” mentioned earlier neatly encapsulates one key issue in any basin-wide cooperative process. That is the creation of more equitable development within the basin, and the flattening of charts such as the Figure above. Clearly linked to this issue is the need to turn the Nile’s development into economic growth and stability in the nine other major basin states. Yet, within this hugely diverse social and economic environment, inhabited by economies with few major linkages between one another and with massive divergence in financial strength, economic structure, and growth trajectories, building an equitable basis for benefit sharing will be difficult. One starting point may well be a clearer focus on addressing poverty, defined in human development terms.

These disparities in poverty reduction capability in the basin, and the difference in scope and extent of poverty, ensure that benefit sharing needs to have a basic poverty focus, even to the extent that cross-subsidization of poverty reduction approaches might take place between states as part of the benefit-sharing process. Some of the development trajectories and possible poverty challenges arising under the NBIs program of work are outlined inTable 5. (See original publication).

 

Information and Data Issues

The issue of information and data use is central in assessing and responding to the development needs of basin states as well as developing effective and transparent institutions and processes of cooperation. Part of the challenge is knowing how and where to develop the basin resources in order to maximize benefits for states through more efficient as well as equitable use of the resource. Much of the data management environment to date has focused on river flows, addressing the problems of water management mentioned earlier.

Data collection on the Nile provided the thread that wove together early attempts at collaborative development. However, on its own it falls far short of providing a sound framework for development and of overcoming differences and disputes between states. This partly reflects the concern felt by some states that earlier efforts were little more than a distraction from key water allocation issues.

The history of collecting data on the Nile is thousands of years old, and testament to this is the proliferation ofNilometers along the river, the best-preserved being the Nilometer on Roda Island, Cairo. However, apart from the sharing of data between British experts under condominal and colonial control in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, it was not until the 1960s that concerted data sharing was attempted. The Hydromet project(initially driven by the rising levels of Lake Victoria caused by exceptional rainfall in the early 1960s) was established in 1967 between Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Supported by the UNDP and theWorld Meteorological Program, its objectives included collection and analysis of data for the Lakes Victoria, Kyoga, and Albert catchments and a study of the water balance of the Nile. However, regional political difficulties in the 1970s forced the project’s premature closure following the withdrawal of Kenya and Tanzania. It ended officially in 1992.

More recently, significant data acquisition models have been developed by, amongst others, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)under the auspices of projects including “Operation Water Resources Management and Information Systems for the Nile Basin Countries,” and “Information Systems for Water Resources Planning and Monitoring in the Lake Victoria region.” These projects have included significant capacity building elements in Upper Nile countries, related closely to monitoring improved sustainable water resources development.

In the early 1990s, Tecconile came into being, supported by CIDA, and included elements concerned with strengthening data processing and GIS/Image Analysis Systems and the implementation of basin-wide networking on data sharing. Tecconile covered nine basin states, with Ethiopia and Kenya acting as observers. Its longerterm objective was to help develop and conserve the Nile waters in an integrated and sustainable manner and to determine the “equitable entitlement” of each riparian state to use of the Nile waters. In the short term the idea was to develop national master plans and to integrate these plans into a wider Nile Basin plan. The original institutional model included the establishment of a Council of Ministers (meeting once a year) and a Technical Committee. While in its own terms the project did not develop to completion, it provided the seed for more concerted efforts at achieving substantial socioeconomic and political cooperation on the Nile. This is examined in the next section.

 

The Development Challenge

 

Building a Cooperative Framework (the 1990s)

As preceding sections have shown, cooperative development of the Nile has, in practice, been undertaken for many decades. However, the level of cooperation has not been anywhere near effective or comprehensive enough to address the growing demand for water both upstream and downstream in the basin.

Earlier sections have illustrated how external political conditions to enable cooperation were not in place until fifteen years ago. Their eventual emergence has subsequently enabled the rapid development of an institutional structure and decisionmaking process that has radically transformed the development environment in the Nile Basin since the early 1990s.

A number of international meetings took place regarding the Nile (including one hosted in London and another in Cairo during the early part of the 1990s) in response to both the opening up of political space within the basin and a growing awareness that future development options would require more strategic and multi-sectoral thinking. This changing landscape culminated in the meeting of Nile Water Ministers in December 1992 at which the Tecconile project was established for a transitional period. The Tecconile initiative resulted in a basin-wide “action plan” – the Nile River basin Action Plan (NRBAP), supported by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). In tandem a series of Nile conferences – Nile 2002 series – started in 1993 bringing together “technical experts” from all Nile Basin countries. Subsequent meetings were held in Khartoum (1994) and other states of the Nile Basin including Ethiopia in 1997. Originally launched “to provide an informal mechanism for riparian dialogue and the exchange of views between countries, as well as with the international community” (NBI, 2001), the meetings also enabled informal contact between officials of riparian states and with external “facilitating” organizations.

Approved by the NileCOM in Arusha in February 1995, the NRBAP included sections on:

• integrated water resources planning and management
• capacity building
• training
• regional cooperation
• environmental protection and enhancement (mainly concentrating on the White Nile).

It became, in effect, the template for the much larger Nile Basin Initiative later in the decade.

Although initially Egypt was the main instigator of Nile technical dialogs, and Ethiopia remained an observer to such dialogs (skeptical of what it saw as slow processes with little effective dialog on key issues), by the early 1990s Ethiopia itself had begun to demand a more comprehensive basin-wide organization “agreed upon by all co-basin states.” Ethiopia submitted a “framework of cooperation” between the Nile River co-basin states for the Undugu meeting held in Addis Ababa in May 1992.^[13] The country remained dubious as to the strength and importance of some of the earlier efforts, but reaffirmed its commitment to a major new undertaking at the Second Nile 2002 meeting in Khartoum held in 1994:

“There have been various efforts to bring about cooperation among the Nile co-basin countries, most of which have been initiated under the auspices of the UN agencies. Yet, these initiatives have not been success stories because of their narrow scope and failure to address the real issues involved within the Nile Basin. Some of the major cooperative efforts that have been initiated within the Nile Basin include: the Hydromet Project, the Bangkok Ministerial Meeting, the ECA/UNDP initiative, the Undugu Group, two FAO initiatives on basin-wide water resources information system, the UNEP initiative on Environmental Action Plan, and the Tecconile as a follow up to the Hydromet project”.^[14]

In public there was continued jockeying for position between key riparian states in the mid-1990s. It was an important time of “position definition,” including, at a bilateral level, between Ethiopia and Sudan. The former was pressing its case for a more comprehensive understanding of “equitable utilization” whilst the latter (as well as Egypt) argued that Ethiopia did not share the same dependence on the Nile and had other major water sources that could be exploited. A Sudanese official’s reply to Ethiopia’s concern that equitable utilization be examined more comprehensively made the point that:

“In our opinion the water national master plan should comprise the waters [of the Nile] and other water resources because the relevant factors to be considered for the equitable entitlement include the knowledge of available water resources other than the shared basin.”^[15]

Nevertheless, the shift in thinking by Ethiopia was picked up quickly by Egypt, and in 1994 the then Egyptian Minister of Public Works and Water Resources reflected the major shift in Egyptian thinking on the Nile, stating that:

“Egypt supports without reservations the development process in Ethiopia for the benefit of the Ethiopian people, especially in the Nile Basin Region, within the context of constructive consultations and a real start for confidence building, clearness, and transparency. The outcome result will, I am sure, be a win game.”^[16]

 

Institutionalizing Cooperation (the NBI)

In spite of the glasnost in relations between formerly belligerent co-riparians, moving from relations characterized by political conflict to new forms of cooperation required significant institutional development. It was not sufficient that the countries were now in a position to develop institutional cooperation; they required external assistance in order to facilitate this process. In 1997, the Nile Ministers requested that the World Bank establish a fundraising group for cooperative projects on the Nile. The Nile Basin Initiative that developed out of this request represented a re-emergence of the earlier NRBAP. It now forms the most important basin-level approach to cooperative development of the Nile waters ever undertaken, and its significance extends well beyond the basin itself.

The Nile Basin Initiative describes itself as a “transitional arrangement until a permanent legal and institutional framework is in place” (NBI, 2000) and comprises a Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin (Nile-COM), a Technical Advisory Committee (Nile-TAC) and a Secretariat (Nile-SEC), the latter located in Entebbe.^[17]

Focusing on a process-oriented approach, the NBI firstly sought to establish a common point of departure for allstakeholders, namely the NBI “Vision.” This aimed at framing the tasks to be institutionalized within subsidiary action programs (SAP) at a sub-basin level. These SAPs aimed to “identify and implement investment projects that confer mutual benefits at the sub-basin level and that the riparians agree to pursue cooperative [activities]” (NBI, 2000).

The “visioning process” took six months to complete, and the wording of it required major revision, discussion, and fine-tuning. Nevertheless, the importance of establishing the “vision” lay as much in the process undertaken as in the end result, and by bringing together all the co-riparians (except for Eritrea which, at the time, remained an observer) raised important discussion on key legal and development issues.

The success to date of the NBI lies in one of its institutional innovations, namely the application of the principle of subsidiarity, or management of the basin at the lowest appropriate level.^[18] This has led to institutional division into an “eastern Nile” comprising Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt (and Eritrea too, were it to formalize its participation), and the Nile “equatorial lakes” countries (comprising Kenya, Uganda,Tanzania, the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundias well as Egypt and Sudan). The inclusion of the latter two represents recognition of the importance of the White Nile to both countries. The basic rationale is that in reducing decision-making complexity the process of cooperation can be facilitated.

Under this principle, the NBI established two Subsidiary Action Plans (See Appendices in original publication), much of which emerged out of the earlier NRBAP project. The Eastern Nile program and the Nile Equatorial Lakes program aimed to express the vision in terms of actions on the ground, bringing high level political engagement and agreement to socioeconomic development within the states themselves.^[19] In tandem with these action programs, a shared vision program would help to continue to support the process of cooperation, included within which were a number of cross cutting projects:

• Nile Basin Transboundary Action
• Regional Power Trade
• Efficient Use for Agricultural Production
• Water Resources Planning and Management
• Applied Training
• Confidence-Building and Stakeholder Involvement
• Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing (see appendices).

This program was envisaged to “create an enabling environment for cooperative management and development … through a limited but effective set of basin-wide activities and projects” (NBI, 2001).

Since 2001 the major preoccupation of the process has been the establishment of sound funding for this portfolio of projects and programs. To this end, the International Consortium on the Cooperative Development of the Nile (ICCON) was created and held its first meeting in Geneva (ICCON 1) in June 2001, at which it received pledges from donors of US$120 million over a six to eight-year time frame. ICCON’s long-term aim as a partnership of riparian states and the international community is to promote joint funding, transparency, and more broadly to raise support for the NBI. One of the key process issues is the establishment of a multidonor Nile Basin Trust Fund to provide “streamlined, cost-effective funding … which would consolidate donor support and ensure the clarity and cohesiveness of the program” (NBI, 2000). Following Parliamentary approval of the NBI’s new international organization status under Ugandan law in September 2002, it was envisaged that the NTF would shortly come under the management of the Nile Basin Secretariat.

In total, the cost of financing the NBI is estimated to be in the order of US$140 million for the Shared Vision Program project implementation, US$30 million for the Subsidiary Action Program project preparation and general NBI facilitation, and program management – crucially, including riparian dialogue as well as program oversight – some US$10 million.

The NBI in 2003 – appropriately the International Year of Freshwater – is now at the stage of moving from the development of cooperation and the institutionalization of this process to the achievement of development through joint multilateral and bilateral projects. This is a crucial test for the whole initiative and the principles on which it is built. The credibility of the external facilitation process is also at stake. Proof of success will not, in the long term, reside in cooperative frameworks or even the absence of major international conflict; rather it will lie in the capacity of processes and institutions to translate cooperation into development, and development that achieves poverty reduction from the local level upwards. One of the major challenges to ensuring the sustainability of the NBI is in creating a process of institutional support at all levels, including civil society at regional, national, and local levels. The importance of this challenge has been emphasized within the Nile Basin Discourse Project(undertaken since 2001) that attempts to facilitate dialogue about the NBI and to establish learning processes for institutions involved in Nile Basin-related activities be they environmental,socioeconomic, or cultural. In 2003 a formal Nile Basin Discourse Desk was established in Entebbe.

 

Lessons and Cautions

 

Cooperation is Not Necessarily Development

Some of the early external facilitation of Nile Basin cooperation by the World Bank focused on issues including the need to “level the playing field” through building national capacity and identifying national priorities, as well as correcting what it saw as “information asymmetry.” A second focus was to move from dialog to actions, within which there was a need to develop dialog on different tracks (for instance, information, capacity, technology) as well as to “start with the achievable and avoid getting bogged down in formulae.” This also sought to recognize that “progress on complex water systems may be slow, but dialog needs to be sustained and trust needs to be established.” Finally there was the aim to “seek opportunities for mutually beneficial programs or projects.” This latter concept of the “win–win” has come to dominate much of the thinking on the NBI, particularly in terms of win–wins in benefit sharing (Hirji and Grey, 1997°

The premise of much of the NBI cooperative framework is that win–wins are achievable, and demonstrably so,through integrated project development. This involves the creation of cooperative frameworks that enable links between cooperation and development to be made, not just in terms of joint funding, management, and the development of projects – the easy part of cooperation – but in terms of joint benefit sharing from such projects. This is a complicated achievement to monitor, and yet in the end the establishment of “equity” as the basis for an operational framework within the Nile Basin demands success in delivering tangible and shared development benefits at all levels, and not simply cooperative frameworks and joint management of institutions.

The tables in the appendices that detail the NBI’s major programs illustrate the nature and level of the national and basin-wide institutional and process complexity within the basin. (See original publication) . At a national level the process will become particularly convoluted, with at least seven or eight NBI-related (or discourse-related) institutional structures at least nominally being established in each state. This will add increased pressure – but admittedly bring in more resources – to existing national-level institutions, from water ministries and departments, to environmental, agricultural, and finance ministries and departments. As far as possible this needs to be mainstreamed within existing processes in order to avoid the problem of duplication, overloading of processes and institutions, and perhaps increased rent-seeking behavior. Such questions are really at the heart of the challenge of shifting from the cooperative to the developmental framework. Avoiding conflict is not that difficult because, arguably, conflict over water was never really a major issue. However, taking the positive step to build development processes into greater cooperation similarly challenges the basin states, because formerly there has not been a great level of regional integration in social, political, and institutional development. To that extent the NBI can help to establish a basis for wider socio-political objectives as well.

 

Development is Not (Necessarily) Poverty Reduction

In this shift from cooperation to development, there needs to be more than just commitment to national development. Qualitatively speaking, it has to address the question of economic and social equity and the inter- and intra-national levels. Even developments generated within the basin – perhaps trade in power or better environmental management – do not necessarily enable poverty reduction. And yet this has to become the major focus of all efforts at taking the initiative forwards. Therefore, in the coming years cooperation needs to be grounded in wider development concepts. As an example, whilst one of the key ENSAP projects on Watershed Management is addressing an issue of major concern to highland farming in Ethiopia, its success will in large part depend on its capacity to integrate learning generated elsewhere within the project, including earlier examples of watershed management undertaken in other regions of Ethiopia. It may be easier to reach cooperation on development options between states than it is to get local-level agreement within states. As a general rule this is likely to apply to a whole range of major infrastructure projects on the river identified under the NBI.

Success of the NBI will, in large part, rest on being able to meet this challenge. NBI development projects need to be mainstreamed within regional, national, and local development processes, and not simply exist in parallel, labeled as “water resource-“ or “river basin-“ focused. This urgent challenge has yet to become effectively internalized within the process.

The Nile Basin is at a key juncture in its history. There is a major need to maintain the integrity of the river system itself in the face of rapidly rising demand, while at the same time demonstrate how the river can be utilized more productively and equitably. If the NBI is to work it also needs to be able to demonstrate early success. This will also help in the spill-over effect on a range of development issues, including increasing the social and economic stability that is essential to helping to achieve political stability in conflict-prone regions.

As an end in itself the NBI does not go far enough: cooperative processes need to be geared to specific goals of development, and poverty reduction related to wider socioeconomic development. But it has traveled a long way to date. A reassessment of direction and impact may soon be required, in order to steer the process from successful cooperation to successful development.

Nile River Water War Inevitable

Water war

Egypt’s precious Nile water is wanted by outsiders, Reem Leila reports

---

An international water expert is claiming there are intensified efforts by an unnamed neighbouring country to funnel off the waters of the River Nile after approaching scarcity in its water resources. Such an assertion, says Ahmed Diab, a global expert on water, is likened to attempts by the US to revive the idea of transferring the storage of water from its current location in Lake Nasser to any of Africa’s Great Lakes in the central African continent, where the water will then pool into a giant reservoir to be sold to whichever country wants it. The use of pipelines in transporting the water would be similar to that of the movement ofpetroleum.

The availability of fresh water is a serious concern in many parts of the world. Due to the shortage of available fresh water, nearly 40 per cent of the world’s population, mainly in the developing countries, is already facing serious water shortages. And more and more nations are gradually joining the list. “Accordingly, nations might be on the verge of a water war by the end of this century,” Diab said. This is in addition to the encouragement of the long-serving scheme of trying to divert the course of the River Nile in Ethiopia. Diab maintained that the US Bureau of Land Reclamation was currently working on the scheme.

According to an official source at the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) who spoke to Al-Ahram Weekly on condition of anonymity, these plans were close to being implemented but that was before the High Dam was built. The plan was for the Nile waters to be stored in Tana Lake in Ethiopia but now, according to the source, because of the High Dam there are merits to water storage. After the building of the High Dam, Egypt has been receiving continuous, observable and constant amounts of water. “According to these three elements Egypt has a historical right to save the water of the Nile in Lake Nasser and none of the continent’s countries or any other country has the authority to violate this right. Accordingly nothing will change and Egypt’s Lake Nasser is and will be the continent’s storage area,” the source confirmed.

Diab believes that water resources in Egypt are becoming scarce. Surface-water resources originating from the Nile are now fully exploited, while groundwater sources are being brought into full production. Egypt is facing increasing water needs demanded by a rapidly growing population, by increased urbanisation, by higher standards of living and by an agricultural policy which emphasises expanded production in order to feed the growing population. The population is currently increasing by more than 1.5 million people a year. “With a population of 80 million, Egypt is in dire need of revising its water resource plans in order not to suffer any water shortage in the future,” Diab said. According to Diab, by the end of 2008 Egypt will be consuming 11 billion cubic metres of water a year which means nearly 815 cubic metres per person annually. In contrast, individuals in other surrounding countries use up only 300 cubic metres. “Egypt’s actual requirements should be only three billion cubic metres per year. The remaining amount is being wasted and shed either in the Mediterranean or in small water canals,” Diab added. This requires good management of water and coordination with the countries of the River Nile Basin as well as the establishment of joint water projects, “such as clearing waterways of grass in return for increasing Egypt’s annual share of water and increasing it from 55.5 billion cubic metres to 85 billion metres per year,” Diab suggested.

The Egyptian government has long recognised upstream development of the Nile waters as a potential national security threat and has stated its readiness to go to war to preserve its access to fresh water. As the Basin’s governments come to understand the dynamics of the population-water relationship, however, advance planning and diplomacy may win out over saber rattling and armed conflict. Recently, representatives of the 10 nations of the Nile watershed met to review past agreements and consider possible future ones related to their use of this shared natural resource.

The main objective of water planning in Egypt has been to harness the highly fluctuating Nile flows, making them available for domestic and productive purposes. The means of fulfilling this objective have been to establish over-season storage, over-year storage, and flood control. These goals were basically achieved in the 1960s following the inauguration of the Aswan High Dam.

According to a water report issued by MWRI the growing interest in the region’s water issues is encouraging, but the challenge of reconciling competing claims on the Nile will continue to be complicated by political and economic concerns. The scope for water conservation and international cooperation is large, but the competition is unlikely to find permanent resolution until the region’s population approaches stabilisation. the report stated that Lake Nasser can hold up to 162 billion cubic metres of water while the Toshka depression can absorb a further 90 to 120 billion cubic metres. At the peak of the flood season, Lake Nasser was receiving up to 750 million cubic metres of water a day. The total volume of water behind the dam currently stands at 153.91 billion cubic metres. “Increasing Egypt’s share of the Nile water and reducing the watershed are on top of Egypt’s agenda, to be discussed in the summit of African ministers of water resources within the next few weeks,” the report stated

The world’s population is currently increasing nearly 80 million people per year, resulting in an increasing demand for fresh water of about 64 billion cubic metres a year. With this phenomenal population growth, there is, in addition to the water requirements for domestic use, an increasing demand for energy generation, agricultural intensification and industrial production. As a result of the growth in the human population, the per capita water supply on the Earth was reduced to an average of 8,500 cubic metres in the early 90s, which is equivalent to 8,500,000 litres per year. According to hydrologists, if the annual per capita fresh water availability of a country goes below 500 cubic metres (500,000 litres), the country enters the category of “absolute water scarcity”.

Dated Case Study on the Nile River Water Conflict

 Case Background

1. Abstract

The Nile river is the main source of water for the nine nations which make up the Nile basin. As is, the water provided by the river is barely enough to satisfy the enormous water demands of the region. By the year 2000, it is expected that at least six of the nine nations which share the Nile’s water will experience acute water stress (Ohlsson, 50). Access to the Nile’s waters has already been defined as a vital national priority by countries such as Egypt and Sudan. It is an issue over which the two nation’s have professed themselves willing to got to war over. Current tensions between Egypt and Sudan, its neighbor to the south, are merely a continuation of a two thousand year-old struggle over who will control the regions scarce water resources. As more of the nations in the Nile valley develop their economies, the need for water in the region will increase. And while the demand for resources increases, the supply is likely to remain unchanged, drastically increasing the chances for armed conflict over the waters of the Nile river. In addition, development projects that are aimed at increasing the flow of the Nile remain endangered by tension and instability in the region, as well as by environmental and financial concerns.

2. Description

The Nile probably gets its name form “nahal” which means “river valley” in Semitic, later “neilos” in Greek and “nilus” in Latin. It is the world’s longest river, stretching 4,187 miles from its source in the mountains of Burundi. The source of the river is so far from the Mediterranean that it took man until the middle of the 20th century to find it (Adv, 1). For centuries, the most accurate source of knowledge on the location of this source were the writings of Herodotus (Greek Historian, 460 BC), who wrote that the Nile’s source was a deep spring between two tall mountains. When Nero ordered his centurions to follow the flow of the river in order to find its source, they got no further than the impenetrable valley of the Sudd. John Henning Speke thought that he had finally found the source when he reached Lake Victoria in 1862, only to be later proven wrong and forgotten by history. In 1937, the source was finally stumbled upon by the little known German explorer Bruckhart Waldekker (Collins, 4-8). 

The Nile is formed by three tributaries, the Blue Nile, the White Nile, and the Atbara. The White Nile rises from its source in Burundi, passes through Lake Victoria, and flows into southern Sudan. There, near the capital city of Khartoum, the White Nile meets up with the Blue Nile which has its source in the Ethiopian highlands, near Lake Tana. Over 53% of the Nile’s waters come from the Blue Nile. The two flow together to just north of Khartoum, where they are joined by the waters of the Atbara, whose source is also located in the Ethiopian highlands (Ody, 1).

The river then flows north through Lake Nasser, the second largest man-made lake in the world, and the Aswan Dam before splitting into two major distributaries just north of Cairo. The two distributaries are the Rosetta branch to the west and the Darneita to the east. In ancient times, the number of distributaries was much greater, but slow water flow, human interference, and the accumulation of silt had led to the disappearance of all the other major distributaries. This has effectively led to the desertification of large stretches of Egyptian land.(Ody, 1)

The Conflict

In ancient Egypt, the Nile, and its delta, were worshiped as a god. The god Hapi, who came in the shape of a frog, represented the Nile delta. Several times throughout history, Egyptians have tried to unify the Nile valley under their rule by conquering the Sudan. The lands to the south of them that bordered the river were in constant danger. The Sudan was invaded during the reign of Queen Sheba, during the Roman rule of Nero, and countless other times. This is because the Egyptians have always feared that one day the Nile’s waters would no longer reach their country. People believed, that since the flow of the Nile was so unpredictable, something had to have been affecting it. A legend says that during one particularly bad famine in Egypt, the Egyptian Sultan sent his ambassadors to the king of Ethiopia in order to plead with him not the obstruct the waters. A Scottish traveler in the 18th century recounted a story that the King of Ethiopia had sent a letter to the pasha in 1704 threatening to cut off the water. Given this fear it is quite natural that the Nile countries desire to secure their water supplies.(Collins, 3-4)

The modern history of the Nile conflict began with the 20th century. The English were quick to realize the importance the river would have for their colonies. Over the centuries, in the swamps of the Sudd, strong winds and the force of the river had created natural dams made up of plants and soil, similar to those made by beavers. These dams had made all navigation up the Nile past a certain point completely impossible. Soon after Sudan was reconquered in 1898, the English began to free the Nile of the vegetation which was obstructing the passage of ships. By the time enough blockages had been removed to clear a path through the Sudd in 1904, the English had already begun drawing up massive alternative drainage plans in order to ameliorate the flow of the Nile. However, the British did not control the Ethiopian portions of the Nile, from which over 80% of the Nile’s waters come. Therefore, they had to sign an agreement with the Ethiopians in 1902 in order to assure themselves that the Nile would not be interfered with. They also had to assert a significant amount of pressure on the Italians and the French so that they would not interfere with the french dominance of the Nile basin (Collins, 67-100). This approach worked well with the Italians, but a little less well with the French. The Egyptians caused the most problems for the English as planned developments on the Nile became a disputed matter between the two governments. In 1929, Great Britain sponsored the Nile Water Agreement, which regulated the flow of the Nile and apportioned it use (Glassman, 150).

After World War II, the British government commissioned a complete hydrological study to be made of the Nile Basin as a whole. Unfortunately, the study was not able to include the Ethiopian portions of the Nile due to political problems. The rest of the Nile valley was included. The study was finally released in 1958 as the Report on the Nile Valley Plan. It was the culmination of 50 years of study. The report suggested various ways to increase the amount of water which reached Egypt. The most important of these suggestions was the construction of the Jonglei canal, which would divert the flow of the Nile in southern Sudan (in the Sudd) to avoid the enormous evaporation losses which occur there. The report, however, treated the entire Nile Basin as a single unity, which was unacceptable to the newly independent African states, especially since it was published just two years after the Suez Canal incident (Ohlsson, 31-34)

Furthermore, the Egyptians had already planned a major construction which would significantly improve the flow of the Nile in their territories. They had decided to build the High Aswan Dam in order to control the yearly floods of the Nile and in order to harvest the hydroelectric power of the river. However, this project was to have major repercussions on the lands of northern Sudan. Building this dam would mean that whole sections of northern Sudan would be inundated by what was to be Lake Nasser. There were also severe environmental concerns as to how the dam would change life on the banks of the Nile. To deal with this problem, the two nation signed an agreement on the “full utilization of the Nile waters” in 1959. This agreement stipulated that Sudan’s yearly water allotment would rise from the 4 billion cubic meters stipulated in the 1929 agreement to 18.5 billion cubic meters. The Sudan would also be allowed to undertake a series of Nile development projects, such as the Rosieres Dam and the Jonglei Canal. In exchange, Egypt would be allowed to build a huge dam near the Sudanese border which would regulate the flow of the river into Egypt and provide water during droughts. The result of this dam, however, would be the inundation of over 6,500 square kilometers of land. The treaty also formed a joint committee which would be in charge of supervising and directing all development projects which affected the flow of the river (Ohlosson, 35-40).

This agreement was only bilateral and did no include any of the other riparian countries of the Nile despite the fact that it portioned out all of the Nile’s water. Ethiopia, from which 80% of the water comes from was not even consulted and no water was even allotted for future usage by any upstream country except Sudan. All of the Nile’s average water flow is divided between the two most downstream countries. Nevertheless, this 1959 agreement is still the most comprehensive agreement ever signed on the use of the Nile’s waters.

Apparently, the residents of northern Sudan and southern Egypt were not consulted on the treaty either. In the 1960′s, over 100,000 Nubians lost their homes due to development projects stemming from that treaty.(Pearce, 29) Some of these same people had to be moved again in the 1990′s in order to build another dam, this time near the border with Ethiopia. The government of Sudan says that these people will be compensated, but the overwhelming feeling amongst the villagers is that they will not be. One villager claimed “We were not informed when the government decided… to build a dam in our area. They just sent tractors with a large number of strangers. These strangers were surveyors.” (Nhail, 1-3). 

Construction of the High Dam at Aswan began in 1959 — as soon the agreement with Sudan was signed. When it was finally finished in 1970, the dam was more than 17 times the volume of the Great Pyramid at El Giza. It now stretches 4 kilometres across the river’s path, rises over 100 meters for its base, and is almost a kilometer thick. Behind it, the waters have formed Lake Nasser, which is 600 kilometers long and 50 kilometers wide in some places. This reservoir is the second largest man-made lake in the world. The Aswan Dam is arguably one of the great architectural accomplishments of the 20th century. To build it, Egypt had to obtain outside funding, because it was to cost over one billion dollars to build. Rebuffed by the United States and the World Bank, Nasser had to turn to the Soviet Union, which was only too glad to help (Pearce, 28-29)

In the 1970′s Sudan and Egypt began the joint construction of the Jonglei Canal, which would have increased the flow of the Nile waters by diverting the Nile away from an area where a great deal of water is lost to evaporation. Unfortunately, construction was stopped in 1983 one hundred kilometers short of completion due to “rebel action”. The civil war in the Sudan has taken its toll on the development project, which was funded in large part by the World Bank. The failure of this project was a great failure for both the Sudanese government and the World Bank. Over 100 million dollars were spent on the Jonglei Canal project (Pearce, 31).

The most complete agreement on the use of the Nile waters remains the 1959 agreement between Sudan and Egypt. This agreement, however, did not put an end to the conflict over the rights to the Nile waters. A strong tension still exists between the Nile basin countries whenever a new Nile development project is proposed. The water needs of all of these countries are barely being met now and will probably not be met in the future, especially in view of the development plans in Ethiopia and Sudan. In addition, Egypt, as the country most in danger of losing access to the Nile waters by development projects in other countries, remains willing and able to intervene militarily in order to keep the status quo.

In August 1994, it was reported that Egypt had planned and subsequently canceled an air raid on Khartoum, in Sudan, where a dam is being built. This is in addition to the tensions between Sudan and Egypt over the attempted assassination of President Muhbarach in the summer of 1995. Border clashes became common between the two neighbors and conflict seemed probable. The tensions have now seemed to subside, but there is no telling when and if they will resume.(El-Kohdary, 1-3)

Egypt has also acted against Ethiopian development on the Nile in the past. In the early 1990′s, it is believed that Egypt blocked an African Development Bank loan to Ethiopia for a project which might have reduced the flow of the Nile’s water into Egypt. This behavior is not unwarranted given predictions by USAID that Egypt will experience a 16 to 30 percent water deficit by the end of the century. This will probably be further increase by further Egyptian development projects planned for the Nile. (El-Kohdary, 1-3)

In 1997, Egypt is to begin the construction of a new valley of the Nile, but creating a new, self-sustaining, river which would flow through the Western Desert. To do this they would cut a canal, called the New Valley Canal, which would connect a series of oases to one another. This would allow Egypt to settle a large number of people far from the Nile; something which has proven impossible up until now. Over 62 million people live on just 4% Egypt’s land. This project would allow Egyptians to take advantage of the good soil quality which is prevalent throughout the country. However, the estimated cost of the project is 2 billion dollars, which Egypt does not have. However, the real problem remains that of where Egypt will find the water to fill the canal and to keep it flowing as it already its full allotment of the Nile’s water (Daniszewski, A1, A16)

3. Duration: In Progress (1904 to now)

4. Location

Continent: Mideast

Region: Mideast Africa

Country: Egypt

5. Actors: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Burundi, Zaire, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya

The main actors, for the moment, are Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia. However, as populations continue to grow and water needs increase in the region, all of the countries in the Nile Basin will be affected.

II. Environment Aspects

6. Type of Environmental Problem: WATER

In Northeastern Africa, water is a scarce commodity. Yet it is also a vital one, as it is needed for irrigated agriculture, industrial expansion, and human consumption, In the Nile basin, the river remains the only reliable source for renewable water supplies. Underground water supplies, or aquifers, an only ba harvested once and will eventually run out. This place the Nile basin countries in a position of reliance on the waters of the Nile. (Postel, 1-23) 

The waters, however, do not flow in sufficient quantities to satisfy the future water requirements of all these nations. The nations are barely satisfied by what they now receive and it is foreseen that their needs will increase as populations rise, industrial growth takes place, and more land is irrigated with Nile water for agricultural use in nations besides Egypt. Egypt’s cropland is already 100% irrigated, fostering an amazing reliance on the flow of the Nile. It is estimated that Ethiopia and Sudan could achieve high levels of food production if they chose to irrigate as much land as possible.

Water stress is present when nations find themselves with less than 2000 cubic meters per person of renewable water supplies. By the end of the century at least five nations in the Nile basin expect themselves to be suffering from water stress. This figure does not include the water that would be needed to feed the citizens of the Nile countries. It is unlikely that the flow of water in the Nile could be increased without the completion of the Jonglei Canal, which, given Sudan’s internal problems, seems highly unlikely in the near future. (Ohlosson, 178-194)

In addition, the environmental situation is further complicated by the problems surrounding the Aswan Dam. Even though the environmental damage to Egypt’s environment caused by the Dam has been much less than originally predicted, it is still quite significant. One major problem is that the silt from the river which for millennia fertilized Egypt’s cropland is no longer being allowed to flow down the river. This means that more chemical fertilizers are being used. It is also causing erosion along the banks of the Nile, which were previously replenished by the silt carried down the river. Much of the Nile delta is now being swept into the Mediterranean. In fact, if barriers near the Nile’s outlet continue to erode, much of low lying Egypt could find itself in the sea, as the sea slowly advances. The Nile is also bringing more salt to the fields of Egypt because of the increased evaporation which takes place in Lake Nasser. (Pearce, 32)

This evaporation also presents a severe problem. Over 2 metres of water evaporate from the surface of Lake Nasser every year. this is because or its location in the middle of the desert. For this reason many opposed the construction of a dam in that location. A similar dam in the highlands of Sudan or Ethiopia would lose much less water. However, if the dam were located elsewhere, Egypt would lose out on the hydroelectric power the dam provides (roughly one third of Egypt’s electricity) (Pearce, 31-32).

7. Type of Habitat: DRY

8. Act and Harm Sites:

Act Site       Harm Site           Example

Egypt          Sudan               Plans for diversion of the Nile

III. Conflict Aspects

9. Type of Conflict: INTERSTATE

Although war has not yet broken out between the nations involved, some believe growing demands may eventually lead to armed conflict. Signs of this trend are already surfacing. There have been numerous skirmishes between Sudanese and Egyptian troops as well as a number of statements made. The nations of the Nile basin have also classified access to the waters of the Nile river as a vital national interest over which they would be willing to go to war.

For now, there has been enough water to satisfy most of the nations’ needs, but in the near future those resources which have been left top them will cease to suffice.

10. Level of Conflict: THREAT

11. Fatality Level of Dispute: >10

III. Environment and Conflict Overlap

12. Environment-Conflict Link and Dynamics: DIRECT

The dynamics are the result of feedback between water resources and development needs, especially water. The internationalization of the issue adds another element.

Causal Diagram

              /--------------------(+)----------------\

              |                     +                 |

           ___V_              _____________          _|__________ 

         /     \ ---(-)->   /             \ -(+)-> /            \ 

        [ Dev't ]     -    [  Water Supply ]  -   [ Agriculture  ] 

         \_____/   <-(+)----\_____________/ <-(-)- \____________/ 

             \                 /\       |               /\        

              \----------------|---(+)--|---------------/

                               |        |

                              (-)   -  (-)

                               |        |

                               |        V

                             ______________

                            /              \

                           [  Int'l Tension ]

                            \______________/

13. Level of Strategic Interest: REGION

14. Outcome of Dispute: YIELD

IV. Related Information and Sources

15. Related ICE and TED Cases

TED Cases
EGYPT Case
ATATURK Case
DANUBE Case
MARSH Case
DEADSEA Case

ICE Cases
BLUENILE Case
LITANI Case
CAUVERY Case
JORDAN River Case

16. Relevant Websites and Literature

1. Ohlosson, Lief. Hydropolitics: Conflict Over Water as a Developmental Constraint. Zed Books; New Jersey, 1995
2. Bol Nhail. “Sudan-Environment: Eviction Threat Over New Dam”, Interpress Service, Feb. 28, 1995 as quoted by
3. El-Kodary, Nabil.”Sudan-Environment: Eviction Threat Over New Dam: Response” March 3, 1995 as quoted byhttp://Sun.nlib.ee/other/infoterra/1995/03/meg00036.html
4. Glassman, Johnathon, “Nile Waters” Journal of African History. Vol 33, iss 1, pg. 149-150
5. Postel, Sandra Last Oasis: facing water scarcity. WW Norton and Co., NY, 1992
6. Collins, Robert O. The Waters of the Nile. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1990
7. Abu-Zeid and Saad “High Dam, 25 Years On” UNESCO Courrier. May 1993, p.37
8. Daniszewski, John. ” Egypt Plans a New Valley to Rival the Nile” L.A. Times, Nov. 18, 1996, A1
9. Pearce, Fred. “High and Dry in Aswan.” New Scientist. May 7, 1994, pg 28-32

10. Relevent Web Sites

Odyssey Down the Nile
Egypt Page 

---

Go to All ICE Cases

Go to ICE Page Cases

Uma comparação entre a doutrina Cristã e a doutrina Mórmon

“Pegue a Bíblia. Compare-a com a religião da Igreja dos Santos dos Últimos Dias e veja se ela passará no teste.” (Brigham Young, 18 de maio de 1873, Journal of Discourses, vol. 16, p. 46)

A seguir, veremos uma comparação entre a doutrina Cristã e a doutrina Mórmon. Esta comparação deixará muito claro que o Mormonismo não está em concordância com a Bíblia. Na verdade, o Mormonismo simplesmente usou as mesmas palavras usadas pelo Cristianismo e deu a elas um novo significado. Mas tendo um entendimento adequado do que o Mormonismo ensina realmente, você poderá ver além destes significados e será capaz de enxergar as verdadeiras diferenças entre o Cristianismo e o Mormonismo.

A diferença é a diferença entre vida eterna e condenação.

Tópico	Cristão	Mórmon
DEUS	Há somente um Deus (Isaías 43.11; 44.6, 8; 45.5).	“E eles (os deuses) disseram: ‘Que haja luz: e foi feita luz…’” (Livro de Abraão 4:3)
	Deus sempre foi Deus. (Salmo 90.2; Isaías 57.15).	“Deus já foi como nós somos agora, é um homem exaltado, e está entronizado acima dos céus!!! (…) Imaginávamos que Deus era Deus desde a eternidade. Mas vou refutar essa ideia e retirar o véu para que você possa ver,” (Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, p. 345).
	Deus é um espírito sem carne e ossos. (João 4.24; Lucas 24.39)	“O Pai tem um corpo de carne e ossos tão tangível como o do homem…” (Doutrinas e Convênios 130:22; compare com Alma 18:26-27; 22:9-10) “Assim sabemos que ambos, o Pai e o Filho, são homens perfeitos em forma e estatura; cada um deles possui um corpo tangível… de carne e ossos.” (James Talmage, Articles of Faith, p. 38)”
TRINDADE	Trindade  é a doutrina de que existe somente um Deus em todo o universo e que Ele existe, simultaneamente, em três pessoas eternas. O Pai, o Filho e o Espírito Santo.	A Trindade são três deuses distintos: O Pai, o Filho e o Espírito Santo. “O fato de que esses são três indivíduos diferentes, fisicamente distintos um do outro, é demonstrado pela aceitação dos registros das intervenções divinas com o homem.” (James Talmage,Articles of Faith, p. 35)
JESUS	Jesus nasceu da virgem Maria. (Isaías 7.14; Mateus 1.23)	“O nascimento do Salvador foi tão natural como o de nossos filhos; foi o resultado de uma ação natural. Ele compartilhou carne e sangue – foi gerado por seu Pai, assim como nós fomos gerados pelos nossos pais.” (Journal of Discourses, vol. 8, p. 115) “Cristo foi gerado por um Pai imortal da mesma forma que homens mortais são gerados por pais mortais.” (Bruce McConkie, Mormon Doctrine, p. 547)
	Jesus é o Filho eterno. Ele é a segunda pessoa da Trindade. Ele possui duas naturezas. Ele é Deus encarnado e homem (João 1.1, 14; Colossenses 2 e 9). É o criador de todas as coisas (Colossenses 1.15-17)	Jesus é literalmente um espírito-irmão de Lúcifer, uma criação. (Gospel Through the Ages, p. 15)
O ESPÍRITO SANTO	O Espírito Santo é a terceira pessoa da Trindade. Ele não é uma força. Ele é uma pessoa. (Atos 5.3-4; 13.2)	O Mormonismo faz distinção entre o Espírito Santo (o terceiro deus da trindade Mórmon) e Espírito de Deus (a presença de Deus como uma essência). “Ele [O Espírito de Santo] é um ser dotado de atributos e poderes divinos, não uma mera força ou essência.” (James Talmage, Articles of Faith, p. 144)
SALVAÇÃO	A Salvação é o perdão de pecados e o livramento da condenação eterna do pecador. É um presente gratuito que recebemos por causa da graça de Deus (Efésios 2.8; Romanos 6.23) e que não se pode fazer por merecer (Romanos 11.6).	A salvação tem um duplo significado no Mormonismo: ressurreição universal e… “O primeiro propósito [da redenção] é assegurar igualmente a toda humanidade, a isenção da punição pela queda, oferecendo, assim, um plano de salvação geral. O segundo propósito é abrir um caminho para a salvação individual, pela qual a humanidade pode ter a segurança da remissão dos pecados pessoais.” (James Talmage, Articles of Faith, p. 78-79)
	A salvação (o perdão dos pecados) não é por meio do esforço pessoal. (Efésios 2.8; Romanos 4.5; Gálatas 2.21)	‘Porque estes pecados são o resultado de atos individuais, é justo que o perdão destes dependa da submissão individual às condições pré-estabelecidas – ‘obedecer às leis e ordenanças do evangelho.” (Articles of Faith, p. 79)
BÍBLIA	É a Palavra inspirada e inerrante de Deus. (2 Timóteo 3.16). É autoridade em todos os assuntos que aborda.	“Acreditamos que a Bíblia é a Palavra de Deus até onde sua tradução for correta…” (8th Article of Faith of the Mormon Church).

 

Esta é apenas uma amostra das inúmeras diferenças entre o Cristianismo e o Mormonismo. Como se vê, são doutrinas bem diferentes. Não é possível que Deus tenha sido criado e não criado ao mesmo tempo. Não é possível haver um Deus e muitos deuses ao mesmo tempo. A Trindade não pode ser um Deus em três pessoas e três deuses em um ofício denominado trindade, etc. Ambos os ensinos não podem ser, ao mesmo tempo, verdade.

Trata-se de algo muito importante, porque a fé só é válida se o objeto da fé também for. O Deus Mórmon é o deus verdadeiro? Ou é o Deus do Cristianismo histórico e bíblico?

O Mormonismo não é, visivelmente, uma representação bíblica do Cristianismo. O Mormonismo não é cristão, e os mórmons servem a um deus diferente do Deus dos cristãos – um deus que não existe.  Paulo fala sobre isso em Gálatas 4.8: “Antes, quando vocês não conheciam a Deus, eram escravos daqueles que, por natureza, não são deuses”. Somente o Deus da Bíblia existe.  Não existem outros deuses.  O Mormonismo coloca a fé em um deus que não existe.

Una Comparación Entre la Doctrina Cristiana y la Doctrina Mormona

“Tome la Biblia, compare la religión de los Santos de los Últimos Días con ésta y vea si pasa el examen.”
(Brigham Young, Mayo 18, 1873, Journal of Dicourses, volumen 16, página 46).

A continuación hay una comparación entre la doctrina Cristiana y la doctrina Mormona. Será muy obvio que el Mormonismo no está de acuerdo con la Biblia. De hecho, el Mormonismo simplemente ha usado las mismas palabras encontradas en el Cristianismo redefiniéndolas. Pero con un adecuado entendimiento de lo que el Mormonismo realmente enseña, Usted podrá ver como estas definiciones no encajan con las definiciones dadas por el Cristianismo.

La diferencia es entre la vida eterna y la condenación. Decida Usted.

 

Tema	Cristiano	Mormón
DIOS	Existe un solo Dios (Is 43:11; 44:6,8; 45:5).	“Y ellos (los Dioses) dijeron: Haya luz: y hubo luz” (Libro de Abraham 4:3).
	Dios siempre ha sido Dios (Sal 90:2; Is 57:15).	“Dios mismo una vez fue como somos nosotros ahora, y es un hombre exaltado, ¡¡¡y se sienta entronado allá en los cielos!!!… Hemos imaginado que Dios fue Dios desde toda la eternidad. Refutaré esa idea y quitaré el velo, para que así Usted pueda ver.” (Enseñanzas del Profeta José Smith [Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith], pág. 345).
	Dios es espíritu sin carne ni huesos. (Jn 4:24; Lc 24:39).	“El Padre tiene un cuerpo de carne y huesos como los de un hombre tangible.” (Doctrina y Pactos [Doctrine and Covenants] 130:22; Compare con Alma 18:26-27; 22:9-10). “Por lo tanto sabemos que tanto el Padre y el Hijo están en forma y estatura perfectas como la de los hombres; cada uno posee un cuerpo tangible…de carne y huesos.”   (Artículos de Fe [Articles of Faith], por James Talmage, pág. 38).
TRINIDAD	La Trinidad es la doctrina que declara que existe un solo Dios en todo el universo y que existe en tres personas eternas, simultáneas: El Padre, el Hijo y el Espíritu Santo.	La Trinidad son tres Dioses separados: El Padre, el Hijo y el Espíritu Santo. “Que estos tres son individuos separados, físicamente distintos unos del otro, está demostrado por los registros aceptados de los tratos divinos con el hombre.” (Artículos de Fe [Articles of Faith], por James Talmage, pág. 35).
JESÚS	Jesús nació de la virgen María (Is 7:14; Mt 1:18, 23).	“El nacimiento del Salvador fue tan natural como el nacimiento de nuestros hijos; éste fue el resultado de la acción natural. Él participó de carne y sangre; fue engendrado por su Padre, como nosotros lo fuimos de nuestros padres.” (Diario de Discursos [Journal of Discourses], volumen 8, pág. 115). “Cristo fue engendrado por un Padre Inmortal de la misma forma que los hombres mortales son engendrados por padres mortales.” (Doctrina Mormona[Mormon Doctrine], por Bruce McConkie, pág. 547).
	Jesús es el Hijo eterno. Él es la segunda persona de la Trinidad. Él tiene dos naturalezas. Él es Dios y hombre en carne (Jn 1:1, 14; Col 2;9), y el creador de todas las cosas. (Col. 1:15-17).	Jesús es literalmente el hermano espiritual de Lucifer, una creación. (El Evangelio a Través de las Edades [Gospel Through the Ages], pág. 15).
EL ESPÍRITU SANTO	El Espíritu Santo es la tercera persona de la Trinidad. Él no es una fuerza. Él es una persona. (Hch 5:3-4; 13:2)	El Mormonismo distingue entre el Espíritu Santo (La presencia de Dios como una esencia) y al Santo Espíritu (el tercer dios en la doctrina Mormona de la trinidad) “Él [el Santo Espíritu] es un ser dotado con los atributos y poderes de la Deidad, y no es una simple fuerza o esencia.” (Artículos de Fe [Articles of Faith], por James Talmage, pág. 144).
SALVACIÓN	La salvación es el perdón de pecados y la liberación del pecador de la condenación. Es un regalo recibido por la gracia de Dios (Ef 2:8; Ro 6:23), y no puede ser ganado. (Ro 11:6).	La salvación tiene un doble significado en el Mormonismo: la resurrección universal y… “El primer efecto [de la expiación] es asegurar igualmente a toda la humanidad, con excepción de la pena de la caída, proporcionando así un plan General de Salvación. El segundo efecto es abrir un camino para la Salvación Individual a través del cual la humanidad pueda asegurar la remisión de los pecados personales.” (Artículos de Fe [Articles of Faith], por James Talmage, páginas 78-79).
	La salvación (el perdón de pecados) no es por obras. (Ef 2:8; Ro 4:5; Gá 2:21).	“Como estos pecados son el resultado de actos individuales, el perdón de estos debe estar sólo condicionado de conformidad individual con los requisitos prescritos—‘obediencia a las leyes y ordenanzas del Evangelio’” (Artículos de Fe [Articles of Faith], por James Talmage, página 79).
LA BIBLIA	La Palabra de Dios es infalible e inspirada. (2 Ti 3:16). Es autoritativa en todos los temas que trata.	“Creemos que la Biblia es la palabra de Dios si esta, se encuentra traducida correctamente…” (Artículo 8 de Fe de la Iglesia Mormona).

 

Estos son sólo ejemplos de muchas de las diferencias existentes en el Cristianismo y el Mormonismo. Como puede ver, existe una gran diferencia doctrinal. Dios no puede ser creado y no creado al mismo tiempo; no puede existir un solo Dios y muchos dioses al mismo tiempo. La Trinidad no puede ser un Dios en tres personas y tres dioses diferentes en un cargo conocido como la Trinidad, etc. Estas enseñanzas son exclusivas entre sí.

Lo anotado anteriormente es importante ya que la fe es buena sólo en la medida en que esa fe esté colocada en la persona correcta. ¿Es el dios Mormón el correcto? O, ¿es el Dios del Cristianismo histórico y bíblico el verdadero?

Definitiva y obviamente el Mormonismo no es la versión bíblica del Cristianismo. No es Cristiano y los Mormones sirven a un dios que no existe y es diferente al que servimos los Cristianos. Pablo habla acerca de esto en Gálatas 4:8: “Ciertamente, en otro tiempo, no conociendo a Dios, servíais a los que por naturaleza no son dioses;” Sólo el Dios de la Biblia es real; no existen otros dioses. El Mormonismo coloca su fe en un dios no existente.

 

Comparison between Mormon and Christian Doctrines

A Comparison Between Christian Doctrine and Mormon Doctrine

by Matt Slick

“Take up the Bible, compare the religion of the Latter-day Saints with it and see if it will stand the test,” (Brigham Young, May 18, 1873, Journal of Discourses, vol. 16, p. 46.)

Following is a comparison between Christian doctrine and Mormon doctrine. It will become very obvious that Mormonism does not agree with the Bible. In fact,Mormonism has simply used the same words found in Christianity and redefined them. But with a proper understanding of what Mormonism really teaches, you will be able to see past those definitions into the real differences between Christianity and Mormonism.

The difference is the difference between eternal life and damnation.

Topic	Christian	Mormon
GOD	There is only one God (Isaiah 43:11; 44:6,8;45:5).	“And they (the Gods) said: Let there be light: and there was light (Book of Abraham 4:3).
	God has always been God (Psalm 90:2;Isaiah 57:15).	“God himself was once as we are now, and is an exalted man, and sits enthroned in yonder heavens!!! . . . We have imagined that God was God from all eternity. I will refute that idea and take away the veil, so that you may see,” (Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith,p. 345).
	God is a spirit without flesh and bones (John 4:24; Luke 24:39).	“The Father has a body of flesh and bones as tangible as man’s,” (Doctrine and Covenants 130:22; Compare with Alma 18:26-27; 22:9-10). “Therefore we know that both the Father and the Son are in form and stature perfect men; each of them possesses a tangible body . . . of flesh and bones,” (Articles of Faith, by James Talmage, p. 38).
TRINITY	The Trinity is the doctrine that there is only one God in all the universe and that He exists in three eternal, simultaneous persons: The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.	The trinity is three separate Gods: The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. “That these three are separate individuals, physically distinct from each other, is demonstrated by the accepted records of divine dealings with man,”(Articles of Faith, by James Talmage, p. 35).
JESUS	Jesus was born of the virgin Mary (Isaiah 7:14; Matt. 1:23).	“The birth of the Saviour was as natural as are the births of our children; it was the result of natural action. He partook of flesh and blood – was begotten of his Father, as we were of our fathers,” (Journal of Discourses, vol. 8, p. 115). “Christ was begotten by an Immortal Father in the same way that mortal men are begotten by mortal fathers” (Mormon Doctrine, by Bruce McConkie, p. 547).
	Jesus is the eternal Son. He is second person of the Trinity. He has two natures.He is God in flesh and man (John 1:1, 14; Col. 2;9) and the creator of all things (Col. 1:15-17).	Jesus is the literal spirit-brother of Lucifer, a creation (Gospel Through the Ages, p. 15).
THE HOLY SPIRIT	The Holy Spirit is the third person of the Trinity. He is not a force. He is a person. (Acts 5:3-4; 13:2)	Mormonism distinguishes between the Holy Spirit (God’s presence via an essence) and the Holy Ghost (the third god in the Mormon doctrine of the trinity). “He [the Holy Ghost] is a being endowed with the attributes and powers of Deity, and not a mere force, or essence,” (Articles of Faith, by James Talmage, p. 144).
SALVATION	Salvation is the forgiveness of sin and deliverance of the sinner from damnation. It is a free gift received by God’s grace (Eph. 2:8; Rom. 6:23) and cannot be earned (Rom. 11:6).	Salvation has a double meaning in Mormonism: universal resurrection and . . . “The first effect [of the atonement] is to secure to all mankind alike, exemption from the penalty of the fall, thus providing a plan of General Salvation. The second effect is to open a way for Individual Salvation whereby mankind may secure remission of personal sins,” (Articles of Faith, by James Talmage, p. 78-79).
	Salvation (forgiveness of sins) is not by works (Eph. 2:8; Rom. 4:5;Gal. 2:21).	“As these sins are the result of individual acts it is just that forgiveness for them should be conditioned on individual compliance with prescribed requirements — ‘obedience to the laws and ordinances of the Gospel,’” (Articles of Faith, p. 79).
BIBLE	The inspired inerrant word of God (2 Tim. 3:16). It is authoritative in all subjects it addresses.	“We believe the Bible to be the word of God as far as it is translated correctly. . .” (8th Article of Faith of the Mormon Church).

This is only a sample of many of the differences between Christianity and Mormonism. As you can see, they are quite different doctrines. God cannot be uncreated and created at the same time. There cannot be only one God and many gods at the same time. The Trinity cannot be one God in three persons and three gods in an office known as the Trinity, etc. These teachings are mutually exclusive.

This is important because faith is only as good as the object in which it is placed. Is the Mormon god the real one? Or, is the God of historic and biblical Christianity the real one?

Mormonism is obviously not the biblical version of Christianity. It is not Christian, and Mormons serve a different god than do the Christians — a god that does not exist.  Paul talks about this in Gal. 4:8, “when you did not know God, you were slaves to those which by nature are no gods.”  Only the God of the Bible exists.  There are no others.  Mormonism puts its faith in a non-existent god.

Comparison of Mormonism to Christianity

Whether Mormons should be considered “Christians” is a controversial and rather complicated issue. Many Catholics and Protestants do not consider Mormons to be Christians because they believe the differences in doctrines are larger and more fundamental than those between Christian denominations.

On other hand, religious studies books tend to group Mormons in with Christians because: Mormons regard themselves as Christians; Mormonism emerged in a Christian context; and Mormonism shares much in common with other forms of Christianity.

Mormons also consider themselves Christians for much the same reasons as listed above. However, they consider themselves to be significantly different from other branches of Christianity. They regard themselves as neither Catholic nor Protestant, viewing both of those faiths as corruptions of true Christianity, which has been restored by Mormonism. 1

The following chart provides a quick-reference guide to the major similarities and differences between the beliefs and practices of Mormonism and mainstream Protestant Christianity. As is always the case with charts, the information is simplified for brevity and should be used alongside more complete explanations. The beliefs listed for both Mormons and Protestant Christians represent those of most, but not all, churches or individuals within each tradition.

	Mormonism	Mainstream Christianity
Religious Authority	All sacred texts equally, continuing revelations	Bible (all), ecumenical councils and creeds (Catholic and Orthodox), official papal pronouncements (Catholic), continuing revelations (Pentecostal)
Sacred Texts	Bible, Book of Mormon, Doctrine and Covenants, Pearl of Great Price	Bible (some include Apocrypha)
Trinity	Rejected – Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three distinct beings who are “one in purpose”	Affirmed - Father, Son and Holy Spirit are of the “same substance”; three persons in one being
God	Heavenly Father, who has a physical body	Trinitarian God, who does not have a body
Jesus Christ	Son of God, Savior, originally one of the spirit beings that all humans used to be (see Jesus Christ). Has a physical body.	Son of God, Word of God, God, second Person of the Trinity (see Christology)
Holy Spirit	A spirit being who is a separate being from God and Jesus.	God, Third Person of the Trinity
Original sin	Denied (see Human Nature)	Affirmed (by most denominations)
Free will	Free to do good or evil	Free will to do good is seriously impaired
Purpose of Christ’s Incarnation	Teach about God, provide a model for right living, die sacrificially for human sin	Teach about God, provide a model for right living, die sacrificially for human sin, reveal God directly to humanity
Resurrection of Christ?	Yes	Yes
Salvation	Both faith and works; works emphasized	Both faith and works; faith emphasized (in most denominations)
Second chance after death?	Yes, during a period of “learning and preparation” after death	No
Afterlife	All spirits go to the spirit world, undergo preparation, then rejoin with bodies in the resurrection (see Afterlife). The good spend the intervening time in spirit paradise, while the wicked go to spirit prison.	Souls of wicked sent to Hell, believers go to Heaven for eternity (see Afterlife). In Catholicism, many believers will suffer in Purgatory before going to Heaven.
Hell	The wicked enter an unpleasant “spirit prison” prior to judgment; after that, only the most obstinately wicked (like Satan) will be consigned to “Outer Darkness” for eternity.	Place (or state of being) of eternal torment and distance from God.
Place of Worship	Chapel or Temple	Church
Meaning of Sacraments (Chr) or Ordinances (LDS)	Ordinances are covenants between man and God and a means of grace. Some of them are necessary for salvation.	Symbolic acts commanded by Christ (some Protestant); means of grace if received with faith (Catholic, Orthodox, and some Protestant).
Sacraments (Chr) or Ordinances (LDS)	Include baptism, confirmation, the sacrament (Lord’s Supper), laying on of hands, ordination, temple endowment, and marriage sealing (see Temple Ordinances)	Two common to all denominations: Baptism and Lord’s Supper. Total of seven in Catholicism.
Symbols	No official symbol; cross is not used; the angel Moroni raising a trumpet is seen atop Mormon temples	Cross, fish and others
Holidays	Easter, Christmas, national and local holidays, birthdays, celebrations of events in Mormon history	Easter, Christmas, saints’ days, several others
	Mormonism	Mainstream Christianity

 

Is Mormonism Christian?

Is Mormonism Christian? This may seem like a puzzling question to many Mormons as well as to some Christians. Mormons will note that they include the Bible among the four books which they recognize as Scripture, and that belief in Jesus Christ is central to their faith, as evidenced by their official name, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Furthermore, many Christians have heard the Mormon Tabernacle Choir sing Christian hymns and are favorably impressed with the Mormon commitment to high moral standards and strong families. Doesn’t it follow that Mormonism is Christian?

To fairly and accurately resolve this question we need to carefully compare the basic doctrines of the Mormon religion with the basic doctrines of historic, biblical Christianity.

To fairly and accurately resolve this question we need to carefully compare the basic doctrines of the Mormon religion with the basic doctrines of historic, biblical Christianity. To represent the Mormon position we have relied on the following well-known Mormon doctrinal books, the first three of which are published by the Mormon Church: Gospel Principles (1997), Achieving a Celestial Marriage (1976), and A Study of the Articles of Faith (1979) by Mormon Apostle James E. Talmage, as well as Doctrines of Salvation (3 vols.) by the tenth Mormon President and prophet Joseph Fielding Smith, Mormon Doctrine (2nd ed., 1979) by Mormon apostle Bruce R. McConkie andTeachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith.

1. Is There More Than One True God?

The Bible teaches and orthodox Christians through the ages have believed that there is only one True and Living God and apart from Him there are no other Gods (Deuteronomy 6:4; Isaiah 43:10,11; 44:6,8; 45:21,22; 46:9; Mark 12:29-34).

By contrast, the Mormon Church teaches that there are many Gods (Book of Abraham 4:3ff), and that we can become gods and goddesses in the celestial kingdom (Doctrine and Covenants 132:19-20; Gospel Principles, p. 245; Achieving a Celestial Marriage, p. 130). It also teaches that those who achieve godhood will have spirit children who will worship and pray to them, just as we worship and pray to God the Father(Gospel Principles, p. 302).

2. Was God Once a Man Like Us?

The Bible teaches and orthodox Christians through the ages have believed that God is Spirit (John 4:24; 1 Timothy 6:15,16), He is not a man(Numbers 23:19; Hosea 11:9; Romans 1:22, 23), and has always (eternally) existed as God — all powerful, all knowing, and everywhere present(Psalm 90:2; 139:7-10; Isaiah 40:28; Luke 1:37).

By contrast, the Mormon Church teaches that God the Father was once a man like us who progressed to become a God and has a body of flesh and bone (Doctrine and Covenants 130:22; “God himself was once as we are now, and is an exalted man, and sits enthroned in yonder heavens!” from Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, pp. 345-347; Gospel Principles, p. 9; Articles of Faith, p. 430; Mormon Doctrine, p. 321). Indeed, the Mormon Church teaches that God himself has a father, and a grandfather, ad infinitum (Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, p. 373; Mormon Doctrine, p. 577).

3. Are Jesus and Satan Spirit Brothers?

The Bible teaches and orthodox Christians through the ages have believed that Jesus is the unique Son of God; he has always existed as God, and is co-eternal and co-equal with the Father (John 1:1, 14; 10:30; 14:9; Colossians 2:9). While never less than God, at the appointed time He laid aside the glory He shared with the Father (John 17:4, 5; Philippians 2:6-11) and was made flesh for our salvation; His incarnation was accomplished through being conceived supernaturally by the Holy Spirit and born of a virgin (Matthew 1:18-23; Luke 1:34-35).

By contrast, the Mormon Church teaches that Jesus Christ is our elder brother who progressed to godhood, having first been procreated as a spirit child by Heavenly Father and a heavenly mother; He was later conceived physically through intercourse between Heavenly Father and the virgin Mary (D&C 93:21; Journal of Discourses, 1:50-51; Gospel Principles, p. 11-13; Achieving a Celestial Marriage, p. 129; Bruce R. McConkie, Mormon Doctrine, pp. 546-547; 742; Ezra Taft Benson, Come unto Christ, p. 4; Robert L. Millet, The Mormon Faith: Understanding Restored Christianity, p. 31). Mormon doctrine affirms that Jesus, all angels, Lucifer, all demons, and all human beings are originally spirit brothers and sisters (Abraham 3:22-27; Moses 4:1-2; Gospel Principles, pp. 17-18; Mormon Doctrine, p. 192).

4. Is God a Trinity?

The Bible teaches and orthodox Christians through the ages have believed that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit or Holy Ghost are not separate Gods or separate beings, but are distinct Persons within the one Triune Godhead. Throughout the New Testament the Son and the Holy Spirit, as well as the Father are separately identified as and act as God (Son: Mark 2:5-12; John 20:28; Philippians 2:10,11; Holy Spirit: Acts 5:3,4; 2 Corinthians 3:17,18; 13:14); yet at the same time the Bible teaches that these three are only one God (see point 1).

By contrast, the Mormon Church teaches that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three separate Gods (Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, p. 370; Mormon Doctrine, pp. 576-577), and that the Son and Holy Ghost are the literal offspring of Heavenly Father and a celestial wife (Joseph Fielding McConkie, Encyclopedia of Mormonism, vol. 2, p. 649).

5. Was The Sin Of Adam and Eve a Great Evil Or a Great Blessing?

The Bible teaches and orthodox Christians through the ages have believed that the disobedience of our first parents Adam and Eve was a great evil. Through their fall sin entered the world, bringing all human beings under condemnation and death. Thus we are born with a sinful nature, and will be judged for the sins we commit as individuals. (Ezekiel 18:1-20; Romans 5:12-21).

By contrast, the Mormon Church teaches that Adam’s sin was “a necessary step in the plan of life and a great blessing to all of us” (Gospel Principles, p. 33; Book of Mormon — 2 Nephi 2:25; Doctrines of Salvation, vol. 1, pp. 114-115).

6. Can We Make Ourselves Worthy Before God?

The Bible teaches and orthodox Christians through the ages have believed that apart from the saving work of Jesus Christ on the cross we are spiritually “dead in trespasses and sins” (Ephesians 2:1,5) and are powerless to save ourselves. By grace alone, apart from self-righteous works, God forgives our sins and makes us worthy to live in His presence (Ephesians 2:8-9; Titus 3:5-6). Our part is only to cling to Christ in heartfelt faith. (However, it is certainly true that without the evidence of changed conduct, a person’s testimony of faith in Christ must be questioned; salvation by grace alone through faith, does not mean we can live as we please — Romans 6:1-4).

By contrast, the Mormon Church teaches that eternal life in the presence of God (which it terms “exaltation in the celestial kingdom”) must be earned through obedience to all the commands of the Mormon Church, including exclusive Mormon temple rituals. Works are a requirementfor salvation (entrance into the “celestial kingdom”) — Gospel Principles, p. 303-304; Pearl of Great Price — Third Article of Faith; Mormon Doctrine, pp. 339, 671; Book of Mormon — 2 Nephi 25:23).

7. Does Christ’s Atoning Death Benefit Those Who Reject Him?

The Bible teaches and orthodox Christians through the ages have believed that the purpose of the atoning work of Christ on the cross was to provide the complete solution for humankind’s sin problem. However, those who reject God’s grace in this life will have no part in this salvation but are under the judgment of God for eternity (John 3:36; Hebrews 9:27; 1 John 5:11-12).

By contrast, the Mormon Church teaches that the purpose of the atonement was to bring resurrection and immortality to all people, regardless of whether they receive Christ by faith. Christ’s atonement is only a partial basis for worthiness and eternal life, which also requires obedience to all the commands of the Mormon church, including exclusive Mormon temple rituals (Gospel Principles, pp. 74-75;Mormon Doctrine, p. 669).

8. Is The Bible The Unique and Final Word of God?

The Bible teaches and orthodox Christians through the ages have believed that the Bible is the unique, final and infallible Word of God (2 Timothy 3:16; Hebrews 1:1,2; 2 Peter 1:21) and that it will stand forever (1 Peter 1:23-25). God’s providential preservation of the text of the Bible was marvelously illustrated in the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls.

By contrast, the Mormon Church teaches that the Bible has been corrupted, is missing many “plain and precious parts” and does not contain the fullness of the Gospel (Book of Mormon — 1 Nephi 13:26-29; Doctrines of Salvation, vol. 3, pp. 190-191).

9. Did The Early Church Fall Into Total Apostasy?

The Bible teaches and orthodox Christians through the ages have believed that the true Church was divinely established by Jesus and could never and will never disappear from the earth (Matthew 16:18; John 15:16; 17:11). Christians acknowledge that there have been times of corruption and apostasy within the Church, but believe there has always been a remnant that held fast to the biblical essentials.

By contrast, the Mormon Church teaches that there was a great and total apostasy of the Church as established by Jesus Christ; this state of apostasy “still prevails except among those who have come to a knowledge of the restored gospel” of the Mormon Church (Gospel Principles, pp. 105-106; Mormon Doctrine, p. 44).

---

Conclusion: The above points in italics constitute the common gospel believed by all orthodox Christians through the ages regardless of denominational labels. On the other hand, some new religions such as Mormonism claim to be Christian, but accept as Scripture writings outside of the Bible, teach doctrines that contradict the Bible, and hold to beliefs completely foreign to the teachings of Jesus and His apostles.

Mormons share with orthodox Christians some important moral precepts from the Bible. However, the above points are examples of the many fundamental and irreconcilable differences between historic, biblical Christianity and Mormonism. While these differences do not keep us from being friendly with Mormons, we cannot consider them brothers and sisters in Christ. The Bible specifically warns of false prophets who will teach “another gospel” centered around “another Jesus,” and witnessed to by “another spirit” (2 Corinthians 11:4,13-15; Galatians 1:6-9). Based on the evidence presented above, we believe Mormonism represents just such a counterfeit gospel.

It has been pointed out that if one claimed to be a Mormon but denied all the basic tenets of Mormonism — that Joseph Smith was a prophet of God, that the Book of Mormon is true and divinely inspired, that god was once a man who progressed to godhood through keeping the laws and ordinances of the Mormon Church, and that the Mormon Church was divinely established — the Mormon Church would reject such a person’s claim to being a Latter-day Saint. One cannot fairly call oneself a Mormon if one does not believe the fundamental doctrines taught by the Mormon Church. By the same token, if the Mormon Church does not hold to even the basic biblical truths believed by the greater Christian community down through the ages, how can Christians reasonably be expected to accept Mormonism as authentic Christianity?

If the Mormon Church believes it is the only true Christian Church, it should not attempt to publicly present itself as a part of a broader Christian community. Instead it should tell the world openly that those who claim to be orthodox Christians are not really Christians at all, and that the Mormon Church is the only true Christian Church. This in fact is what it teaches privately, but not publicly.