Craig Eisele on …..

April 21, 2012

Africa: Huge Water Reserves Under Continent

Researchers have found thatAfrica has huge reserves of water underground, which they estimate are more than a hundred times the annual renewable freshwater resources.

Their findings, published in the academic journal Environment Research Letters, show that the largest reserves are in aquifers in the north African countries of Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Chad and Sudan.

.

The scientists used existing data, but for the first time this data was collated to give a continent-wide picture. They estimate that there are 0.66 million cubic kilometres of groundwater storage under Africa.

However, the researchers emphasise that it is important to take into consideration the rate at which this stored water can be replenished.

Whilst the largest reserves lie across the arid region of north Africa, these were filled five thousand years ago when the region was much wetter. There is plenty of water under this area, about seventy five meters deep, but whatever is taken out is not replenished.

Other factors to be taken into account are the geological characteristics of the underground water reservoirs. For example, if the groundwater is very deep underground it cannot be accessed by hand pump.

The researchers find that “for many African countries appropriately sited and constructed boreholes will be able to sustain community handpumps and for most of the populated areas of Africa, groundwater levels are likely to be sufficiently shallow to be accessed using a handpump”.

One of the report’s authors, Helen Bonsor of the British Geological Survey, told AIM that it is not appropriate to downscale the report’s findings, and that their work does not deal with the quality of the water stored. It thus does not deal with the issues of salinization or contamination, although she said that in general the stored water is purer than surface water. She stressed that the report is intended to encourage debate and more local research.

There is certainly a large amount of water under Mozambique, and the paper estimates that there are 6,290 cubic kilometres of groundwater stored under the country, with particularly large reserves under Maputo province.

The groundwater in Mozambique is replenished at a rate of between 25 and 100 millimetres per year, and is stored relatively close to the surface. The paper shows that the aquifer productivity for much of Mozambique is high.

The British Geological Survey has also been undertaking a one year research project funded by the British government’s Department for International Development, looking at the resilience of African groundwater to climate change.

That research found that “groundwater possesses a high resilience to climate change in Africa and should be central to adaptation strategies”.

February 1, 2012

The Threat of a Water War Egypt and Sudan to Stand Together

Egypt and Sudan draw battle lines with upstream nations over access to the Nile

NATIONS FIGHT over water, especially when access is curtailed or threatened, and there are the ingredients for a battle over the 4,100-mile long Nile River. Egypt and Sudan have counted on the abundance of the Nile’s life-giving flow. Now upstream nations want to keep more of the abundance for themselves. Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda are asserting their rights to more of the river’s relentless flow. Washington needs to intervene to forestall hostilities between the countries.

Britain conquered Uganda and Kenya in the 19th century in part to protect the precious Nile waters from being diverted away from their critical possession of Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea route to India. Without the yearly sustaining floods of the Nile, agriculture and settlement in the valley of the river from Luxor to Cairo and Alexandria would have been impossible.

When Britain in the 1920s controlled all of the waters of the Nile, bar those sluicing down the Blue Nile from Ethiopia, it signed a pact that gave Egypt and Sudan rights to nearly 75 percent of its annual flow. This 1929 agreement was confirmed in 1959, after Egypt and the Sudan had broken from Britain but while the East African countries were still colonies.

A new 2010 Cooperative Framework Agreement, now signed by most of the key upstream abutters, would give all riparian states (including the Congo, where a stream that flows into Lake Tanganyika is the acknowledged Nile source) equal access to the resources of the river. That would give preference to large scale upstream energy and industrial, as well as long-time agricultural and irrigation uses.

Egypt and Sudan have refused to sign the new agreement, despite years of discussions and many heated meetings. Given climate change, the drying up of water sources everywhere in Africa and the world, Egypt, which is guaranteed 56 billion of the annual flow of 84 billion cubic meters of Nile water each year, hardly wants to lose even a drop of its allocation. Nor does Sudan, guaranteed 15 billion cubic meters.

About 300 million people depend on the waters of the Nile. The upstream countries, with still growing populations, believe that their socio-economic development has long been unfairly constrained by Egypt’s colonial-era lock on the river. Ethiopia and Uganda have not been able to support agricultural schemes. Nor have they been able fully to harness the river or its tributaries for industry and power. Both have suffered from major hydroelectric shortages in recent years.

Egypt has declared the continued surge of the Nile waters a “red line’’ that affects its “national security.’’ There is discussion in Egypt about the use of air power to threaten upstream offenders, especially if Ethiopia becomes too demanding. In theory, Ethiopia could divert much of the Blue Nile to its own uses. Or Ethiopia and others could charge Egypt for water that has largely escaped modern pricing.

Egypt is sufficiently disturbed by Ethiopia’s potentially aggressive water designs that it has recently made friends with Eritrea, Ethiopia’s arch enemy. In 1998, Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war over slices of insignificant mountainous territory. Although the shooting ended in 2000, a peace settlement handed down by the World Court in 2006 has still not been observed by both sides. If Egypt attacks Ethiopia, Eritrea might join in. Egyptian generals claim that Israel is on the other side, helping the upstream nations by encouraging their thirst for water and by financing the construction of four hydroelectric projects in Ethiopia.

All these issues provide conditions for a war over water. Washington, Egypt’s largest donor, has significant leverage to de-escalate tensions and mediate between the haves and have-nots. After all, Washington supports both Egypt and Ethiopia lavishly and militarily. It needs to demand that all sides stand down.

Egypt and Ethiopia Move Closer to War Over Nile River Water

Ethiopia’s prime minister has rejected a threat by Egypt to prevent the building of dams and other water projects upstream on the Nile river.

Meles Zenawi told Al Jazeera on Wednesday that Egypt will not be able to stop his country from building dams on the river. His comments came nearly a week after Ethiopia joined Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania in signing a new treaty on the equitable sharing of the Nile, despite strong opposition from Egypt and Sudan who have the major share of the river waters.

The Nile flows through 10 African nations, but the distribution of its waters among each Nile basin country has long been a source of tension in the region. Historic agreements have given Egypt and Sudan veto power over upstream projects that could affect the flow of water. But the agreement signed last week by four of the Nile Basin countries marked the creation of a new commission to manage the water. Kenya, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo are expected to sign within a year.

‘Old-fashioned ideas’
Egypt has warned that the agreement lacks legitimacy. But Zenawi told Al Jazeera’s Andrew Simmons that Egypt’s approach is out of date.”Some people in Egypt have old-fashioned ideas based on the assumption that the Nile water belongs to Egypt, and that Egypt has a right to decide who gets what, and that the upper [Nile basin] countries are unable to use the Nile water because they will be unstable and they will be poor,” he said.

“These circumstances have changed and changed forever. “Ethiopia is not unstable. Ethiopia is still poor, but it is able to cover the necessary resources to build whatever infrastructure and dams it wants on the Nile water.” The upstream countries want to be able to implement irrigation and hydro-power projects in consultation with Egypt and Sudan, but without Egypt being able to exercise the veto power it was given by a 1929 colonial-era treaty with Britain.

Legal action threatened
Egypt, however, has warned that Cairo’s water rights are a “red line” and it threatened legal action if a unilateral deal was reached.

But Zenawi dismissed the warning, saying it would not solve the dispute at hand. “The way forward is not for Egypt to try and stop the unstoppable. The way forward is to seek a win-win solution through diplomatic efforts,” he said.

Al Jazeera’s Amr El Kahky, reporting from Cairo, said Egyptian government officials said such statements undermine the spirit of co-operation between the Nile Basin Initiative countries. “A government official told me that Egypt does not oppose the development of these countries,” he said. “But at the end of the day, Egypt does not want to see the flow of the Nile and the water share of the Nile being hindered or reduced.”

Water supply fears
The new agreement, the Nile Basin Co-operative Framework, is to replace a 1959 accord between Egypt and Sudan that gave them control of more than 90 per cent of the water flow.

The two countries have expressed fears that their water supply would be severely reduced if the seven other Nile users divert the river with domestic irrigation and hydro-power projects. The Nile Basin Initiative, which had been spearheading the talks, will now become the Nile Basin Commission and will receive, review and approve or reject projects related to Africa’s longest river. The commission will be based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital, and have representation from all nine Nile Basin countries.(Aljazeera)

January 30, 2012

Global Conflicts Loom for Fresh Potable Water Sources

Filed under: riparian States,water,Water Wars — Mr. Craig @ 1:08 pm
Tags: , , ,

For centuries war and conflict has been tied to the protection of water resources. With the risk of water shortages around the world becoming more and more of an issue, water has become the fuel of certain conflicts in many regions around the world. “Water Wars” are becoming inevitable in the world’s future as the misuse of water resources continues among countries that share the same water source. International law has proven itself inadequate in defending the equal use of shared water supplies in some parts of the world (Darwish, Middle East Water Wars). The rapid population increase has greatly affected the amount of water readily available to many people.

Water as a resource is very comparable to oil; it is essential to all daily human activities. Water is becoming a very valuable commodity, yet freshwater resources are unevenly distributed among developing countries. This scarcity in water has triggered desperation in countries that already have little access to water, let alone reliable water supplies. This desperation usually cannot be resolved by negotiations. If governments or rebels want water badly enough, they resort to force to obtain it. Water has very rarely been the main ingredient in international conflicts, but it is often factored into the problem due to its economic importance. (Peter Gledick, Water Conflict Chronology)

“Conflicts over water arise form the fact that under conditions of increasing scarcity, competition levels also increase.” Anthony Turton

The Potential Causes

There has been much speculation over what causes conflicts over water. The conflicts arise over who has the power to control water and therefore control the economy and population. By breaking it down into categories, we can begin to understand the causes. Conflicts can be caused by water use which includes military, industrial, agricultural, domestic and political uses. Through the military and political uses, conflicts can be exacerbated by the use of water systems as a weapon and as a political goal. In relation to industrial and agricultural uses conflicts may arise from the overuse and degradation of water resources, and the insufficient amount that is left over for communities.

Conflicts can further be a result of pollution affecting the quality of the water supply. The military is already most likely the number one producer of wastes in the world, and the leftover chemical and weapons used in times of war can have an effect on water supplies. Wastes from industries and agriculture can contaminate groundwater resources if not disposed of properly, and cause frustration for those who must travel to obtain sufficient daily water supplies. This lack of water quality can cause a conflict to arise regarding the distribution of water. Not having water evenly distributed among people and countries creates an imbalance among those who share supplies, particularly in developing countries (Cause of Conflicts, Haftendorn).

The increase of urbanization has increased the demand for water. However the supply cannot take care of the demand. With the problem of uneven water distribution future conflicts can occur. As societies become more developed they tend to use more resources such as water (Klare).

Regions of Conflicts

Many regions around the world deal with shortages of water. However, some areas deal more with conflicts over inadequate water supplies and disputes over shared water supplies. In regions where countries compete for access to water, the relations between the countries are likely to be unstable. In regions where water supply is scarce, combat sometimes seems to be the only way to resolve the problem. It is estimated that there are 1,250 square kilometers of freshwater remaining in the world’s semi-arid and arid regions and this supply is not evenly distributed among two or more countries sharing the same water source. Severe water scarcity is strongest in the Middle East and Northern Africa. The need for water in these regions is essential for food production used in irrigation farming (Klare).

Water systems usually arise in one country and pass through others before reaching the sea or oceans. The rivers and lakes that come off these larger water systems are typically shared by more than one country. The states where these systems originated tend to try and gain the most control over the water. This is the case along river systems like the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Jordan River (Klare).

The Middle East

Middle East conflicts are usually tied in the media to religion or oil, but water has become a major factor in recent disputes. In prominent watersheds such as the Jordan River Basin and the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, water supplies can be critical especially when they are being shared among multiple countries. These rivers play a very important role in the agriculture and economic development of these states.

Jordan River Basin

The area of the Jordan River Basin, including parts of Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank, is primarily an arid region. The river originates in Lebanon and has a total average flow of 1,200 million cubic meters per year. This river system consists of the Jordan and Yarmuk River, which flows from Syria. With the arid climate and low precipitation in this region, water has become the most valuable resource (Klare). Most countries in the Jordan River Basin are among some of the poorest countries in the region. Groundwater aquifers are the principle source for water supplies to the states that rely on the Jordan River. Water use varies throughout the region. Israel uses the greatest amount of water available in the basin, and next in line is Jordan. The Israeli-occupied West Bank uses the smallest amount. The daily amount of water per person in the Jordan River Basin is the lowest in the world (Water Scarcity in Jordan River Basin).

The patterns of water use, overuse, and political territorial issues are resulting in disagreement over water distribution. The increase in population (both through natural increase and Israeli settlements) has led to significant challenges in managing limited water supplies. Without the existence of a legitimate water sharing agreement, the countries of Syria and Israel have taken over the water supplies. The construction of reservoirs on the Yarmuk River has caused the reduction of discharge into the Jordan River (The Jordan River Basin).

The Mountain Aquifer underneath the West Bank is a point of contention between Israelis and Palestinians. Issues include the domination of groundwater supplies by the Israeli state and settlers, and the walling off of Palestinian access to water supplies. Compared to Israeli settlers Palestinians are charged three times the cost for water that comes from under the West Bank (Villiers).

Map and Satellite picture of the Jordan River Basin

The Tigris-Euphrates Basin

The scarcity of water supplies in the river basin of ancient Mesopotamia has long fed disagreement among neighboring nations. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers originate in Turkey, and their watershed covers a much larger area than the Jordan River basin. The river system is shared by several countries and ethnic groups who regularly disagree on water issues. Like the Jordan River Valley, rising population in these areas is heavily affecting the availability of water. The Tigris and Euphrates are especially important to Syria and Iraq. Syria obtains approximately 85 percent of the renewable water supply while Iraq obtains 100 percent from the combination of both rivers (Klare).

The Turks (and the Kurds who live in southeastern Turkey) are less dependent on the rivers, yet they still have plans for irrigation schemes to increase their utilization of both rivers. Along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, conflict arises from north to south. The downstream states of Iraq and Syria depend heavily on these two rivers for their water supply. Dams along the rivers installed by Turkey have prevented some of the water from flowing downstream to these warmer, drier countries.(Haftendorn). All three countries (but mainly Turkey) have constructed dams on the rivers for purposes of agriculture, hydroelectric power and industrialization.

Turkey and Syria have increased hostilities towards one another over the use of the Euphrates River. Turkey’s plans to utilize its portion of the Euphrates have affected the share going to Syria for irrigation purposes. Hostilities between Syria and Iraq escalated due to the filling of Lake Assad by Syria, resulting to the reduction of downstream flow in the 1970’s. Iraqi’s began accusing Syria of holding back water supplies. Among all three countries, the water supply conflict is equated with their national security (Tigris Euphrates Dispute).

Tigris-Euphrates River

Warfare in Iraq

The 1991 Gulf War brought on water crisis in Iraq due to the bombing of water treatment facilities in Iraq by the U.S., triggering water shortages in the country. Out of the seven major water pumping stations, four were destroyed. The targeting of sewage and water treatment plants contributed to the mass contamination of the Trigris River, and triggered many waterborne diseases. The bombing during the 2003 Iraq invasion agian targeted civilian infrastructure, and left many southern Iraqis with little or no access to water in the first weeks of the occupation. (See Iraq water crisis.)

Iraqi women waiting for incoming water supplies while confronted by British troops

Africa

In many parts of Africa, water shortages are a part of everyday life. Many countries share one water resource for the use both of their populations. A large percentage of these countries are very dependant on the weather to provide proper irrigation to the agricultural industry, since water resources are so scarce.The major areas being shared among countries are the Nile River, Volta River, Zambezi River, and the Niger Basin. Conflicts rage from the privatization of the water resources to the many people displaced by dams along the rivers, and the unequal distribution of water supplies amongst neighboring countries.With the growing demand for water resources, conflicts seems almost inevitable, especially with many African governments’ history of poor management of resources and inadequate conflict resolution mechanisms.

The Nile River Basin

The Nile is the longest river in the world, stretching for 4,130 miles. The Nile River for centuries has been the source of sustaining human life in Egypt and Sudan. The Nile’s tributaries, lakes, and rivers collect and disperse water in nine African countries before it reaches the Mediterranean Sea. The Egyptians have used military force to ensure their control over the headwaters of the Nile, because the country has no other water source. Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda have constructed various river projects to increase their annual water withdrawals, affecting Egyptian control over the Nile (Klare). However, in some cases national governments have agreed to share water that flows between their countries. For example, the leaders of Uganda, Sudan and Egypt signed a pact to share the waters of the Nile River. Such solutions can potentially prevent water shortage and head off conflict.

Nile River

Volta River Basin

Niger River Basin

Zambezi Water Basin

School children crossing contaminated river source

Asia

South Asian countries deal with conflict over the sharing of river water supplies both in downstream and upstream regions. The distribution of water resources throughoutSoutheast and Central Asia is increasingly becoming a political issue, with the tensions amounting over the control of water supplies (Biliouri). The idea of shared water supply has not been easily understood by the nations of this region. The growing populations come with the increase in demand and could be a catalyst for conflict to arise out of the ethnic and political disputes (Water and Conflict).

In India and China water shortages pose both a social and economic threat. Throughout India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh, water shortages are increasingly triggering conflict. Although the freshwater resources are abundant, they are not well distributed to drier regions in dire need of water. With the immense amount of pollution being dumped in the freshwater supply, clean water is becoming scarce to the mass of people and tensions can easily escalate.

The Indus River Basin has been an area of conflict between India and Pakistan. Spanning 1,800 miles, the river and its tributaries together make up one of the largest irrigation canals in the world. The basin provides water to millions of people in northwestern India and Pakistan. Dams and canals built in order to provide hydropower and irrigation ha dried up stretches of the Indus River. Water projects have further caused the displacement of people and have contributed to the destruction of the ecosystem in the Indus plain.

The divisions of the river basin waters have created friction among the countries of South Asia, and among their states and provinces. Accusations of overdrawing made by each central region or province has resulted in the lack of water supplies to coastal regions of Pakistan (Controversy over Indus River Water). The Ganges River has long been disputed over by India and Bangladesh. The two regions share a common river system, formed by the joining of the Bhagirathi and the Alaknanda.

Water Supply in Bangladesh

Map of the Indus River Basin

Ganges River System:

The Ganges River possesses strong economic and religious importance. The Ganges River as a water source has been strongly disputed between India and Bangladesh. With increasing demands of water in Calcutta for industrial and domestic use, and irrigation use in the Indian state of West Bengal, water conflicts between the two countries have increased. With large amounts of pollution in this river system, the available water is unsanitary and can increase illness, as well as trigger mass migration.

Ganges River pollution makes it an unsanitary water resource

Understanding The Nile River Water Conflict

Introduction

 

Perceptions and Realities

Perceptions and realities of water and conflict in basins such as the Nile vary widely. The river continues to be brought into debates about “water wars” by writers on the subject.[1] Visions of future conflict continue to capture the imagination of the international media. [2]As recently as 1999, a BBC report on Africa’s waters could still state that:

The main conflicts in Africa during the next twenty-five years could be over that most precious of commodities – water, as countries fight for access to scarce resources … the possible flashpoints are the Nile, Niger, Volta, andZambezi basins. [3]

Problems with portraying Africa’s waters – and the Nile especially – in this light have always existed, but continuing to do so increasingly contradicts evidence that the contrary process is at work, namely moves towards greater cooperation rather than conflict.

One of the major problems with the “water wars” thesis is that it includes only a cursory understanding of “scarcity” issues, and of the actual facts and figures that underlie much of the analysis. Commonly, a threshold figure of 1,000 cu m per person per year is provided as the level below which states are said to be “water scarce.” In the case of Nile Basin states, this ranks Burundi, Rwanda, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Kenya all as water “scarce” by 2025, and depending on population growth, they may possibly be joined by Tanzania.

The continuous growth of the population of the Nile Basin is one of the factors dominating these calculations. Population growth has already encouraged abstraction of groundwater, especially for domestic water supply, in both rural and urban areas without any corresponding increase in surface water resources. More than 5 percent of the water used in Egypt is groundwater. The groundwater in the Sudan is pumped from the aquifers underlying wadi beds such as the Gash, Howare, and Nyala. For rural communities, in particular, these are essential sources for domestic purposes. Safe abstraction of groundwater can provide a quick solution for small-scale projects, but in the long term will not provide basin-wide solutions to shortages in key sectors such as agriculture.

Categorizations of scarcity are usually based on an assumption about water use in each country that rarely receives careful attention. Most critical in this respect is that the threshold figure should include water for all uses, that is, including food production.[4] In fact, many states – and Egypt is an important example – no longer rely on actual water resources in combination with land and other natural resources to achieve food security, but instead import large quantities of food, and in so doing come to rely on trade in “virtual water” to sustain national food security.[5]

Another key problem is that notions of scarcity are based on a static view of the internal capacity of states to change in response to dwindling resource availability – what has been termed their “adaptive capacity.” For this reason future projections of scarcity – such as those given for the Nile Basin states above – presuppose that states will not adapt effectively in the meantime, and that there are not major differences in capacity to cope with change between different states, either economically, socially, or both (the work of Ohlsson, Turton, and others takes the argument further).

For other authors, the notion of scarcity itself is sometimes part of a construction used by particular interest groups in order to legitimize certain development processes, including, for instance, the construction of major water management schemes and dams [6]. Taken together, these conceptual challenges demand a more careful reading of current and future scarcity of water resources, and militate against drawing overly simplistic conclusions about growing scarcity causing future conflict.

Notwithstanding these conceptual challenges, the water wars thesis is used by decision makers and by political leaders in order to focus attention on global resource issues – and their particular basin concerns. In the main, these serve immediate political ends. Boutros-Boutros Ghali is on record as stating in the mid-1980s that “The next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics.” And in the mid-1990s Ismail Serageldin of theWorld Bank warned that “If the wars of this century were fought over oil, the wars of the next century will be fought over water – unless we change our approach to managing this precious and vital resource.” Such concerns and warnings rarely attempt to interrogate the realities of conflict over rivers such as the Nile, but instead feed on widely perceived notions of insecurity and vulnerability within domestic populations. These feelings are often driven by public perceptions of the challenges facing shared river basins and their societies, and the political actors are feeding on and responding to those perceptions. Some of these wider perceptions will also have resulted from external factors such as the impact of drought in the Horn of Africa and on Nile flows during the 1980s.

Nevertheless, confounding much of this skepticism, in the 1990s the countries of the Nile Basin in fact moved towards greater cooperation and joint development rather than conflict. In spite of tensions often being raised by political rhetoric within the basin, a broader vision of future cooperation constructed by the basin states has established unprecedented political cooperation in overcoming past rivalries and uneven development of co-riparian states. This article examines the context and development of this process, and draws out key lessons emerging for the future development of the basin and, more broadly, for global attempts at shifting other basins from conflict to cooperation, and then to joint development.

 

Initiatives and Challenges

Addressing the challenge of moving towards greater cooperation and joint development has been central to theNile Basin Initiative (NBI), a riparian-led process of joint decision making and cooperative development that emerged during the 1990s. In the last five years nine of the ten Nile Basin states (with Eritrea observing) have been exploring the development of the NBI in partnership with key external agencies, including the World Bankand bilateral donors.[7] The NBI has both built on and added to a basic underlying set of enabling relations between states and the willingness of key basin states to move from “unilateralism” to “multilateralism” in resource development.

The development of this process was premised on two major assumptions: that the basin states could agree on a common vision “to pursue,” and that they would agree to form two distinct sub-basin entities. The common vision (discussed later in the article) brought about a broad target for the process of subdividing the basin and developing two distinct yet interrelated basin development programs: the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program. This process has subsumed national-level decision making beneath a broader basin-wide framework, but with national level objectives built into the range of future development options and projects. The process involved is discussed in more detail later in this article. The political feasibility of the 1990s enabled much of this process to take place, and provided the basis for its mainstreaming within national-level political processes.

The end of the cold war and the problems of “satellite state” politics in the region were major contributory factors in greater feasibility; another was the actual realization amongst basin states that in order to manage the river in the future, greater joint development of the resource would have to take place under a broader cooperative framework. The drought experience in a key part of the basin during the 1980s helped to form this perception.

 

From Cooperation to Socioeconomic Development

Developing cooperation on the Nile is a major achievement of international diplomacy within the region. It has created an environment of joint cooperation, and political will to move development processes forwards. However, the generation of support and effective development processes at all levels of society is the next major challenge. In moving a step beyond development of cooperative institutions and processes to the creation of effective developments that derive benefits at all levels within the basin, the NBI has set itself a new challenge in river basin management, and one that embeds basin-level processes in far wider African development issues.

The socioeconomic development framework requires that the benefits can be generated and shared within the basin (and within the basin states – the two not being synonymous), and that the benefits can be targeted to local-level socioeconomic developments that address very real problems of poverty reduction. Under the Shared Vision Program (SVP) of the Nile Basin Initiative the Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing Project document states that:

The development objective of this project is to support the SVP by enabling the riparians to form a range of basin-wide development scenarios, and specify the benefits accruing from the implementation of such scenarios (together with some notion of how benefits will be shared). Fundamentally, the project aims to provide an opportunity for riparian dialogue that can include a wide range of society and that will develop common visions of cooperative development in sectoral or thematic areas. (NBI SDBS, 2001)

One of the key concerns mentioned in the document is the extension of involvement in the Nile Basin Initiative beyond the state – that is, to include a wide range of society. In the process to date, and the wider construction of new political environments, the main actors in the NBI have worked at the state level. Two key issues arising out of this process are first, how to incorporate the visions and beliefs of society at all levels within this wider basin vision in order to ensure that ownership has both depth and breadth; and second, how to ensure that non-state, civil society actors also have a voice in the kinds of program that are being established.

In Figure 2, “A” represents the spectrum of national views incorporated within the core NBI vision. (See originalpublication). On either side are “peripheral” visions, or the wider thinking and views present in society on development options, the sharing of benefits and issues of governance, including participation, representation, and accountability. Key concerns in Figure 2 are the “wider” periphery where basin developments have regional or even continental-scale repercussions, and the narrower, lower-level visioning of the process. In effect, whose process are we talking about: a national broad-based vision, or the vision of local communities whose needs and concerns are more narrowly defined by the need to survive and develop within frequently adverse socioeconomic, political, and natural environments? Both the breadth of the vision and the depth require careful linkage. In this the NBI can build very strong developmentled processes that, in the final analysis, are rooted in the wider African political economy.

 

The Nile Basin

 

Geography

The geography of the Nile Basin is both distinct and varied. From the most remote source at the head of the River Luvironzo near Lake Tanganyika, to its mouth on the Mediterranean Sea, at 6,500 km the Nile is the longest river in the world. Some 2.9 million km2 in extent, overall the basin drains about 10 percent of the continent. But the geographical and political linkages go beyond the basin itself – the ten Nile Basin states embed Nile Basin processes within the wider social and economic development of Africa across all major parts of the continent.[8]The ten Nile countries link processes in southern Africa to northern Africa and the Mediterranean, development inCentral Africa to the West African Atlantic coast, and the regional systems of the Middle East to the Indian Ocean.

From the highest point at 5,120 m above sea level in the Ruwenzori mountain range, to the Quattarah Depression, at 159 m below sea level, the river channel consists of flat reaches in certain sub-basins presently linked by steep channels. Within this basin the topography is diverse. The highlands of the Ethiopian Plateau and the “Mountains of the Moon” in Central Africa give way to the lowland pastoral plains of Sudan and the deserts of Egypt. Tropical vegetation, snow-capped peaks, and some of the driest areas in the world, as well as some of the largest bodies of inland waters, can be found along the basin’s length and breadth.

The huge Congo–Nile watershed is home to internationally important rainforest areas. The Lake Victoria basin and southwestern Ethiopia include key areas of genetic plant diversity, and important dry lands and arid zone habitats emerge as rainfall decreases to the north (NBI TEA, 2001). One of the most dramatic natural features is the globally important wetland area of the Sudd in southern Sudan, which at 30,000 km2 is one of the largest wetland areas in the world.

One of the key geopolitical features of the basin is the large number of national borders that traverse it. This is largely the result of European colonial or condominium occupation in the nineteenth century. With the exception of Ethiopia, whose border definition was itself a response to European colonial expansion in and around the state, border issues remained contentious in a number of places even up to the late twentieth century. The criss-crossing of borders ensures little congruence between state boundaries and the basin’s physical or human geography: as a result, the proportions of basin area within each state and the extent of state contributions to the basin area vary widely, as depicted in the Figure bellow.

Most major basins spanning such areas include highly diverse environments, so the Nile is not exceptional in this respect. Nevertheless, the complexity of the number of states, combined with the uneven distribution of the basin between states and the complex hydrology of the system, poses significant technical and institutional challenges both for the management of shared waters and, in the future, for ascertaining where and how benefits can and should be shared within and outside the basin.

 

Hydrology

The Nile’s hydrology has preoccupied basin residents for thousands of years, and with good reason. A large portion of the basin flows is highly seasonal, and the overall flow range is susceptible to major inter-annual and decadal fluctuations. Since the end of the nineteenth century – and in particular following British control of a key part of the Nile Basin – major hydrological investigations were undertaken to try to devise methods of controlling the river system in order to facilitate its exploitation. The flows of the Nile have been measured for thousands of years, and the origins and reasons for variations preoccupied many of the Nilotic societies. The Nilometers at Roda Island in Cairo and elsewhere along the river are testament to the huge task of trying to grapple with the fickle flows of the Nile.

Major supply structures and approximate extent of basin

Major supply structures and approximate extent of basin

Of particular concern for downstream riparian societies in the most arid parts of the basin were the seasonal and inter-annual peaks and troughs. These would effectively control the prosperity of the riparian societies, almost wholly dependent on river flows for agricultural production. For up to eight millennia, the very unreliability of the flow has preoccupied communities.

That the flow could vary from year to year as well as seasonally has been recorded for many thousands of years and the awareness of Egypt’s cycles of lean years followed by years of plenty was part of the way of life of people residing in the lower Nile valley before the filling of Lake Nasser/Nubia in the 1960s. (Sutcliffe and Lazenby, 1994, introduction)

The key hydrological characteristics of the river are its two major origins: in the highlands of Ethiopia and Eritrea, and in the Nile equatorial lakes region. The former provides the major flow of the Nile north of Khartoum – the Blue Nile – and the latter the far lower and slower flows of the White Nile. While the catchment of the Blue Nile is small relative to that of the White Nile, high rainfall from June to September means that it is by far the greatest contributor to main Nile flows – some 60 percent of the total. The White Nile, by contrast, is derived from rainfall in the equatorial lakes region around Lake Victoria – at 69,500 km2 the world’s second largest lake – but provides a mere 30 percent of flows as measured at Aswan.

The second major feature of the hydrological system is the huge seasonality of the Blue Nile’s flows, concentrated from July to October in a spectacular flood.

From the point of view of basin development the main interest in the hydrology of the Blue Nile within Ethiopia is for flood forecasting for reservoir operation and to give warning of possible inundation in Khartoum and in the agricultural areas downstream.(Sutcliffe and Lazenby, 1994)

This massive spate is roughly equivalent to seventy times its low season discharge, and brings with it huge quantities of silt. These have literally provided the building blocks of downstream Nilotic societies for millennia.

The difference in the two major river regimes is marked: while the White Nile’s average monthly maximum (October) and minimum (February) discharges vary only slightly from 1.4 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 1.2 bcm, theBlue Nile and associated rivers (Atbara – which joins the main Nile at Atbara north of Khartoum – and the Sobat which joins the White Nile just as the river emerges from the Sudd) vary greatly from a high of 15.6 bcm in August to just 0.3 bcm in April.

This seasonal variation has posed a key challenge to river basin planners and agriculturalists alike: how to capture and store the river’s waters for more gradual release. At a more fundamental level, but one that has been beyond the capacities of societies within the basin for the greater part of their history, has been the challenge of how to overcome the (sometimes) disastrous inter-annual variations in flow as well.

Over the years, fluctuations in the flow of the Blue Nile have contributed changes in mean annual discharge of plus or minus 20 percent, with very severe consequences for water management in Egypt and Sudan (Conway and Hulme, 1996). The mitigation of major inter-annual variation was the task of the “Century Storage” scheme developed as a concept during the first half of the twentieth century. The idea was to capture a whole annual flood in order to fully control and regulate the river’s flow. This would enable states to maximize resource use efficiency. In part the idea was realized in Aswan High Dam, constructed in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but with some major human and environmental costs.

A third major feature of the river system is caused by virtue of the river’s situation in hot, arid areas whereevaporation losses are high. By far the most significant losses are in the Sudd in southern Sudan. Between entry and exit the river loses up to 50 percent of its original flow. This loss to the system for Egypt and Sudan has meant significant shortfalls in summer months, when flows from the Blue Nile reach their lowest point. Therefore, enabling greater White Nile flows during this period has important economic consequences, even though it is only a relatively small proportion of annual flows. Reducing this loss was at the heart of attempts to speed up the flow through the Sudd via the Jonglei Canal Scheme.

The figure bellow illustrates the variance between “export” and “import” of water. The major production of water by Ethiopia – but low capture of the resources – is contrasted with Egypt’s low internal renewable resources. This marks the nature of dependence on water from upstream catchment to downstream states in the Nile Basin. It goes a long way towards illustrating the reason the Egyptian claim on historic or acquired rights to the waters became its main stated position on the Nile waters for so long.

PCCP_Nile_Basin_variance_between_import_and_export_of_water.JPG.bmp

Similarly, for Ethiopia, the massive amount of water generated by the huge annual rainfall, but the fact that nearly all of the 111 bcm flowed to neighboring states, prompted (until the last decade) the “sovereign right” position to use the waters within its territory for its own national development. For Ethiopia the loss of huge volumes of soil in the annual flood also underlined the fact that it could be resource rich and poor at the same time unless the resources could be harnessed more effectively. The nature of dependence on resources received externally against internal renewable resources is illustrated in Figure 6(See original publication)

Not surprisingly the huge dependence on external flows in Egypt and Sudan has driven major supply-side developments, seeking to both capture and regulate the river’s flows. This has progressed throughout the twentieth century, and now constitutes the main system of regulating the river’s flows. They are, as well, largely constructed to suit a particular set of demands and legal and institutional structures established between Egypt and Sudan, in particular. The future challenge of ensuring that cooperation leads to development in the future may require changes in the way supply structures are used, as well as the inclusion of new structures in upstream countries.

 

Climate

The north–south orientation of the River Nile on the African continent ensures extreme variability in climate between the extremes of the basin. The Nile Basin receives annually an average rainfall of about 650 mm, or a total of about 1,900 bcm per year. Long-term mean annual flow at Aswan is about 85 bcm per year, making the annual runoff coefficient of the basin around 4.5 percent. This figure is small and, for example, is just 10 percent of that of the Rhine. The reason for this is found largely in those parts of the basin belonging to the arid and hyper-arid zones that are large in surface area, and contribute only negligibly to basin runoff. With losses from major swamp areas as well, up to 30 percent of the rainfall the Nile Basin receives in an average year is lost before being used for any purpose.

The Nile Basin’s climate range varies between extreme aridity in the north (Egypt and Sudan in particular) to tropical rainforest in Central and East Africa and parts of Ethiopia. On the Ethiopian massif, the key contributor of Nile flows, the kiremt rains produce the main June to November spate. This spectacular phenomenon is the combination of three mechanisms: the move of the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) (summer monsoon) over the highlands, before retreating again, the tropical “upper easterlies,” and local convergence in the Red Sea coastal region. The resulting rainfall is often intense, and causes rapid runoff leading to major soil loss.

Changes to the pattern and movement of the ITCZ cause major shifts in rainfall across Ethiopia and neighboring countries, particularly in association with the varied topography in the region. In some years the northeastern highlands of Ethiopia are particularly badly affected by low and unpredictable rainfall patterns, contributing to severe crop failure, and at times major famine.

One of the key factors affecting this rainfall variability is the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO), the occurrence of positive anomalies in sea surface temperatures over the Central and Eastern Pacific Ocean, which can have dramatic global impacts on regional weather systems. In the case of the Nile, studies have shown significant correlation between the ENSO index in May and Ethiopia’s Kiremt rainfall. Whetton and Rutherford (1994, cited by Conway et al., 1997)showed that Nile floods were significantly lower than average in all El Niño years, but that the strong relationship develops only after 1830 and continues up to the 1980s.

These variable rainfall patterns in recent years have prompted major efforts at better forecasting in the basin. In particular, the successive years of low rainfall during the mid-1980s, with floods in some years barely half a “normal” year, led to a decline in the level of Lake Nasser/Nubia to such an extent that by the time a major rainfall event occurred in August 1988 the turbines were just short of being turned off.

This experience had the dual impact of illustrating how vulnerable Egypt could be to successive low flows in the absence of the High Dam, but also the importance of a more integrated basin-wide management regime for Egypt’s water security. Successive low-flow years would require more than one massive structure to help achieve greater water security in the future; upstream augmentation of flows would also be important.

 

Demography and Society

Given the large number of countries, the reach of the basin across Africa, as well as the range of agro-ecological zones, the human geography of the Nile Basin is extremely diverse. The ten states that comprise the basin cover some 300 million people, of which about 150 million live within the Nile Basin itself. The basin also boasts some ofAfrica’s major cities, from Dar es Salaam, Kampala, and Nairobi to Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Cairo. The latter alone accounts for probably in the region of 10 percent of the basin’s total population.

The rich human geography is characterized by great ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity, cutting across national as well as basin boundaries with neighboring watersheds. This increases the complexity of the Nile’s interrelationships with wider African social, political, and economic systems. For decision makers and managers this adds layer upon layer of complexity to the ways in which the Nile Basin Initiative will develop and implement projects based on the equitable sharing of benefits between states and the ethnic groups which they comprise and, in many cases, share. Even a single state can have great diversity: Ethiopia alone, for instance, has over fifty languages and is roughly split between Muslims and Christian populations, with significant animist minorities.

Equally as important as ethnicity is the range of livelihoods associated with the demographic characteristics of the basin. For many populations within the basin, subsistence production is the mainstay of their survival, whether through pastoral livestock production in the lowlands of Ethiopia or the Sudd region of southern Sudan, or highland agriculture in countries including Rwanda, Burundi, Eritrea, and Kenya. In many cases these livelihoods are linked to particular ethnic and/or religious identities, and changes wrought externally in policy decisions over resource management can therefore have important socioeconomic as well as political consequences. In the case of Ethiopia, balancing the needs of particular ethnic regions and wider national development goals has led to the creation of a federal system based on ethnic regions.

Given the human heterogeneity of the basin, the achievement of a socially stable, politically benign environment for river basin development will always be challenging. However, there are important ways in which the development of benefits from the river’s waters can form a positive feedback loop, assisting national development processes in adding advantage to deprived regions, increasing successful national integration and economic development, and eventually broadening the elimination of poverty within the basin.

 

The Development Context

 

History

The historical development of the Nile Basin has left a legacy of cultures and societies with a rich archaeological record. This has ensured that the basin remains one of the most distinct and visually identifiable regions of the world. The global importance of the Nile valley’s archaeology has generated some of the most important international efforts at protecting archaeological sites, including the huge operation undertaken in the mid-1960s to rescue sites being inundated by Lake Nasser, following construction of the Aswan High Dam.

Beyond the archaeological significance of the river’s history, it has also played an important part in early European contact with Africa, drawing explorers and adventurers from Europe as far back as the fifteenth century, many of whose exploits paved the way for future European expansionism and, eventually, colonial control.[9] With the exception of Ethiopia, a country never colonized, but occupied for five years by Italy, much of this European control was not relinquished until the mid-twentieth century.

The recent historical development of the Nile Basin includes three major phases over the last 150 years. The first phase from the late nineteenth century to after the Second World War was an era of almost total social and economic domination by European powers. From after the Second World War to the late 1980s there was a period of colonial “unbundling” of control and exploitation, giving way to ideologies and political systems influenced by the state ideologies developing within the cold war bipolar world. Frequently, the legacy left behind was one of competing nationalisms between newly independent states, and within the more centrally controlled states, challenges to state legitimacy by rebel groups.[10]

The third major shift has taken place from the end of the 1980s onwards. As the cold war gave way to a new system of global political control dominated by one superpower, realignments, regime change, and new policy directions emerged during the 1990s. In particular the economic situation of many basin states shifted to more open, free-market economic systems causing major social and economic wrenches. It is within this era of substantial social, economic, and political change that the emergence of the Nile Basin Initiative has taken place and the major ideas and concepts of the Nile Basin Initiative have been framed.

 

Contemporary Politics

This era of superpower “satellite” politics in the basin witnessed key state development processes including, in the case of Egypt, heavy reliance on an “import substitution” model up until the end of the 1960s. In other states including Sudan,Tanzania, and Ethiopia, the command-led approach to economic development was supported at various points by strong trading links with the Soviet Union. Many states continued interventionist economic policies up until the late 1970s. Ethiopia remained an exception until the late 1960s, and went in the reverse economic direction to many other basin states during the 1970s, increasing its level of centralized, state-led development under Mengistu Haile Mariam. Indeed, as Egypt under Anwar Sadat approached a new era of“infitah” – or the “opening up” of the economy – Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile Mariam undertook major nationalization of capital assets, including land.

During the 1980s conflicts in key Nile states re-emerged, including civil conflict in Sudan, and in Ethiopia a new intensification in the civil war, with rebels emanating from northern parts of Ethiopia and Eritrea (a province of Ethiopia at that time) fighting to overthrow Mengistu’s government. The military support provided by different sides based on regional and international cold war allegiances – in particular the role of the Soviet Union in providing concessionary oil and huge amounts of military hardware to Ethiopia – helped to fuel and prolong the conflicts. Many of these arms remain in the area and help to fuel smaller conflicts at the local level.

Because of this reliance on external support, with the rapid collapse of the Eastern bloc in the late 1980s major political changes took place in Ethiopia, and by 1991 the government had fallen to the rebel groups.

In parallel with statist ideological development at this time, there were other strands of thinking developing more widely in the region that challenged both secular concepts of socialist and capitalist development, namely the emergence of a form of political Islam. By the late 1980s this had influenced the formation of a new government in Sudan, and for most of the 1990s has shaped both external, international relations between Sudan and key states in Western Europe and the United States, and regional-level relationships.

Under this shifting mosaic of ideological and political developments, the contemporary politics of the region have frequently been extremely violent, from local to national to international level. In recent years major wars have been fought between co-riparian states and/or their proxies, including the Ethiopian–Eritrean “Border War” in the late 1990s, the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and conflict in Southern Sudan. While the River Nile is a single physical unifying factor, its broader socioeconomic and political capacity to unify has yet to be developed.

 

Legal Issues

The legal regime on the Nile is in theory governed by rules and norms of international law on the sharing of international waters that emerged during the twentieth century, partly in response to the untenable “Harmon Doctrine.” Until the middle of the nineteenth century this doctrine had inferred absolute sovereignty of the state over its territory, and by extensions, a freedom to do what it wished with waters flowing in international rivers through that territory. Subsequently both the Helsinki Rules of 1966 and the ILC rules brought in concepts of cooperation, equitable distribution of waters, due consultation over proposed projects, and adequate compensation. By the latter part of the twentieth century the International Convention on the Non- Navigational Uses International WaterCourses (UN) brought in a substantial body of international law that included principles on sharing benefits, as well as waters. To date the Convention has not been ratified by any Nile riparian state.

Specific to the Nile Basin itself, there have been a great number of legal documents and diplomatic exchanges on the sharing and use of the Nile’s waters since the latter part of the nineteenth century. (The major instruments are tabulated in Table 2 of original publication). They illustrate clearly the ways in which competing interests on the Nile have vied to assert control, if not sovereignty, over the access to the waters of the Nile, largely through bilateral agreements – and often between very unequal negotiating entities.

One of the key challenges underlying development of the current initiative is the need to move beyond bilaterism in the achievement of future agreement on legal principle, while not starting full renegotiation of existing treaties. In many ways the process has moved beyond the need for future treaties. This “backgrounding” of legal issues in managing and allocating the Nile waters reflects an important shift in the way such issues are perceived and used by the riparian states themselves. They have moved from an earlier era of bellicose assertions of prior, historic rights and national sovereignty over water courses, to a “common vision” of development of the Nile that seeks: “to achieve sustainable socioeconomic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources.” The significance of this joint statement lies in its emphasis on equitable usage and socioeconomic development. It demonstrates a shift to a view of sharing between states based on maximizing shared benefits, rather than focusing on the water resources themselves. There is a significant reflection of the UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of Watercourses in the vision, namely the usage of the term “equitable.” For downstream states this represents acknowledgement – albeit implicit – of the need (if not the right) to upstream water resources development which at some point will impact on shares as currently allocated under the 1959 Agreement (See Table 2 ). For upstream states this also implies the redundancy of insisting on renegotiations as a starting point if, in many senses, the NBI has taken their position beyond the negotiating table and directly to the implementation of actions on the ground within a cooperative framework.

None the less, the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement remains the point of departure for Egypt and Sudan, certainly in terms of their bilateral relationship, and under it, they form in effect a “joint position,” on the NBI. It is also important to see the Agreement in the context of regional political development at the time. For both states – but in particular Egypt – it represented important new expressions of independence that were extremely politically symbolic.[11] For Egypt, the Aswan High Dam represented a historic solution to its perceived water insecurity, namely the capture of an entire annual flood under one structure lying wholly within its territory (although the reservoir stretched far into Sudanese Nubia). The 1959 NWA for Sudan also represented a major improvement in its share of the Nile waters (See Table 2 in original publication for a comparison with the 1929 Agreement).

The NWA effectively divided all the Nile waters between the two riparian states on the basis of an assumed annual average discharge as measured at Aswan of 84 bcm. The division – 55.5 bcm to Egypt and 18.5 bcm toSudan – took into account anticipated losses to evaporation in the soon to be constructed Lake Nasser/Nubia of some 10 bcm per annum. The key legal principle within the Agreement was expressed as “present acquired rights.” Historic patterns of usage took precedence, in effect, over the future need of other upstream states.Ethiopia took exception to the Agreement and refused to recognize its legitimacy.[12] Nevertheless, until very recently the NWA remained the basis of the position taken by the two key riparian states (See Table 2).

Ethiopia’s position was strengthened at the time by the strong connection to US foreign policy interests. With Egypt moving towards the Soviet sphere of influence, the United States took advantage of Ethiopia’s reaction to the NWA by proposing a study of the development of the upstream Nile waters in Ethiopia. By 1964 the US Bureau of Reclamation had produced the Blue Nile Waters Study, which included proposals for a series of huge dams and irrigation schemes in Ethiopia. These projects never came to fruition, yet helped to stoke Egyptian fears surrounding the actions of upstream riparians.

 

Socioeconomic Development

The hydrological and geographical variability of the Nile Basin are matched by socioeconomic differences between countries. The range of income levels and the structural differences between national economies spans Egypt – a middle-income, industrializing nation – at one end of the scale, to many upstream states that in an economic sense are a fraction of the size of Egypt and are weighed down by debt, static or declining economies, and huge externalities caused, amongst other things, by internal conflict and the impact of diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria.

The significance of agriculture in the different economies also varies widely as a proportion of GDP, which is of key significance in terms of water usage. Workers engaged in agriculture constitute 80 to 90 percent of the total workforce in the Equatorial Plateau and East African countries. This drops to between 70 and 75 percent in Congo and the Sudan and to 42 percent in Egypt. Similarly, the proportion of hydropower produced by the various states is related in many cases to the seasonality of flows, the capacity to capture the resource, and the relationship of water storage to irrigation potential. Internal food production as opposed to import dependency varies in both type (staple foods) and quantity (proportion purchased externally and/or provided in the form of food aid).

The key issue arising out of this diversity of contexts, which is of relevance to turning cooperative frameworks into long-term development processes, is that the solutions to benefit sharing have to begin with the actual needs of people. At the most basic level the ten states vary hugely in population terms, from over 60 million in each of Ethiopia and Egypt, to under 10 million in Rwanda, Burundi, and Eritrea. Half of the states have populations of over 20 million, ensuring that the development needs vary hugely in qualitative and quantitative terms.

There are also great variations in livestock populations and in area and population density, from just 26,300 km2in Burundi to Sudan, which at 2,505,800 km2, is the largest state (by area) in Africa. There are implications for the integration of remoter areas of the basin within new development processes.

At a macro level, Egypt’s economy dwarfs all the other economies (see Figure bellow). GNI per head ranges widely, from only US$100 in Ethiopia to more than fourteen times that amount –US$1,490 – in Egypt. In addition, the proportion of the amount that accrues to agriculture in Ethiopia is substantially more than in Egypt.

The concept of “benefit sharing” mentioned earlier neatly encapsulates one key issue in any basin-wide cooperative process. That is the creation of more equitable development within the basin, and the flattening of charts such as the Figure above. Clearly linked to this issue is the need to turn the Nile’s development into economic growth and stability in the nine other major basin states. Yet, within this hugely diverse social and economic environment, inhabited by economies with few major linkages between one another and with massive divergence in financial strength, economic structure, and growth trajectories, building an equitable basis for benefit sharing will be difficult. One starting point may well be a clearer focus on addressing poverty, defined in human development terms.

These disparities in poverty reduction capability in the basin, and the difference in scope and extent of poverty, ensure that benefit sharing needs to have a basic poverty focus, even to the extent that cross-subsidization of poverty reduction approaches might take place between states as part of the benefit-sharing process. Some of the development trajectories and possible poverty challenges arising under the NBIs program of work are outlined inTable 5(See original publication).

 

Information and Data Issues

The issue of information and data use is central in assessing and responding to the development needs of basin states as well as developing effective and transparent institutions and processes of cooperation. Part of the challenge is knowing how and where to develop the basin resources in order to maximize benefits for states through more efficient as well as equitable use of the resource. Much of the data management environment to date has focused on river flows, addressing the problems of water management mentioned earlier.

Data collection on the Nile provided the thread that wove together early attempts at collaborative development. However, on its own it falls far short of providing a sound framework for development and of overcoming differences and disputes between states. This partly reflects the concern felt by some states that earlier efforts were little more than a distraction from key water allocation issues.

The history of collecting data on the Nile is thousands of years old, and testament to this is the proliferation ofNilometers along the river, the best-preserved being the Nilometer on Roda Island, Cairo. However, apart from the sharing of data between British experts under condominal and colonial control in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, it was not until the 1960s that concerted data sharing was attempted. The Hydromet project(initially driven by the rising levels of Lake Victoria caused by exceptional rainfall in the early 1960s) was established in 1967 between Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Supported by the UNDP and theWorld Meteorological Program, its objectives included collection and analysis of data for the Lakes Victoria, Kyoga, and Albert catchments and a study of the water balance of the Nile. However, regional political difficulties in the 1970s forced the project’s premature closure following the withdrawal of Kenya and Tanzania. It ended officially in 1992.

More recently, significant data acquisition models have been developed by, amongst others, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)under the auspices of projects including “Operation Water Resources Management and Information Systems for the Nile Basin Countries,” and “Information Systems for Water Resources Planning and Monitoring in the Lake Victoria region.” These projects have included significant capacity building elements in Upper Nile countries, related closely to monitoring improved sustainable water resources development.

In the early 1990s, Tecconile came into being, supported by CIDA, and included elements concerned with strengthening data processing and GIS/Image Analysis Systems and the implementation of basin-wide networking on data sharing. Tecconile covered nine basin states, with Ethiopia and Kenya acting as observers. Its longerterm objective was to help develop and conserve the Nile waters in an integrated and sustainable manner and to determine the “equitable entitlement” of each riparian state to use of the Nile waters. In the short term the idea was to develop national master plans and to integrate these plans into a wider Nile Basin plan. The original institutional model included the establishment of a Council of Ministers (meeting once a year) and a Technical Committee. While in its own terms the project did not develop to completion, it provided the seed for more concerted efforts at achieving substantial socioeconomic and political cooperation on the Nile. This is examined in the next section.

 

The Development Challenge

 

Building a Cooperative Framework (the 1990s)

As preceding sections have shown, cooperative development of the Nile has, in practice, been undertaken for many decades. However, the level of cooperation has not been anywhere near effective or comprehensive enough to address the growing demand for water both upstream and downstream in the basin.

Earlier sections have illustrated how external political conditions to enable cooperation were not in place until fifteen years ago. Their eventual emergence has subsequently enabled the rapid development of an institutional structure and decisionmaking process that has radically transformed the development environment in the Nile Basin since the early 1990s.

A number of international meetings took place regarding the Nile (including one hosted in London and another in Cairo during the early part of the 1990s) in response to both the opening up of political space within the basin and a growing awareness that future development options would require more strategic and multi-sectoral thinking. This changing landscape culminated in the meeting of Nile Water Ministers in December 1992 at which the Tecconile project was established for a transitional period. The Tecconile initiative resulted in a basin-wide “action plan” – the Nile River basin Action Plan (NRBAP), supported by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). In tandem a series of Nile conferences – Nile 2002 series – started in 1993 bringing together “technical experts” from all Nile Basin countries. Subsequent meetings were held in Khartoum (1994) and other states of the Nile Basin including Ethiopia in 1997. Originally launched “to provide an informal mechanism for riparian dialogue and the exchange of views between countries, as well as with the international community” (NBI, 2001), the meetings also enabled informal contact between officials of riparian states and with external “facilitating” organizations.

Approved by the NileCOM in Arusha in February 1995, the NRBAP included sections on:

  • integrated water resources planning and management
  • capacity building
  • training
  • regional cooperation
  • environmental protection and enhancement (mainly concentrating on the White Nile).

It became, in effect, the template for the much larger Nile Basin Initiative later in the decade.

Although initially Egypt was the main instigator of Nile technical dialogs, and Ethiopia remained an observer to such dialogs (skeptical of what it saw as slow processes with little effective dialog on key issues), by the early 1990s Ethiopia itself had begun to demand a more comprehensive basin-wide organization “agreed upon by all co-basin states.” Ethiopia submitted a “framework of cooperation” between the Nile River co-basin states for the Undugu meeting held in Addis Ababa in May 1992.[13] The country remained dubious as to the strength and importance of some of the earlier efforts, but reaffirmed its commitment to a major new undertaking at the Second Nile 2002 meeting in Khartoum held in 1994:

“There have been various efforts to bring about cooperation among the Nile co-basin countries, most of which have been initiated under the auspices of the UN agencies. Yet, these initiatives have not been success stories because of their narrow scope and failure to address the real issues involved within the Nile Basin. Some of the major cooperative efforts that have been initiated within the Nile Basin include: the Hydromet Project, the Bangkok Ministerial Meeting, the ECA/UNDP initiative, the Undugu Group, two FAO initiatives on basin-wide water resources information system, the UNEP initiative on Environmental Action Plan, and the Tecconile as a follow up to the Hydromet project”.[14]

In public there was continued jockeying for position between key riparian states in the mid-1990s. It was an important time of “position definition,” including, at a bilateral level, between Ethiopia and Sudan. The former was pressing its case for a more comprehensive understanding of “equitable utilization” whilst the latter (as well as Egypt) argued that Ethiopia did not share the same dependence on the Nile and had other major water sources that could be exploited. A Sudanese official’s reply to Ethiopia’s concern that equitable utilization be examined more comprehensively made the point that:

“In our opinion the water national master plan should comprise the waters [of the Nile] and other water resources because the relevant factors to be considered for the equitable entitlement include the knowledge of available water resources other than the shared basin.”[15]

Nevertheless, the shift in thinking by Ethiopia was picked up quickly by Egypt, and in 1994 the then Egyptian Minister of Public Works and Water Resources reflected the major shift in Egyptian thinking on the Nile, stating that:

“Egypt supports without reservations the development process in Ethiopia for the benefit of the Ethiopian people, especially in the Nile Basin Region, within the context of constructive consultations and a real start for confidence building, clearness, and transparency. The outcome result will, I am sure, be a win game.”[16]

 

Institutionalizing Cooperation (the NBI)

In spite of the glasnost in relations between formerly belligerent co-riparians, moving from relations characterized by political conflict to new forms of cooperation required significant institutional development. It was not sufficient that the countries were now in a position to develop institutional cooperation; they required external assistance in order to facilitate this process. In 1997, the Nile Ministers requested that the World Bank establish a fundraising group for cooperative projects on the Nile. The Nile Basin Initiative that developed out of this request represented a re-emergence of the earlier NRBAP. It now forms the most important basin-level approach to cooperative development of the Nile waters ever undertaken, and its significance extends well beyond the basin itself.

The Nile Basin Initiative describes itself as a “transitional arrangement until a permanent legal and institutional framework is in place” (NBI, 2000) and comprises a Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin (Nile-COM), a Technical Advisory Committee (Nile-TAC) and a Secretariat (Nile-SEC), the latter located in Entebbe.[17]

Focusing on a process-oriented approach, the NBI firstly sought to establish a common point of departure for allstakeholders, namely the NBI “Vision.” This aimed at framing the tasks to be institutionalized within subsidiary action programs (SAP) at a sub-basin level. These SAPs aimed to “identify and implement investment projects that confer mutual benefits at the sub-basin level and that the riparians agree to pursue cooperative [activities]” (NBI, 2000).

The “visioning process” took six months to complete, and the wording of it required major revision, discussion, and fine-tuning. Nevertheless, the importance of establishing the “vision” lay as much in the process undertaken as in the end result, and by bringing together all the co-riparians (except for Eritrea which, at the time, remained an observer) raised important discussion on key legal and development issues.

The success to date of the NBI lies in one of its institutional innovations, namely the application of the principle of subsidiarity, or management of the basin at the lowest appropriate level.[18] This has led to institutional division into an “eastern Nile” comprising Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt (and Eritrea too, were it to formalize its participation), and the Nile “equatorial lakes” countries (comprising Kenya, Uganda,Tanzania, the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundias well as Egypt and Sudan). The inclusion of the latter two represents recognition of the importance of the White Nile to both countries. The basic rationale is that in reducing decision-making complexity the process of cooperation can be facilitated.

Under this principle, the NBI established two Subsidiary Action Plans (See Appendices in original publication), much of which emerged out of the earlier NRBAP project. The Eastern Nile program and the Nile Equatorial Lakes program aimed to express the vision in terms of actions on the ground, bringing high level political engagement and agreement to socioeconomic development within the states themselves.[19] In tandem with these action programs, a shared vision program would help to continue to support the process of cooperation, included within which were a number of cross cutting projects:

  • Nile Basin Transboundary Action
  • Regional Power Trade
  • Efficient Use for Agricultural Production
  • Water Resources Planning and Management
  • Applied Training
  • Confidence-Building and Stakeholder Involvement
  • Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing (see appendices).

This program was envisaged to “create an enabling environment for cooperative management and development … through a limited but effective set of basin-wide activities and projects” (NBI, 2001).

Since 2001 the major preoccupation of the process has been the establishment of sound funding for this portfolio of projects and programs. To this end, the International Consortium on the Cooperative Development of the Nile (ICCON) was created and held its first meeting in Geneva (ICCON 1) in June 2001, at which it received pledges from donors of US$120 million over a six to eight-year time frame. ICCON’s long-term aim as a partnership of riparian states and the international community is to promote joint funding, transparency, and more broadly to raise support for the NBI. One of the key process issues is the establishment of a multidonor Nile Basin Trust Fund to provide “streamlined, cost-effective funding … which would consolidate donor support and ensure the clarity and cohesiveness of the program” (NBI, 2000). Following Parliamentary approval of the NBI’s new international organization status under Ugandan law in September 2002, it was envisaged that the NTF would shortly come under the management of the Nile Basin Secretariat.

In total, the cost of financing the NBI is estimated to be in the order of US$140 million for the Shared Vision Program project implementation, US$30 million for the Subsidiary Action Program project preparation and general NBI facilitation, and program management – crucially, including riparian dialogue as well as program oversight – some US$10 million.

The NBI in 2003 – appropriately the International Year of Freshwater – is now at the stage of moving from the development of cooperation and the institutionalization of this process to the achievement of development through joint multilateral and bilateral projects. This is a crucial test for the whole initiative and the principles on which it is built. The credibility of the external facilitation process is also at stake. Proof of success will not, in the long term, reside in cooperative frameworks or even the absence of major international conflict; rather it will lie in the capacity of processes and institutions to translate cooperation into development, and development that achieves poverty reduction from the local level upwards. One of the major challenges to ensuring the sustainability of the NBI is in creating a process of institutional support at all levels, including civil society at regional, national, and local levels. The importance of this challenge has been emphasized within the Nile Basin Discourse Project(undertaken since 2001) that attempts to facilitate dialogue about the NBI and to establish learning processes for institutions involved in Nile Basin-related activities be they environmental,socioeconomic, or cultural. In 2003 a formal Nile Basin Discourse Desk was established in Entebbe.

 

Lessons and Cautions

 

Cooperation is Not Necessarily Development

Some of the early external facilitation of Nile Basin cooperation by the World Bank focused on issues including the need to “level the playing field” through building national capacity and identifying national priorities, as well as correcting what it saw as “information asymmetry.” A second focus was to move from dialog to actions, within which there was a need to develop dialog on different tracks (for instance, information, capacity, technology) as well as to “start with the achievable and avoid getting bogged down in formulae.” This also sought to recognize that “progress on complex water systems may be slow, but dialog needs to be sustained and trust needs to be established.” Finally there was the aim to “seek opportunities for mutually beneficial programs or projects.” This latter concept of the “win–win” has come to dominate much of the thinking on the NBI, particularly in terms of win–wins in benefit sharing (Hirji and Grey, 1997°

The premise of much of the NBI cooperative framework is that win–wins are achievable, and demonstrably so,through integrated project development. This involves the creation of cooperative frameworks that enable links between cooperation and development to be made, not just in terms of joint funding, management, and the development of projects – the easy part of cooperation – but in terms of joint benefit sharing from such projects. This is a complicated achievement to monitor, and yet in the end the establishment of “equity” as the basis for an operational framework within the Nile Basin demands success in delivering tangible and shared development benefits at all levels, and not simply cooperative frameworks and joint management of institutions.

The tables in the appendices that detail the NBI’s major programs illustrate the nature and level of the national and basin-wide institutional and process complexity within the basin. (See original publication) . At a national level the process will become particularly convoluted, with at least seven or eight NBI-related (or discourse-related) institutional structures at least nominally being established in each state. This will add increased pressure – but admittedly bring in more resources – to existing national-level institutions, from water ministries and departments, to environmental, agricultural, and finance ministries and departments. As far as possible this needs to be mainstreamed within existing processes in order to avoid the problem of duplication, overloading of processes and institutions, and perhaps increased rent-seeking behavior. Such questions are really at the heart of the challenge of shifting from the cooperative to the developmental framework. Avoiding conflict is not that difficult because, arguably, conflict over water was never really a major issue. However, taking the positive step to build development processes into greater cooperation similarly challenges the basin states, because formerly there has not been a great level of regional integration in social, political, and institutional development. To that extent the NBI can help to establish a basis for wider socio-political objectives as well.

 

Development is Not (Necessarily) Poverty Reduction

In this shift from cooperation to development, there needs to be more than just commitment to national development. Qualitatively speaking, it has to address the question of economic and social equity and the inter- and intra-national levels. Even developments generated within the basin – perhaps trade in power or better environmental management – do not necessarily enable poverty reduction. And yet this has to become the major focus of all efforts at taking the initiative forwards. Therefore, in the coming years cooperation needs to be grounded in wider development concepts. As an example, whilst one of the key ENSAP projects on Watershed Management is addressing an issue of major concern to highland farming in Ethiopia, its success will in large part depend on its capacity to integrate learning generated elsewhere within the project, including earlier examples of watershed management undertaken in other regions of Ethiopia. It may be easier to reach cooperation on development options between states than it is to get local-level agreement within states. As a general rule this is likely to apply to a whole range of major infrastructure projects on the river identified under the NBI.

Success of the NBI will, in large part, rest on being able to meet this challenge. NBI development projects need to be mainstreamed within regional, national, and local development processes, and not simply exist in parallel, labeled as “water resource-“ or “river basin-“ focused. This urgent challenge has yet to become effectively internalized within the process.

The Nile Basin is at a key juncture in its history. There is a major need to maintain the integrity of the river system itself in the face of rapidly rising demand, while at the same time demonstrate how the river can be utilized more productively and equitably. If the NBI is to work it also needs to be able to demonstrate early success. This will also help in the spill-over effect on a range of development issues, including increasing the social and economic stability that is essential to helping to achieve political stability in conflict-prone regions.

As an end in itself the NBI does not go far enough: cooperative processes need to be geared to specific goals of development, and poverty reduction related to wider socioeconomic development. But it has traveled a long way to date. A reassessment of direction and impact may soon be required, in order to steer the process from successful cooperation to successful development.

Nile River Water War Inevitable

Water war

Egypt’s precious Nile water is wanted by outsiders, Reem Leila reports

An international water expert is claiming there are intensified efforts by an unnamed neighbouring country to funnel off the waters of the River Nile after approaching scarcity in its water resources. Such an assertion, says Ahmed Diab, a global expert on water, is likened to attempts by the US to revive the idea of transferring the storage of water from its current location in Lake Nasser to any of Africa’s Great Lakes in the central African continent, where the water will then pool into a giant reservoir to be sold to whichever country wants it. The use of pipelines in transporting the water would be similar to that of the movement ofpetroleum.

The availability of fresh water is a serious concern in many parts of the world. Due to the shortage of available fresh water, nearly 40 per cent of the world’s population, mainly in the developing countries, is already facing serious water shortages. And more and more nations are gradually joining the list. “Accordingly, nations might be on the verge of a water war by the end of this century,” Diab said. This is in addition to the encouragement of the long-serving scheme of trying to divert the course of the River Nile in Ethiopia. Diab maintained that the US Bureau of Land Reclamation was currently working on the scheme.

According to an official source at the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) who spoke to Al-Ahram Weekly on condition of anonymity, these plans were close to being implemented but that was before the High Dam was built. The plan was for the Nile waters to be stored in Tana Lake in Ethiopia but now, according to the source, because of the High Dam there are merits to water storage. After the building of the High Dam, Egypt has been receiving continuous, observable and constant amounts of water. “According to these three elements Egypt has a historical right to save the water of the Nile in Lake Nasser and none of the continent’s countries or any other country has the authority to violate this right. Accordingly nothing will change and Egypt’s Lake Nasser is and will be the continent’s storage area,” the source confirmed.

Diab believes that water resources in Egypt are becoming scarce. Surface-water resources originating from the Nile are now fully exploited, while groundwater sources are being brought into full production. Egypt is facing increasing water needs demanded by a rapidly growing population, by increased urbanisation, by higher standards of living and by an agricultural policy which emphasises expanded production in order to feed the growing population. The population is currently increasing by more than 1.5 million people a year. “With a population of 80 million, Egypt is in dire need of revising its water resource plans in order not to suffer any water shortage in the future,” Diab said. According to Diab, by the end of 2008 Egypt will be consuming 11 billion cubic metres of water a year which means nearly 815 cubic metres per person annually. In contrast, individuals in other surrounding countries use up only 300 cubic metres. “Egypt’s actual requirements should be only three billion cubic metres per year. The remaining amount is being wasted and shed either in the Mediterranean or in small water canals,” Diab added. This requires good management of water and coordination with the countries of the River Nile Basin as well as the establishment of joint water projects, “such as clearing waterways of grass in return for increasing Egypt’s annual share of water and increasing it from 55.5 billion cubic metres to 85 billion metres per year,” Diab suggested.

The Egyptian government has long recognised upstream development of the Nile waters as a potential national security threat and has stated its readiness to go to war to preserve its access to fresh water. As the Basin’s governments come to understand the dynamics of the population-water relationship, however, advance planning and diplomacy may win out over saber rattling and armed conflict. Recently, representatives of the 10 nations of the Nile watershed met to review past agreements and consider possible future ones related to their use of this shared natural resource.

The main objective of water planning in Egypt has been to harness the highly fluctuating Nile flows, making them available for domestic and productive purposes. The means of fulfilling this objective have been to establish over-season storage, over-year storage, and flood control. These goals were basically achieved in the 1960s following the inauguration of the Aswan High Dam.

According to a water report issued by MWRI the growing interest in the region’s water issues is encouraging, but the challenge of reconciling competing claims on the Nile will continue to be complicated by political and economic concerns. The scope for water conservation and international cooperation is large, but the competition is unlikely to find permanent resolution until the region’s population approaches stabilisation. the report stated that Lake Nasser can hold up to 162 billion cubic metres of water while the Toshka depression can absorb a further 90 to 120 billion cubic metres. At the peak of the flood season, Lake Nasser was receiving up to 750 million cubic metres of water a day. The total volume of water behind the dam currently stands at 153.91 billion cubic metres. “Increasing Egypt’s share of the Nile water and reducing the watershed are on top of Egypt’s agenda, to be discussed in the summit of African ministers of water resources within the next few weeks,” the report stated

The world’s population is currently increasing nearly 80 million people per year, resulting in an increasing demand for fresh water of about 64 billion cubic metres a year. With this phenomenal population growth, there is, in addition to the water requirements for domestic use, an increasing demand for energy generation, agricultural intensification and industrial production. As a result of the growth in the human population, the per capita water supply on the Earth was reduced to an average of 8,500 cubic metres in the early 90s, which is equivalent to 8,500,000 litres per year. According to hydrologists, if the annual per capita fresh water availability of a country goes below 500 cubic metres (500,000 litres), the country enters the category of “absolute water scarcity”.

Dated Case Study on the Nile River Water Conflict

 Case Background

1. Abstract

The Nile river is the main source of water for the nine nations which make up the Nile basin. As is, the water provided by the river is barely enough to satisfy the enormous water demands of the region. By the year 2000, it is expected that at least six of the nine nations which share the Nile’s water will experience acute water stress (Ohlsson, 50). Access to the Nile’s waters has already been defined as a vital national priority by countries such as Egypt and Sudan. It is an issue over which the two nation’s have professed themselves willing to got to war over. Current tensions between Egypt and Sudan, its neighbor to the south, are merely a continuation of a two thousand year-old struggle over who will control the regions scarce water resources. As more of the nations in the Nile valley develop their economies, the need for water in the region will increase. And while the demand for resources increases, the supply is likely to remain unchanged, drastically increasing the chances for armed conflict over the waters of the Nile river. In addition, development projects that are aimed at increasing the flow of the Nile remain endangered by tension and instability in the region, as well as by environmental and financial concerns.

2. Description

The Nile probably gets its name form “nahal” which means “river valley” in Semitic, later “neilos” in Greek and “nilus” in Latin. It is the world’s longest river, stretching 4,187 miles from its source in the mountains of Burundi. The source of the river is so far from the Mediterranean that it took man until the middle of the 20th century to find it (Adv, 1). For centuries, the most accurate source of knowledge on the location of this source were the writings of Herodotus (Greek Historian, 460 BC), who wrote that the Nile’s source was a deep spring between two tall mountains. When Nero ordered his centurions to follow the flow of the river in order to find its source, they got no further than the impenetrable valley of the Sudd. John Henning Speke thought that he had finally found the source when he reached Lake Victoria in 1862, only to be later proven wrong and forgotten by history. In 1937, the source was finally stumbled upon by the little known German explorer Bruckhart Waldekker (Collins, 4-8). 

The Nile is formed by three tributaries, the Blue Nile, the White Nile, and the Atbara. The White Nile rises from its source in Burundi, passes through Lake Victoria, and flows into southern Sudan. There, near the capital city of Khartoum, the White Nile meets up with the Blue Nile which has its source in the Ethiopian highlands, near Lake Tana. Over 53% of the Nile’s waters come from the Blue Nile. The two flow together to just north of Khartoum, where they are joined by the waters of the Atbara, whose source is also located in the Ethiopian highlands (Ody, 1).

The river then flows north through Lake Nasser, the second largest man-made lake in the world, and the Aswan Dam before splitting into two major distributaries just north of Cairo. The two distributaries are the Rosetta branch to the west and the Darneita to the east. In ancient times, the number of distributaries was much greater, but slow water flow, human interference, and the accumulation of silt had led to the disappearance of all the other major distributaries. This has effectively led to the desertification of large stretches of Egyptian land.(Ody, 1)

The Conflict

In ancient Egypt, the Nile, and its delta, were worshiped as a god. The god Hapi, who came in the shape of a frog, represented the Nile delta. Several times throughout history, Egyptians have tried to unify the Nile valley under their rule by conquering the Sudan. The lands to the south of them that bordered the river were in constant danger. The Sudan was invaded during the reign of Queen Sheba, during the Roman rule of Nero, and countless other times. This is because the Egyptians have always feared that one day the Nile’s waters would no longer reach their country. People believed, that since the flow of the Nile was so unpredictable, something had to have been affecting it. A legend says that during one particularly bad famine in Egypt, the Egyptian Sultan sent his ambassadors to the king of Ethiopia in order to plead with him not the obstruct the waters. A Scottish traveler in the 18th century recounted a story that the King of Ethiopia had sent a letter to the pasha in 1704 threatening to cut off the water. Given this fear it is quite natural that the Nile countries desire to secure their water supplies.(Collins, 3-4)

The modern history of the Nile conflict began with the 20th century. The English were quick to realize the importance the river would have for their colonies. Over the centuries, in the swamps of the Sudd, strong winds and the force of the river had created natural dams made up of plants and soil, similar to those made by beavers. These dams had made all navigation up the Nile past a certain point completely impossible. Soon after Sudan was reconquered in 1898, the English began to free the Nile of the vegetation which was obstructing the passage of ships. By the time enough blockages had been removed to clear a path through the Sudd in 1904, the English had already begun drawing up massive alternative drainage plans in order to ameliorate the flow of the Nile. However, the British did not control the Ethiopian portions of the Nile, from which over 80% of the Nile’s waters come. Therefore, they had to sign an agreement with the Ethiopians in 1902 in order to assure themselves that the Nile would not be interfered with. They also had to assert a significant amount of pressure on the Italians and the French so that they would not interfere with the french dominance of the Nile basin (Collins, 67-100). This approach worked well with the Italians, but a little less well with the French. The Egyptians caused the most problems for the English as planned developments on the Nile became a disputed matter between the two governments. In 1929, Great Britain sponsored the Nile Water Agreement, which regulated the flow of the Nile and apportioned it use (Glassman, 150).

After World War II, the British government commissioned a complete hydrological study to be made of the Nile Basin as a whole. Unfortunately, the study was not able to include the Ethiopian portions of the Nile due to political problems. The rest of the Nile valley was included. The study was finally released in 1958 as the Report on the Nile Valley Plan. It was the culmination of 50 years of study. The report suggested various ways to increase the amount of water which reached Egypt. The most important of these suggestions was the construction of the Jonglei canal, which would divert the flow of the Nile in southern Sudan (in the Sudd) to avoid the enormous evaporation losses which occur there. The report, however, treated the entire Nile Basin as a single unity, which was unacceptable to the newly independent African states, especially since it was published just two years after the Suez Canal incident (Ohlsson, 31-34)

Furthermore, the Egyptians had already planned a major construction which would significantly improve the flow of the Nile in their territories. They had decided to build the High Aswan Dam in order to control the yearly floods of the Nile and in order to harvest the hydroelectric power of the river. However, this project was to have major repercussions on the lands of northern Sudan. Building this dam would mean that whole sections of northern Sudan would be inundated by what was to be Lake Nasser. There were also severe environmental concerns as to how the dam would change life on the banks of the Nile. To deal with this problem, the two nation signed an agreement on the “full utilization of the Nile waters” in 1959. This agreement stipulated that Sudan’s yearly water allotment would rise from the 4 billion cubic meters stipulated in the 1929 agreement to 18.5 billion cubic meters. The Sudan would also be allowed to undertake a series of Nile development projects, such as the Rosieres Dam and the Jonglei Canal. In exchange, Egypt would be allowed to build a huge dam near the Sudanese border which would regulate the flow of the river into Egypt and provide water during droughts. The result of this dam, however, would be the inundation of over 6,500 square kilometers of land. The treaty also formed a joint committee which would be in charge of supervising and directing all development projects which affected the flow of the river (Ohlosson, 35-40).

This agreement was only bilateral and did no include any of the other riparian countries of the Nile despite the fact that it portioned out all of the Nile’s water. Ethiopia, from which 80% of the water comes from was not even consulted and no water was even allotted for future usage by any upstream country except Sudan. All of the Nile’s average water flow is divided between the two most downstream countries. Nevertheless, this 1959 agreement is still the most comprehensive agreement ever signed on the use of the Nile’s waters.

Apparently, the residents of northern Sudan and southern Egypt were not consulted on the treaty either. In the 1960′s, over 100,000 Nubians lost their homes due to development projects stemming from that treaty.(Pearce, 29) Some of these same people had to be moved again in the 1990′s in order to build another dam, this time near the border with Ethiopia. The government of Sudan says that these people will be compensated, but the overwhelming feeling amongst the villagers is that they will not be. One villager claimed “We were not informed when the government decided… to build a dam in our area. They just sent tractors with a large number of strangers. These strangers were surveyors.” (Nhail, 1-3). 

Construction of the High Dam at Aswan began in 1959 — as soon the agreement with Sudan was signed. When it was finally finished in 1970, the dam was more than 17 times the volume of the Great Pyramid at El Giza. It now stretches 4 kilometres across the river’s path, rises over 100 meters for its base, and is almost a kilometer thick. Behind it, the waters have formed Lake Nasser, which is 600 kilometers long and 50 kilometers wide in some places. This reservoir is the second largest man-made lake in the world. The Aswan Dam is arguably one of the great architectural accomplishments of the 20th century. To build it, Egypt had to obtain outside funding, because it was to cost over one billion dollars to build. Rebuffed by the United States and the World Bank, Nasser had to turn to the Soviet Union, which was only too glad to help (Pearce, 28-29)

In the 1970′s Sudan and Egypt began the joint construction of the Jonglei Canal, which would have increased the flow of the Nile waters by diverting the Nile away from an area where a great deal of water is lost to evaporation. Unfortunately, construction was stopped in 1983 one hundred kilometers short of completion due to “rebel action”. The civil war in the Sudan has taken its toll on the development project, which was funded in large part by the World Bank. The failure of this project was a great failure for both the Sudanese government and the World Bank. Over 100 million dollars were spent on the Jonglei Canal project (Pearce, 31).

The most complete agreement on the use of the Nile waters remains the 1959 agreement between Sudan and Egypt. This agreement, however, did not put an end to the conflict over the rights to the Nile waters. A strong tension still exists between the Nile basin countries whenever a new Nile development project is proposed. The water needs of all of these countries are barely being met now and will probably not be met in the future, especially in view of the development plans in Ethiopia and Sudan. In addition, Egypt, as the country most in danger of losing access to the Nile waters by development projects in other countries, remains willing and able to intervene militarily in order to keep the status quo.

In August 1994, it was reported that Egypt had planned and subsequently canceled an air raid on Khartoum, in Sudan, where a dam is being built. This is in addition to the tensions between Sudan and Egypt over the attempted assassination of President Muhbarach in the summer of 1995. Border clashes became common between the two neighbors and conflict seemed probable. The tensions have now seemed to subside, but there is no telling when and if they will resume.(El-Kohdary, 1-3)

Egypt has also acted against Ethiopian development on the Nile in the past. In the early 1990′s, it is believed that Egypt blocked an African Development Bank loan to Ethiopia for a project which might have reduced the flow of the Nile’s water into Egypt. This behavior is not unwarranted given predictions by USAID that Egypt will experience a 16 to 30 percent water deficit by the end of the century. This will probably be further increase by further Egyptian development projects planned for the Nile. (El-Kohdary, 1-3)

In 1997, Egypt is to begin the construction of a new valley of the Nile, but creating a new, self-sustaining, river which would flow through the Western Desert. To do this they would cut a canal, called the New Valley Canal, which would connect a series of oases to one another. This would allow Egypt to settle a large number of people far from the Nile; something which has proven impossible up until now. Over 62 million people live on just 4% Egypt’s land. This project would allow Egyptians to take advantage of the good soil quality which is prevalent throughout the country. However, the estimated cost of the project is 2 billion dollars, which Egypt does not have. However, the real problem remains that of where Egypt will find the water to fill the canal and to keep it flowing as it already its full allotment of the Nile’s water (Daniszewski, A1, A16)

3. Duration: In Progress (1904 to now)

4. Location

Continent: Mideast

Region: Mideast Africa

Country: Egypt

5. Actors: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Burundi, Zaire, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya

The main actors, for the moment, are Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia. However, as populations continue to grow and water needs increase in the region, all of the countries in the Nile Basin will be affected.

II. Environment Aspects

6. Type of Environmental Problem: WATER

In Northeastern Africa, water is a scarce commodity. Yet it is also a vital one, as it is needed for irrigated agriculture, industrial expansion, and human consumption, In the Nile basin, the river remains the only reliable source for renewable water supplies. Underground water supplies, or aquifers, an only ba harvested once and will eventually run out. This place the Nile basin countries in a position of reliance on the waters of the Nile. (Postel, 1-23) 

The waters, however, do not flow in sufficient quantities to satisfy the future water requirements of all these nations. The nations are barely satisfied by what they now receive and it is foreseen that their needs will increase as populations rise, industrial growth takes place, and more land is irrigated with Nile water for agricultural use in nations besides Egypt. Egypt’s cropland is already 100% irrigated, fostering an amazing reliance on the flow of the Nile. It is estimated that Ethiopia and Sudan could achieve high levels of food production if they chose to irrigate as much land as possible.

Water stress is present when nations find themselves with less than 2000 cubic meters per person of renewable water supplies. By the end of the century at least five nations in the Nile basin expect themselves to be suffering from water stress. This figure does not include the water that would be needed to feed the citizens of the Nile countries. It is unlikely that the flow of water in the Nile could be increased without the completion of the Jonglei Canal, which, given Sudan’s internal problems, seems highly unlikely in the near future. (Ohlosson, 178-194)

In addition, the environmental situation is further complicated by the problems surrounding the Aswan Dam. Even though the environmental damage to Egypt’s environment caused by the Dam has been much less than originally predicted, it is still quite significant. One major problem is that the silt from the river which for millennia fertilized Egypt’s cropland is no longer being allowed to flow down the river. This means that more chemical fertilizers are being used. It is also causing erosion along the banks of the Nile, which were previously replenished by the silt carried down the river. Much of the Nile delta is now being swept into the Mediterranean. In fact, if barriers near the Nile’s outlet continue to erode, much of low lying Egypt could find itself in the sea, as the sea slowly advances. The Nile is also bringing more salt to the fields of Egypt because of the increased evaporation which takes place in Lake Nasser. (Pearce, 32)

This evaporation also presents a severe problem. Over 2 metres of water evaporate from the surface of Lake Nasser every year. this is because or its location in the middle of the desert. For this reason many opposed the construction of a dam in that location. A similar dam in the highlands of Sudan or Ethiopia would lose much less water. However, if the dam were located elsewhere, Egypt would lose out on the hydroelectric power the dam provides (roughly one third of Egypt’s electricity) (Pearce, 31-32).

7. Type of Habitat: DRY

8. Act and Harm Sites:

Act Site       Harm Site           Example

Egypt          Sudan               Plans for diversion of the Nile

III. Conflict Aspects

9. Type of Conflict: INTERSTATE

Although war has not yet broken out between the nations involved, some believe growing demands may eventually lead to armed conflict. Signs of this trend are already surfacing. There have been numerous skirmishes between Sudanese and Egyptian troops as well as a number of statements made. The nations of the Nile basin have also classified access to the waters of the Nile river as a vital national interest over which they would be willing to go to war.

For now, there has been enough water to satisfy most of the nations’ needs, but in the near future those resources which have been left top them will cease to suffice.

10. Level of Conflict: THREAT

11. Fatality Level of Dispute: >10

III. Environment and Conflict Overlap

12. Environment-Conflict Link and Dynamics: DIRECT

The dynamics are the result of feedback between water resources and development needs, especially water. The internationalization of the issue adds another element.

Causal Diagram

              /--------------------(+)----------------\

              |                     +                 |

           ___V_              _____________          _|__________ 

         /     \ ---(-)->   /             \ -(+)-> /            \ 

        [ Dev't ]     -    [  Water Supply ]  -   [ Agriculture  ] 

         \_____/   <-(+)----\_____________/ <-(-)- \____________/ 

             \                 /\       |               /\        

              \----------------|---(+)--|---------------/

                               |        |

                              (-)   -  (-)

                               |        |

                               |        V

                             ______________

                            /              \

                           [  Int'l Tension ]

                            \______________/

13. Level of Strategic Interest: REGION

14. Outcome of Dispute: YIELD

IV. Related Information and Sources

15. Related ICE and TED Cases

TED Cases
EGYPT Case
ATATURK Case
DANUBE Case
MARSH Case
DEADSEA Case

ICE Cases
BLUENILE Case
LITANI Case
CAUVERY Case
JORDAN River Case

16. Relevant Websites and Literature

  1. Ohlosson, Lief. Hydropolitics: Conflict Over Water as a Developmental Constraint. Zed Books; New Jersey, 1995
  2. Bol Nhail. “Sudan-Environment: Eviction Threat Over New Dam”, Interpress Service, Feb. 28, 1995 as quoted by
  3. El-Kodary, Nabil.”Sudan-Environment: Eviction Threat Over New Dam: Response” March 3, 1995 as quoted byhttp://Sun.nlib.ee/other/infoterra/1995/03/meg00036.html
  4. Glassman, Johnathon, “Nile Waters” Journal of African History. Vol 33, iss 1, pg. 149-150
  5. Postel, Sandra Last Oasis: facing water scarcity. WW Norton and Co., NY, 1992
  6. Collins, Robert O. The Waters of the Nile. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1990
  7. Abu-Zeid and Saad “High Dam, 25 Years On” UNESCO Courrier. May 1993, p.37
  8. Daniszewski, John. ” Egypt Plans a New Valley to Rival the Nile” L.A. Times, Nov. 18, 1996, A1
  9. Pearce, Fred. “High and Dry in Aswan.” New Scientist. May 7, 1994, pg 28-32

10. Relevent Web Sites

Odyssey Down the Nile
Egypt Page 


Go to All ICE Cases

Go to ICE Page Cases

January 18, 2012

Nile River Regional Water Report Intelligence UNDP

Here you MAY be able to download the PDF File. I had difficulty and decided to print it in its entirety here on this blog.

http://waterwiki.net/images/a/ab/NileRegionalWaterIntelReportUNDP.pdf

Regional Water Intelligence Report
The Nile Basin and the
Southern Sudan Referendum
By Jakob Granit (Team leader), Ana Cascao, Inga Jacobs,
Christina Leb, Andreas Lindström and Mara Tignino
Stockholm, December, 2010

Regional Water Intelligence Reports (RWIR)
The purpose of the Regional Water Intelligence Reports (RWIR) is to provide
regular updates on the political economy of transboundary water resources issues,
management and development. The RWIR focuses on the socio-economic aspects
of water management and highlight the links between water, energy, food and
human security from a regional perspective.
Disclaimer: The analysis and policy recommendations of this Report do not
necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme, its
Executive Board, or its Member States. The Report is an independent publication
commissioned by the UNDP. It is the fruit of a collaborative effort by a team of
consultants and advisers managed by SIWI.

Note to the Reader

This Regional Water Intelligence Report (RWIR) examines the current political landscape in the Nile Basin and includes a political and legal analysis of the Southern Sudan independence referendum to be held on 9th January 2011.  The objective is to analyze key political events and their potential impact on Nile cooperation, within the framework of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), with a specific focus on the referendum in Southern Sudan. Some recommendations are explored that the international community could consider taking in the post referendum process to strengthen development and cooperation. The analysis of political events provides input to further analysis on the political economy of water in the Nile basin. The report does not provide a detailed overview of the NBI process to date which is provided elsewhere. Input to the RWIR is based on public referenced information and confidential interviews.
The Report was commissioned by the UNDP Water Governance Facility (WGF), part of the UNDP Water Governance Programme. The report is an independent study to inform UNDP and other actors interested in strategic decision making on current and future regional and national water programming and sustainable investments.
The WGF would like to thank the authors of the Report and colleagues for their inputs and comments.

For the Water Governance Facility,
Håkan Tropp and Alastair Morrison
For the Water Governance Facility,
Håkan Tropp and Alastair Morrison4
Figure 1. Map of the Nile Basin5
Figure 2. Map of Southern Sudan6

Table of Contents
1 Key Messages and Recommendations ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 8
1.1 Key messages ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 8
1.2 Recommendations linked to the four scenarios ……………………………………………………………………….. 12
2 Overview of the Nile Basin Political Landscape ……………………………………………………………………………….. 13
2.1 National level ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13
2.2 Regionalisation processes ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 17
2.2.1 The Tripartite Task Force – EAC, COMESA and SADC ……………………………………………………. 19
2.3 A history of Nile agreements …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 20
2.3.1 Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA)…………………………………….. 20
3 Political and Legal Analysis of the Upcoming Southern Sudan Referendum 2011 ………………………………… 21
3.1 Administrative structure in the North and South……………………………………………………………………….. 21
3.1.1 Special areas………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 22
3.2 Content of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ………………………………………………………….. 23
3.2.1 CPA and water ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 23
3.2.2 Post-referendum negotiations ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 24
3.3 Other peace agreements ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 24
3.3.1 Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement………………………………………………………………………………….. 24
3.3.2 Darfur peace process …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 24
3.4 A legal analysis of secession ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 24
3.4.1 Separation of parts of the territory of a State……………………………………………………………………. 25
3.4.2 Principles of international law to be considered in case of secession ………………………………….. 26
3.4.3 Succession to international treaties and transboundary waters ………………………………………….. 26
3.5 Legal implications in case of separation of the Southern Sudan…………………………………………………. 27
3.5.1 Succession/continuation of international treaties………………………………………………………………. 27
3.5.2 Status of the Cooperative Framework Agreement…………………………………………………………….. 28
4 Key drivers in post referendum scenarios……………………………………………………………………………………….. 28
4.1 Land and Resource-related Conflicts……………………………………………………………………………………… 28
4.2 Food (in)security …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 29
4.3 Southern Sudan: where oil meets water and hydropower assets ……………………………………………….. 29
4.3.1 Oil assets……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 29
4.3.2 Hydropower and regional power markets………………………………………………………………………… 30
4.3.3 The Jonglei diversion canal…………………………………………………………………………………………… 31
4.4 Tribal issues……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 31
5 Hydropolitics and Post Referendum Scenarios………………………………………………………………………………… 32
5.1 Outlook………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 32
5.2 Four scenarios for Southern Sudan ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 33
6 Appendix……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 36
6.1 A time line of political events…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 36
6.2 Colonial background and treaty time line ………………………………………………………………………………… 37
6.2.1 Treaty timeline…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 38
6.3 South Sudan Fact Box- September 2010………………………………………………………………………………… 427
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AANRY Annual Average Natural River Yield
ABC Abyei Boundaries Commission
AEC Assessment and Evaluation Commission
AMCOW African Ministerial Conference on Water
AU African Union
AUHIP African Union High-Level Implementation Panel
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CFA Cooperative Framework Agreement
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC East African Community
EAPP East African Power Pool
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ENSAP Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Programme
EPDRF Ethiopian People‟s Democratic Revolutionary Front
FTA Free Trade Area
GoS Government of Sudan
GoSS Government of Southern Sudan
HEP Hydro Electric Power
ICC International Criminal Court
ICSS Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF International Monetary Fund
INC Interim National Constitution
LVFO Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization
NBI Nile Basin Initiative
NCP National Congress Party
NDP National Democratic Party
NELSAP Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Programme
NELSB Nile Equatorial Lakes Sub Basin
NEPAD The New Partnership for Africa‟s Development
SAP Strategic Action Programme
OAU Organization of African Unity
PCA Permanent Court of Arbitration
PCP Popular Congress Party
PJTC Permanent Joint Technical Commission
REC Regional Economic Communities
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
SACU Southern African Customs Union
SADC Southern African Development Community
SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement
TAC Technical Advisory Committee
TBC Technical Border Committee
UN United Nations
WWII World War II8
1 Key Messages and Recommendations
1
In a statement on November 16, 2010, the rotating UN Security Council President, “urged the parties
to the Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CPA) to ensure peaceful, credible, timely and free
referenda that would reflect the will of the people of Southern Sudan and Abyei”. The President of the
Council further stated that “the Security Council emphasizes that the situation in Sudan represents
one of the most urgent challenges facing the Council…and encourages the efforts to ensure that the
referenda were held on 9 January 2011”.
2
In a press statement on 11 December 2010, the African
Union High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP), chaired by former South African
President, Thabo Mbeki, stated that it “…is confident that the CPA partners can reach comprehensive
and constructive agreements on all the post‐ referendum issues, informed by a commitment to the
mutual viability of the North and the South, regardless of the outcome of the South Sudan
Referendum.”
3
The concerns voiced in the quotes above echo the key concerns this report is putting
forward regarding the implications of forced unity versus secession by Southern Sudan from the North
of Sudan.
This report is providing an analysis of transboundary water resources issues as they relate to the
upcoming January referendum in Sudan. The report recognizes the cooperative efforts carried out
through the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) which has since 1999 provided an international platform for
attempting to build trust between the riparians, identify and promote investment projects at the
subsidiary level and support the negotiations on a basin wide compact. This report does not provide a
detail analysis of the NBI since this information is available elsewhere. We are acknowledging good
progress at the level of the subsidiary investment programs in the Nile Equatorial Lakes Region
Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP), in close partnership with the East African Community (EAC),
and progress towards investment identification in the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program
(ENSAP). The Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA) on transboundary water management
has for the time being not achieved an overall ten country compact. Instead, the Nile Equatorial Lakes
Sub Basin (NELSB) countries, with the exception of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and
Burundi, together with Ethiopia have signed the CFA resulting in political tensions and intensive
diplomatic engagement between the Nile riparians.
The report is intended to inform the international community on the political and economical landscape
in the Nile basin shaping the future of the cooperative processes on water resources management
and development. It recommends possible preventive actions to consider to mitigate the impacts of a
potential post referendum crisis and/or strengthen the positive outcomes of a referendum.
1.1 Key messages
The national and regional political economy in the Nile Basin
1. In the Nile Equatorial Lakes Region national politics are dominated the by EAC integration
efforts and in the Eastern Nile by the high stakes taken by the authoritarian governments to
maintain power. From June 2010 to January 2011, four of the five EAC member countries have
had/will have presidential elections. Rwandan Patriotic Front leader, Paul Kagame was re-elected
as president in August 2010. The withdrawal of the opposition parties from Burundi‟s national
presidential elections in June 2010 resulted in an overwhelming majority vote for President Pierre
Nkurunziza, who has been elected for another five year term. Kenya has been involved in a
referendum which culminated in the promulgation of the new constitution in August 2010.9
Tanzania recently underwent its parliamentary and presidential elections on 31 October 2010,
which saw Jakaya Kikwete sworn in for another five-year term on November 6th. Uganda‟s
presidential elections are expected to take place in January 2011 and maintain the current political
leadership. The DRC‟s presidential elections are expected to take place on 27 November 2011.
The wave of presidential elections, and the retention of old leadership may have positive
implications for institutional development on the Nile in terms of continuity. However, the EAC
integration process has also been affected by the number of national elections interrupting the
integration efforts.
In the Eastern Nile region national politics are dominant by authoritarian regimes. In Ethiopia the
Parliamentary Elections this year were a show of absolute power of Ethiopian People‟s
Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF), the ruling party of Prime-Minister Meles Zenawi.
Demands by opposition parties for new elections were rejected by the highest courts in Ethiopia.
Egypt continues to be under a state of Emergency Law. Parliamentary elections are planned for
November/December 2010 with Presidential Elections planned for September 2011. The Muslim
Brotherhood, the major opposition party, hopes to increase its representation in the Parliament
and has agreed not to participate in the Presidential elections. At the international level, the
International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a second warrant of arrest against the President of
Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir in July 2010. In April 2010, Sudan had its first presidential
poll in 24 years. The President continues to assure that the Referendum in Southern Sudan would
take place in January 2011, and that a peace agreement for Darfur would be reached soon.
2. The integration agenda in the Nile- region is driven in the Nile Equatorial Lakes Region by
the strengthening of the EAC and at the African wide level by the COMESA-EAC-SADC
Tripartite Task Force. Regional integration provides an avenue for sharing tangible benefits from
transboundary waters cooperation such as agriculture products and electricity from hydropower
generation and intangible benefits such as water quality improvement and flood and drought
management. The regional integration agenda is strong in the Nile Equatorial Lakes region and
provides a forum for cooperation in many aspects including peace and security, trade, transport,
natural resources management, and immigration. At the African level the African Union (AU) is
moving Africa‟s regional integration process. While the AU had displayed an instrumental
commitment to regional integration, the practicalities of this commitment are less clear, particularly
as it relates to institutional overlap. Currently, there are eight Regional Economic Communities
(RECs) recognised by the AU, each established under separate treaties. Along with the AU and
The New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD), the African Ministerial Council on Water
(AMCOW) is striving to provide supra-regional coordination on water resources management. In
2008, the Heads of State and Governments of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA), EAC and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) met in
Kampala and called for the establishment of a single Free Trade Area covering the 26 countries of
the three main RECs. While the approval process has met with delays strong progress can be
noted and the Tripartite Free Trade Area (FTA) is set to be launched in January 2012 establishing
a single economic market with a combined population of 527 million and a GDP of $ 625 billion.
3. The progress towards an all encompassing Nile compact on transboundary waters will take
time as history demonstrates. A considerable number of legal instruments that were inter alia
supporting third country interests in the water and in agricultural production of the Nile riparians
were concluded during the colonial period. There exists disagreement among Nile riparian States
with respect to the validity of some of those treaties, as well as with respect to the question
whether the 1959 Egyptian-Sudanese Agreement on the Full Utilization of the Water of the Nile
also binds other riparian States. Bilateral and sub-basin agreements concluded since the 1970s
indicate an increasing trend towards cooperation based on mutually beneficial use of the shared
water resources. The CFA was negotiated in this spirit. For the time being, disagreements 10
concerning the existing legal framework stand in the way of CFA adoption by all Nile riparian
States. It seems of vital importance therefore that the relationships between the Nile riparians,
which have been institutionalized through the NBI so far, are maintained in the future by all means
possible.
Focus on Southern Sudan and the upcoming referendum on southern Sudanese selfdetermination
4. Southern Sudan’s economy is entirely dependent on oil. About 98 % of the revenue in the
South is generated in the oil sector. Oil is also a key driver of the entire Sudanese economy which
complicates the relationship between South and North Sudan as many oil fields are located in the
South. Currently the province of Abyei is the place where combined oil and referendum politics
converge. The Abyei province is set to determine through a vote if it is to belong to the North or
South in a separate election the day of the referendum in Southern Sudan.
5. Southern Sudan quickly needs to develop its power generation capacities. The region
currently depends to a large extent on diesel fueled electricity generation. Fuel is supplied by truck
from Khartoum. Southern Sudan has considerable hydropower potential. Feasibility studies show
that the area has the potential of becoming a net exporter of hydropower generated electricity if
the sector is developed. This would enable electricity supplies to Sudan as a whole in addition to
the wider region by interconnecting currently isolated networks. It would provide diversification to
Southern Sudan‟s economy lessening the dependence on oil.
6. Tribal conflicts in Southern Sudan directly or indirectly affect the majority of the people
and impact the stability of the whole country. Tribal conflicts are among key concerns that
might affect the upcoming elections. Tribal related violence has taken on different proportions and
has become more deadly since the signing of the CPA in 2005. This is mainly because a surge in
available small-arms in circulation as well as the withdrawal of troops from the Sudan‟s Peoples
Liberation Movement (SPLM) from rural areas coupled with weak implementation of the CPA in
the South. Tribal identity still outweighs national identity constituting difficulties to promote
common national agendas.
7. The Southern Sudan referendum appears to be on schedule. The Government of Sudan
(GoS) and the SPLM and the SPLA signed the CPA on 9 January 2005. The two parties
confirmed their commitment to six instruments previously agreed upon which were integrated into
the CPA. The 2002 Machakos Protocol provides the general principles of governance between the
national government and Southern Sudan and it states the right to self-determination through
referendum for the people of Southern Sudan. At the end of the six year interim period an
internationally monitored referendum will determine the future status of the people of Southern
Sudan. The referendum appears to be on schedule for 9 January 2011. Delays cannot be
excluded. The political and media campaigns have started, the civic education activities are taking
place in several parts of Southern Sudan, and the registration process of voters was initiated on
15 November. A calendar with set milestones from November to January has been defined by the
Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS).11
8. The issue of the status of the special border areas and borders can be a source of
instability in the post referendum period. The Protocol on the resolution of the Abyei conflict
stipulates that simultaneously with the referendum for Southern Sudan, the residents of the Abyei
area will decide if the Abyei area retains a special status within the North or be part of Southern
Sudan. The confirmation of the 1956 borders between North and South are subject to the results
of the referendum on the Abyei area. The Protocol on the resolution of the Southern Kordofan and
Blue Nile States conflict establishes that a popular consultation will take place in Southern
Kordofan and Blue Nile States. The CPA will be submitted to the people of the two States through
their respective elected legislatures. If the CPA is endorsed through the legislature, then the CPA
becomes the final settlement of the conflict in that State.
9. Status of CPA and water. In 2010, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM signed a
Memorandum of Understanding on Post-Referendum Issues and Arrangements. A joint
negotiation team composed of members from each side will conduct the negotiations on postreferendum issues facilitated by the African Union and supported by Intergovernmental Authority
on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations (UN). The negotiations address four keyissues:
citizenship; security; financial, economic and natural resources; international treaties and legal
issues. Water is included in the third area. Currently, the national government exercises an
exclusive competence on transboundary waters.
10. Lessons learned from secession. State building and adoption of constitutional laws take usually
from 3 to 4 years. However, each case of secession is special. If the outcome of the 2011
referendum is secession, the fact that Southern Sudan disposes of an interim national constitution
which remains in force until the adoption of a permanent constitution might smooth the process of
setting up the governance structure of an independent State.
11. Four post referendum scenarios and transboundary water implications
Scenario 1 – Unity
In case that the majority outcome of the referendum is Unity, then Sudan remains one country. In
this scenario, Southern Sudan is expected to get a more extended autonomy. Southern Sudan is
likely to strive for more extended responsibilities with respect to infrastructure, oil, energy and
water assets. The interim constitutions of the North and the South might possibly undergo some
change and be replaced with permanent constitutions. Under this scenario North and South
Sudan will likely negotiate an internal allocation of the water share attributed to Sudan under the
1959 agreement. Sources referenced in this report indicate the possibility that Unity is “forced”
upon the South which in that case is likely to be accompanied by civil strife with regional
implications.
Scenario 2 – Independence and succession to the 1959 Agreement
If Southern Sudan secedes from North Sudan, it will become the 11
th
riparian nation of the Nile
Basin located downstream of the Nile Equatorial Lakes region and with strong connections to the
Eastern Nile. The transition period until the State is recognized, functional and a constitution is
adopted might take one or two years at best. If Southern Sudan decides to succeed into rights and
obligations of the 1959 agreement, this would be a clear signal of alignment with the downstream
riparians. This alignment with the downstream riparians is likely to undermine South Sudan‟s
ambitions to join the EAC. The 1959 Agreement provides for the construction of water 12
conservation schemes in Southern Sudan. This is an implicit reference to the controversial Jonglei
canal project. The likelihood of this scenario is therefore considered to be low.
Scenario 3 – Independence without succession to the 1959 Agreement
With respect to succession to international treaties, Southern Sudan has the possibility to adopt a
position similar to the Nyerere Doctrine i.e. reviewing earlier treaties regarding their binding force.
With respect to treaties dating from before 1956, it could claim that it was under colonial rule and
that even after 1956 it continued its struggle for political autonomy and independence. In not
accepting the binding force of the 1959 agreement, a possible sovereign Southern Sudan would
signal alignment with the upstream neighbours. It might further decide to sign and ratify the CFA, a
step that will most likely antagonise Northern Sudan and Egypt in particular if Southern Sudan
becomes the sixth country to ratify. Article 40 in the CFA states that it is “open to signature by all
States in whose territory part of the Nile River Basin is situated”. Should Southern Sudan become
independent there are major benefits for it to join the EAC in the form of increased African trade,
transport and electricity network connections and hard security. Southern Sudan currently has
observer status in both COMESA and the EAC. Voices from the South about joining the EAC
speak in favour of this scenario.
Scenario 4 – Independence and wait-and-see
As the Nile issues are not amongst the most pressing priorities in the post-referendum
negotiations between North and South, the Government of Southern Sudan will not be obliged to
take a public position immediately. This also gives times to the South to see the benefits,
limitations and risks of all the options available. Keeping silent and not compromising to any
positions gives leeway to Southern Sudan, as a new midstream riparian, to opt for aligning
downstream or upstream at a later stage, if at all. In the meantime, Southern Sudan will be able to
observe how the CFA and the NBI processes evolve independently of its own actions. Scenario 4
is the most likely scenario in the short-term.
12. IGAD and AU will play major roles in all the post referendum scenarios. Policy coherence
and coordination between IGAD and the African Union (AU) is critically important in facilitating a
smooth transition during the post-referendum period. IGAD‟s members will likely be the first to
make recommendations regarding Southern Sudan‟s post-referendum status, but the AU‟s
participation in, and ultimate backing of, these recommendations is crucial if an independent South
is to secure maximum legitimacy. The gravitas of the AU and the importance of its recognition
cannot be ignored. The AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) can play a leading role in
lining up the Union‟s 53 member states in support of realities on the ground.
1.2 Recommendations linked to the four scenarios
Transboundary waters may not be the most immediate issue to consider in a post-referendum phase
considering the focus on security, citizenship and the management of oil revenue. However, a
possible eleventh riparian state sharing the water resources on the Nile, strategically located in the
middle of the basin and with major hydropower development opportunities and large areas of land that
can be utilized for irrigation, demonstrate the potential of working through the NBI to unlock the
development potential in the region. Southern Sudan is close to the growing market of the EAC from
which major investment is flowing to the region. It is our view that scenarios one (Unity) and two
(independence with succession to the 1959 agreement) are less likely than scenario three and four.
With the EAC states together with Ethiopia (except Burundi) having signed the CFA, scenario three
illustrates the possibility that Southern Sudan could sign the CFA as soon as a sovereign state has 13
been established. Support from regional organizations will be crucial to ensure that a transition to a
sovereign state can be made in a harmonious manner.
The following recommendations can be considered in relation to scenario three and four:
13. Within the framework of the NBI in the short term
a. Ensure close coordination between UN institutions operating in the Nile Basin region and the
African Union on the management and development of transboundary waters. This can
include joint planning, training and investment support work. A stronger role of the AU in
supporting the NBI process could be explored in partnership with AMCOW and NEPAD.
b. Strengthen the negotiation capacity on transboundary water management and development of a
new independent Southern Sudan government during the post-referendum negotiations to
promote effective energy development (oil and hydropower) and sustainable use of the
transboundary water assets.
c. Undertake stakeholder analysis at a local level to understand tribal issues and how it relates to
transboundary and local water management and development. The interrupted Jonglei canal
project clearly illustrates the need to fully understand local needs and expectations.
d. Further the understanding of the development of the RECs, the roles of IGAD and AU in the NBI
with the objective of strengthening regional institutional development through EAC, IGAD, AU
and their roles in supporting the NBI.
e. Work with the NBI Secretariat, NELSAP, ENSAP, Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) and the
Council of Ministers to define a support strategy in support of an independent Southern Sudan
joining the NBI process of cooperation.
14. Within the framework of the NBI in the mid term
a. The infrastructure gaps in Southern Sudan are large. Options to explore benefits from the river
and beyond should be actively explored in partnership with GoSS, the NBI institutions, EAC,
Ethiopia, Northern Sudan and AU. This includes integrated studies in which water, energy,
transport infrastructure, environment and climate change development scenarios are
undertaken. Such studies can be build on the Strategic/Sectoral Social and Environmental
Assessment (SSEA) methodology undertaken in the Nile Equatorial Lakes Region.
4
b. Specific pre-feasibility and feasibility study support to the NBI and GoSS in assessing the
hydropower development potential, power trading to the South, East and North, development
of irrigated agriculture and environmental management.
c. Engage in long term dialogue with the COMESA-EAC-SADC single Free Trade Area partners to
explore the role of NBI and Southern Sudan it its development.
2 Overview of the Nile Basin Political Landscape
2.1 National level
Burundi. In June 2010 President Pierre Nkurunziza was re-elected for a five year term. Opposition
parties withdraw from the election in protest over what they considered to be an unfair electoral
process. This resulted in an overwhelming majority vote for the CNDD – FDD, obtaining a two-thirds
majority within parliament, in principle changing Burundi‟s political system from multiparty into single 14
party dominance.
5
Burundi‟s pre-election period experienced civil unrest.
6
Burundi together with
Rwanda became EAC members in 2007.
7
Burundi‟s interest in the Nile is vested in the Kagera River on which it is highly dependent for
development
8
, particularly hydropower generation. Burundi‟s consumptive water demand is relatively
low and the country claims riparian rights to the Kagera River. Burundi has strategic interests in the
Lake Victoria Basin and could benefit from regional co-operation.
9
Burundi has in its international
relations been constrained by political instability and internal violence contributing limited institutional
capacity. Burundi has sought support from the NBI to level the playing field in the basin-wide
negotiations.
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The DRC plans for presidential elections on 27 November
2011
10
. The DRC has only recently expressed interest in the Nile.
11
It is less dependent on the White
Nile for its development, and as such its consumptive demands in the basin are relatively low.
12

During the time of President Mobuto Sese Seko, the DRC entertained an Egyptian proposal to build a
transmission line from the Great Inga hydropower station to the Nile basin, which would eventually
lead all the way to Europe.
13
Currently, the two hydroelectric dams, Inga I and Inga II, operate at low
output.
The DRC contributes significantly to Lake Victoria and Lake Albert flows and has therefore expressed
interest in ascertaining its riparian rights, promoting tourism as well as fishing and shipping rights.
14
,
15
DRC has expressed a newfound interest in co-operating in mutually beneficial basin management
programmes such as on Lake Albert and Edward. The former Executive Director of the NBI was
Congolese. DRC is backing the formation of a future basin-wide agreement.
16
Ethiopia. Parliamentary elections were held in Ethiopia in June 2010. Contrary to the Parliamentary
elections in 2005
17
, the Parliamentary Elections this year were a show of absolute power of EPDRF.
The ruling party of Prime-Minister Meles Zenawi won 499 (91%) of the 547 sets, EPRDF-allied parties
won 35 seats, and the opposition or independent candidates won only two seats
18
. The elections were
highly contested by the opposition, that have demanded new elections, saying the outcomes of the
elections are the end result of campaigns of intimidation, fraud, harassment and violence by the ruling
party
19
. Demands by opposition parties for new elections were rejected by the highest courts in
Ethiopia, and results had been officially confirmed in June 2010
20
.
The 2010 elections come to confirm the status quo in the Ethiopian political system, dominated by the
ruling party EPDRF and its allies. Optimists see this as positive signal in economic terms, taking into
account that the government of Meles Zenawi had been responsible for the country‟s recent good
economic performance and open up for external investment
21
. According to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), Ethiopia’s economy grew 9.9% in 2009 and was expected to grow 7% in 2010
22
.
However, without opposition in the Parliament there are fears that the country will be governed in a
more autocratic manner than in the past. At the same time the government is changing from within. A
new Ministry was created merging Water resources and Energy in the same cabinet
23
, providing an
indication of the priority given to hydropower development in Ethiopia.
The long-lasting border problem between Ethiopia and Eritrea is expected to continue in the regional
agenda during 2010 and 2011. During 1998-2000 the two countries have disputed a border conflict
with political contours.
24
The highlands of Ethiopia, the source of the Blue Nile and several other main tributaries, contribute
roughly 85 % of its water resources”
25
. The current hydro-power capacity of Ethiopia is 850 MW.
Ethiopia‟s hydro-power potential is estimated to be 45,000 MW. The last three years electricity
coverage in Ethiopia has increased from 17 to 33 percent”
26
.
Egypt. Egypt is under a state of Emergency Law since the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in
1981
27
. This Law was placed by President Hosni Mubarak when he replaced Sadat as Head of State.
The key concept of this Law is that counter-terrorism operations can be conducted without restrictions
by ordinary legislation. Detention is not limited in accordance with specific legal criteria that regulate its 15
duration
28.
According to observers the Emergency Law has been used by the regime to crack down
any party or movement opposing the current political system
29
.
November/December 2010: Parliamentary Elections. The first round of these elections will be held on
November, 28; and the second round in December, 5. Parties will be disputing a total number of 454
seats in the Parliament. During the last elections, in 2005, the National Democratic Party (NPD,
Mubarak‟s party) got the majority of the seats, although the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood was able to
get a good representation in the Parliament, by participating in the elections with independent
candidates
30
. This was made possible through an agreement between the Brotherhood and the ruling
regime in 2005, where the ruling party allow the Brotherhood to participate as independents in the
Parliamentary elections, and in exchange not run for the Presidential elections
31
. In the upcoming
elections, the same parties will be candidates. However, several of the opposition voices and parties
are calling for a boycott of these elections, accusing the government of manipulating the election
campaign, by arresting and attempting to silence opposition groups
32
. However the Muslim
Brotherhood, the major opposition party, stated they will run for the next election and hope to increase
its representation in the Parliament from 20% (2005) to 30%.
33
September 2011: Presidential Elections. The first presidential elections in Egypt were held in 2005 and
President Hosni Mubarak, in power since 1981, was elected with 88.6% of the votes
34
. Doubts remain
if President Mubarak will be a candidate in the next elections, in particular due to his age (88 years
old) and his failing health conditions
35
. In the last two to three years, Egyptian and international media
have been publishing rumours about a „family succession‟ or “inheritance power scheme” in Egypt, in
which Gamal Mubarak, son of the President would assume power
36
. More recently, several names are
being suggested as potential candidates to the Presidential elections although none of them officially
confirmed.
Egypt is the riparian that is the most dependent on the Nile waters for its socio-economic
development.
37
Despite using 95 per cent of its allocated water for irrigation, it still imports over 50 per
cent of its food grains. Increasing Egyptian demand for food places further pressure on the water
supply.
38
Historically, Egypt has been able to impose solutions to water resources and development
preferred by itself.
39
The new Executive Director for the NBI is Wael Khairy, an Egyptian.
40
Kenya. Kenya is planning for presidential elections in December 2012. In August 2010, Kenya
adopted a new constitution. The new constitution is central to political reforms aimed at averting a
repeat of the 2008 post-election violence that also hurt regional trade and blocked petrol, diesel and
heavy oil transport flows to the coastal cities of Mombasa, Kenya and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. The
international community has deplored the Government of Kenya‟s invitation to Sudanese President
Omar al-Bashir to attend the constitution‟s adoption ceremony, given the International Criminal Court
arrest warrants against President al Bashir
41
.
The constitution declares that, “Every person has the right to a clean and healthy environment, which
includes the right to have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations
through legislative and other measures and the right to clean water (Art.43 (d)).”
42
Kenya has major
interests in Lake Victoria, evident in its membership status in all regional co-operative arrangements
regarding the lake. In terms of basin-wide relations Kenya has always seen itself as a “broker” in the
Nile basin and has never exhibited much interest in any binding agreements on water use.
43
Rwanda. Paul Kagame of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) won Rwanda’s presidential elections
that took place on 9 August 2010, and was re-elected for a second term on 11 August, 2010.
Internally, opposition and human rights groups said the election lacked credible competition, while
externally, the United Nations and the European Union expressed concerns about the deteriorating
human rights situation in Rwanda ahead of the election.
44
Rwanda, centrally located between
francophone and Anglophone Africa will gain from regional co-operation and has worked hard to
become a member of the EAC (2007
45
) and contribute to the integration efforts
46
.
Rwanda has similar interests to Burundi. It too, is blessed with high and regular rainfall and it is also
mainly interested in strengthening its hydropower capabilities.
4748
The Kagera River inflow is hugely 16
important to the water balance of Lake Victoria, in which Rwanda is a key riparian player. It is also in
support of a new basin-wide agreement.
49
Sudan. At the national level, in April 2010, Sudan had its first presidential poll in 24 years
50
. These
Presidential elections were set up under the 2005 CPA that ended more than two decades of NorthSouth civil war and saw the formation of a power-sharing agreement between the SPLM and the
National Congress Party. President Omar al-Bashir won the elections with 68% of the vote
51
. The
main opposition parties withdrew their candidates, accusing al-Bashir of widespread vote rigging
52
. In
the South, Salva Kiir, the leader of the SPLM, won the election in the presidential poll in Sudan’s semiautonomous southern region, with 92.9% of the votes
54
. The elections in the South were a first test for
the referendum process, whereby Southern Sudan will opt for unity or secession from North Sudan.
The pre-election campaign period had been a political test for Sudan with several delays
55
. Although
the legitimacy of the final results was questioned by some, the fact is that Sudan had it first multi-party
elections since 1986.
56
President Bashir continues to assure that the Referendum in Southern Sudan
would take place in January 2011, and that a peace agreement for Darfur would be reached soon
57
.
According to GoSS officials, Southern Sudan has a comparative advantage in its natural resources,
particularly oil assets, land and water for agriculture. GoSS officials have likened independence of
Southern Sudan to “agricultural independence” And claim that it can become the breadbasket of the
continent and the Middle East.
58
,
59
Sudan is relatively less dependent on the waters of the Nile than Egypt as it has extensive rainfed
areas within its borders.
60
However it has a large potential for irrigated agriculture drawing water from
the Nile
61
. About 60% of the waters of the Nile flow through Sudan with the White Nile (western
branch) and Blue Nile (eastern branch) converging in Khartoum in Northern Sudan. The White Nile
passes through Southern Sudan. The North and the South both claim to have agreed on continued
cooperation on water sharing governed by the agreed quotas in the NBI.
62
Regarding the role of Egypt, downstream to Sudan, GoSS officials have assured their Egyptian
counterparts that if the South becomes independent, they would first review existing water usage with
the North and operate within Sudan‟s current allocation of 25 per cent of the flow, thus not affecting
the Egypt‟s allocated flow.
65
GoSS officials have stated their commitment to preventing excessive loss
of water but want Egypt to recognize the development needs of Southern Sudan.
66
Some Egyptian
officials have expressed concern that an independent Southern Sudan could join the East African
states and then object to the standing water sharing agreements.
68
Tanzania. Tanzania held parliamentary and presidential elections on 31 October 2010. President
Jakaya Kikwete was sworn in for another five-year term on 6 November 2010. Tanzania‟s GDP growth
rate is increasing incrementally (estimated at 6.4% in 2010 and 7.1% in 2011 by the Economist
Intelligence Unit) and has a low and stable inflation rate.
70
Tanzania is a member of the EAC, along
with Kenya and Uganda and is also a SADC member state.
Tanzania is endowed with more transboundary waters than any country in Africa,
71
sharing twelve
international rivers and lakes with other nations.
72
The institutional framework for water governance in
Tanzania is provided by the National Water Policy (NAWAPO) of July 2002, although Tanzania is
undergoing a review of its policies particularly as it relates to current and future transboundary
challenges including. the falling lake levels of Lake Victoria. In terms of the Nile waters, Tanzania has
stated its needs as: wanting to exercise its riparian rights on Lake Victoria, having great interest in
developing and conserving the resources of the Lake Victoria sub-basin, and having an interest in
developing tourism and agriculture.
73
It poses a relatively smaller threat to the quantity and the quality
of the Nile River, and would benefit from basin-wide co-operation.
74
Uganda. Uganda will follow the election trend in the Nile Equatorial Lakes Sub-basin (NELSB) region
with the upcoming presidential elections planned for January 2011. Familiar faces are expected to
stay in power for another term in office. 17
Uganda is a key riparian on the Nile as regards its water contribution.
75
The abundant rainfall in
Uganda and the characteristics of the hydrology of the Sudd, makes consumptive demands not a
serious threat to downstream users.
According to Uganda‟s National Water Policy of 1999, “it is in Uganda‟s interest to ensure that the
good water quality in the water bodies within the national boundaries is maintained for sustainable
use”.
76
Based on Uganda‟s overall policy objectives of good neighbourliness and promotion of regional
co-operation for optimal use, Uganda‟s policy principles therefore adhere to the various accepted
principles of international law, regional and basin-wide bodies of co-operation such as EAC and its
Lake Victoria Basin Commission, IGAD, Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO), etc.
77
Uganda
has a strong interest in ensuring its entitlement in future Nile water agreements, and also expects to
benefit from basin-wide co-operation programmes in particularly in hydropower and agriculture
development.
78
The ongoing 250 MW Bujagali Hydropower scheme (Independent Power Project) on
the main stem of the Nile was developed subsequent to receiving no objection from the NBI
partners
79
.
2.2 Regionalisation processes
The AU is the culmination of Africa‟s regional integration mission, which saw the rapid increase in the
number of integration-based institutions in the 1980s through the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final
Act of Lagos. This integration agenda was formalised in the 1990s upon the adoption of the Abuja
Treaty establishing the Regional Economic Communities, and again in the year 2000, which saw the
development of the Constitutive Act establishing the AU. AUs predecessor the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), has been referred to as the “custodian of the norms of international society that
restrictively defined self-determination” and “whose rigid and inflexible adherence to the principles of
international society undermined the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.”
80
This refers
to the OAU‟s stance of non-interference regarding intra-state conflicts. In contrast, the AU and its
Constitutive Act have created a fundamental shift to better address human rights and poor governance
issues
81
. In terms of water governance, the AU has influenced regional policy frameworks through its
Commissioner for Agriculture and Water, as well as the complete development agenda of the Water
Programme of NEPAD. Along with the AU and NEPAD, the African Ministerial Council on Water
(AMCOW), formed in 2002, also aims to provide supra-regional coordination of water resource
management although it still needs to develop into this role institutionally.
While the AU has displayed an instrumental commitment to regional integration, the practicalities of
this commitment are less clear, particularly as it relates to institutional overlap. Currently, there are
eight RECs recognised by the AU, each established under a separate regional treaty:
 the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)
 the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
 the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
 the East African Community (EAC)
 the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
 the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
 the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)18
All NELSB states are party to more than one of the above-mentioned RECs, which has resulted in a
highly complex institutional landscape of overlapping memberships.
82
This formed the theme of the
2006 Banjul summit, and at the July 2007 Accra summit the Assembly finally decided to adopt a
Protocol on Relations between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities.
83
This
protocol is intended to facilitate the harmonisation of policies and ensure compliance with the Abuja
Treaty and Lagos Plan of Action t.
Trade policy experts have warned of technical inefficiencies and the high costs of overlapping
membership.
84
Traders have to operate within a number of trade regimes each with its own tariff rates,
rules of origin and procedures. Recent non-tariff barrier disputes between Zambia and Kenya over the
latter‟s exports of cooking oil to Zambia, are noteworthy.
85
Specifically, Zambia has pleaded to the
COMESA Council of Ministers to send an independent verification committee of experts to Nairobi to
address its concerns over Kenya‟s exports of palm-oil based cooking fat to Zambia. Zambia has long
argued that imports entering its borders of palm-oil based cooking fats from Kenya should be
subjected to extra verification and scrutiny to determine whether or not they comply with COMESA‟s
rules of origin.
86
These concerns worsen as the risk of trade deflection increases when goods that
have been preferentially imported from country A (a member of REC X) by country B (a member of
both REC X and REC Y) are subsequently preferentially re-exported to country C, which is only a
member of REC Y. The official barriers to trade become very porous in such situations.
87
The EAC, already a Common Market, has four Member States in COMESA (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda
and Uganda) and one Member State in SADC (Tanzania). Moreover, five SADC Member States are
also members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South
Africa, and Swaziland). There are, therefore, ten countries in the region that are already members of
existing customs unions. However, these ten Member States (as well as the other non-Members to
existing customs unions) have also been involved in negotiations to establish alternative customs
unions to the ones they currently belong to.
88
COMESA and SADC share seven Member States that
are not part of any customs union but are involved in customs unions preparatory negotiations.
89
Therefore, of the twenty-six countries that constitute the combined membership of COMESA, EAC and
SADC, seventeen (or almost two-thirds of the total membership) are either in an existing customs
union, or participating in negotiating an alternative customs union to the one they belong to, or are in
the process of negotiating two separate customs unions which would be contrary to WTO rules.
90
In
order to resolve these challenges, the three Regional Economic Communities (SADC, EAC, and
COMESA) formed a Tripartite Taskforce with a view to harmonise their trade related programmes, and
to eliminate duplication of efforts. Greater integration within regions as well as between regions has
therefore not only been desirable, but a necessity to grapple with institutional complexity.19
Mauritius
Swaziland
Madagascar
Seychelles
Somalia
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Kenya
Uganda
Burundi
IGAD
EAC
COMESA
Tanzania
Egypt
ARAB LEAGUE
Algeria Iraq Jordan Syria Yemen
Lebanon Saudi Arabia Bahrain UAE
Kuwait Mauritania Morocco Oman
Palestine Qatar Tunisia
Libya
DRC
Malawi
Zimbabwe
Zambia
Sao Tome
and Principe
Cameroon
CAR
Angola Rwanda
SADC
Namibia
Lesotho
South Africa
Congo
Gabon
Eq.Guinea
Chad
ECCAS
Botswana
Mozambique
Lake Victoria Basin
Commission
Nile Basin Initiative
Lake Victoria Fisheries
Organisation
Commission for the
Congo-Ubangi-Sangha
Basin (CICOS)
Djibouti
Comoros
Sudan
2.2.1 The Tripartite Task Force – EAC, COMESA and SADC
On the 22 October 2008, the Heads of State and Government of COMESA, EAC and SADC met in
Kampala and called for the establishment of a single Free Trade Area covering the 26 countries of the
three RECs. Currently, draft FTA proposal documents are under review, and it is expected that at the
next Tripartite Summit, the Heads of State and Government will pronounce themselves on the way
forward on the establishment of the single FTA.
91
The objective of the FTA proposal is to establish the
FTA on a tariff-free, quota-free, exemption-free basis by combining the existing FTAs of COMESA,
EAC and SADC. The Tripartite FTA will focus on building robust infrastructure programs designed to
catalyse the regional market through interconnectivity (facilitated for instance by all modes of
transport, telecommunications and energy interconnections) and to promote competitiveness (for
instance through adequate supplies of energy).
92
Once the FTA Agreement is signed, Member States
will have until December 2011 (or within 6 months of signing), to get their domestic processes ready
for the ratification of the Agreement, including the establishment of support institutions and through the
adoption of customs procedures and instruments.
93
While the approval process has met with delays
due to the inability to set an agreeable date for the Tripartite Summit to meet, it is proposed that once
this approval process is confirmed, the Tripartite FTA should be launched in January 2012.
94
The Tripartite FTA opens up a larger market to its Member States. A single economic space of this
nature will therefore be more attractive to investment and large scale production. The EAC, COMESA
and SADC currently have a combined population of 527 million and combined GDP of $ 625 billion.
95
Estimates show a growth in exports among the 26 Tripartite countries from USD 7 billion in 2000 to 20
USD 27 billion in 2008, and a growth in imports from USD 9 billion in 2000 to USD 32 billion in 2008.
96
This trade increase was in large part, a result of the free trade area initiatives of the three
organisations. The Tripartite FTA could therefore address the current challenges of multiple
memberships by advancing harmonisation, integration and coordination initiatives. If successful, the
Tripartite will greatly contribute to Africa‟s economic integration. However, it remains to be seen how
exactly these three REC‟s, each with its own unique historical trajectory, each Member State with its
own political membership agenda, will merge.
2.3 A history of Nile agreements
A brief outline of colonial history of the 10 Nile Basin States is provided in appendix 6.2 to provide a
backdrop to questions concerning termination, continuation and contestation of treaties that form part
of the legal framework of the Nile Basin. Most of the Nile Basin was for a long period of time under
British colonial influence. In the early 1900s, the United Kingdom had become reliant on agricultural
exports from Egypt and the region.
97
A number of legal instruments that were inter alia supporting
colonial interests in water and in agricultural production have been concluded during this period.
Today, there exists disagreement among a number of Nile riparian States with respect to the binding
force of some of the treaties listed in appendix 6.2.1, most notably with respect to the 1929 and 1959
agreements.
Claim to completeness of analysis of the legal framework cannot be made; there exist intergovernmental agreements and governmental documents that have never been published
98
or are not
easily available for other reasons, and yet might be of legal relevance. The analysis is based on a
textual analysis of available legal instruments.
2.3.1 Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA)
99
The Agreement on the Nile River Basin CFA is an instrument negotiated by the Nile riparian countries.
The agreement outlines general principles of cooperative water resources management with respect
to protection, utilization, conservation and development of the Nile River System. The principles
according to which the System is to be used are the following; cooperation, sustainable development,
subsidiarity, equitable and reasonable utilization, prevention of the causing of significant harm, the
right of Nile Basin States to use water within their territories, protection and conservation, information
concerning planned measures, community of interest, exchange of data and information,
environmental impact assessment and audits, peaceful resolution of disputes, water as a finite and
vulnerable resource, water has social and economic value, and water security (Article 3). The
agreement envisages the establishment of a permanent joint mechanism, the Nile River Basin
Commission (Article 15), which “shall succeed to all rights, obligations and assets of the Nile Basin
Initiative at entry into force of the CFA (Article 30). Article 14 of the CFA which deals with water
security is incomplete. Paragraph (b) of the article provides that it will be the task of the Nile River
Basin Commission to resolve the text of the provision within six months after its establishment. Annex
on Article 14 (b) to the CFA provides two text options which have been proposed for the paragraph in
question. The CFA is open to signature, ratification or accession “by all States in whose territory part
of the Nile River Basin is situated” (Articles 40 and 41). Thus based on a textual interpretation of the
agreement, the treaty would be open for accession by an independent South Sudan under the
scenario that it eventually becomes an independent State de lege.
The agreement was opened for signature on 14 May 2010 for a period of one year until 13 May
2011
100
. The text has not been adopted by all negotiating parties. Opening of a treaty for signature
which has not been adopted by all negotiating parties is a situation that occurs on occasion for
example with respect to multilateral conventions.
101
So far five States – Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda,
Tanzania and Rwanda – have signed the agreement.
102
After six States have ratified the agreement,
the latter enters into force on the sixtieth day following the date of deposit of the sixth instrument of 21
ratification
103
or accession with the African Union (Article 42). The African Union is the designated
depository of the treaty. With entry into force of the agreement, the Nile River Basin Commission will
be legally established and succeeds to all rights, obligations and assets of the Nile Basin Initiative
(Articles 15 and 30).
CFA Timeline
14 May 2010 – 13 May 2011
104
Open for signature
60
th
day after deposit of 6
th
instrument of
ratification
Entry into force
Upon entry into force Establishment of the Nile River Basin Commission de lege
Binding force of international treaties on third States
With respect to the binding force of treaties on third States the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties codified the following rules; “A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third
State without its consent” (Article 34). “An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty
if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and the
third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing” (Article 35). While treaties do not apply
retroactively, the 1969 Vienna Convention is widely recognized as codifying customary law and its
provisions have been applied by international courts and tribunals to treaties predating the entry into
force of the Convention. Of the Nile Basin States, DR Congo, Egypt and Rwanda are contracting
parties, Ethiopia and Kenya have signed but not ratified the 1969 Convention.
105
3 Political and Legal Analysis of the Upcoming Southern Sudan
Referendum 2011
3.1 Administrative structure in the North and South
Sudan is divided into twenty-five states; fifteen of them are located in northern Sudan and ten in
Southern Sudan. The Sudanese National Assembly adopted the Interim National Constitution (INC) on
6 July 2005.
106
The INC recognizes the commitment of Sudan to comply with the Cooperative Peace
Agreement (CPA) and to give constitutional support to the Protocol on the resolution of the conflict in
the Abyei and the Protocol on the resolution of the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile
States.
107
A Bill of Rights is included in the INC protecting, inter alia, the right to life and human dignity;
the right to personal liberty; the prohibition of slavery, forced labour and torture; the equality before the
law and the fair trial.
108
The source of legislation for the Northern States of Sudan is the Sharia.
109
Southern Sudan is a decentralised State consisting of ten states.
110
The President of the GoSS, Salva
Kiir Mayardiit, signed the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS) on 5 December 2005.
111
The
2005 December Constitution is the supreme law of Southern Sudan.
112
The Southern Sudan
Constitution provides two scenarios in relation to the outcome of the 2011 referendum. Its Article 208
states that:
“(6) Should the outcome of the referendum on self-determination confirm unity, the current system of
governance established under this Constitution shall remain in force and all the institutions established
under it shall continue to function in accordance with the provisions thereof until a permanent
Constitution is promulgated.
(7) If the outcome of the referendum on self-determination favours secession, this Constitution shall
remain in force as the Constitution of a sovereign and independent Southern Sudan, and the parts, 22
chapters, articles, sub-articles and schedules of this Constitution that provide for national institutions,
representation, rights and obligations shall be deemed to have been duly repealed”.
A Bill of Rights has been included in the Interim Constitution.
113
All international human rights treaties,
covenants and instruments ratified by the Republic of the Sudan are an integral part of the Bill.
114
The
first session of the Transitional Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly has taken place in September
2005.
115
3.1.1 Special areas
Abyei area. The Abyei area is located between the North and South of Sudan and is defined by the
CPA as “a bridge between the North and the South, linking the people of Sudan”.
116
It contains parts of
the Bahr river basin and of the Sudd, one of the world‟s largest wetlands.
117
The Protocol on the resolution of the Abyei conflict stipulates that simultaneously with the referendum
for Southern Sudan, the residents of the Abyei area will decide if the Abyei area retains a special
status within the North or be part of Southern Sudan.
118
The “residents of Abyei Area” are defined as
“the Members of Ngok Dinka community and other Sudanese residing in the area.” This Protocol
significantly singles out “the members of Ngok Dinka community,” and merely makes a general
reference to “other Sudanese,” without mentioning any other specific community.
119
The residents of
the Abyei Area will be called upon to cast their separate ballot irrespective of the outcome of the
referendum in Southern Sudan. The outcome of the latter will be relevant with respect to the
consequences of the choice made by the residents of the Abyei area. Indeed, they may find
themselves north or south of an international boundary if Southern Sudan secedes.
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. The Protocol on the resolution of the Southern Kordofan
and Blue Nile States conflict establishes that a popular consultation will take place in Southern
Kordofan and Blue Nile States. The CPA will be submitted to the people of the two States through
their respective elected legislatures. If the CPA is endorsed through the legislature, then the CPA
becomes the final settlement of the conflict in that State.
120
Should any of the two legislatures of the
two States, after reviewing the agreement, decide to rectify any shortcomings in the constitutional,
political or administrative arrangement of the CPA, such legislature should engage in negotiations with
the national government with the view to rectifying these shortcomings.
121
The process of consultation
is behind schedule. The delay is due not only to the difficulty of the task but also because the CPA
requires that the popular consultation be conducted by the elected State legislature. In Southern
Kordofan the elections are expected for February 2011; the Blue Nile State Assembly appointed a
commission that will conduct the consultations over the following months.
122
The issue of borders. The 1956 borders between North and South are inviolable subject to the
results of the referendum on the Abyei area.
123
The CPA provides for a Technical ad hoc Border
Committee (TBC)
124
which was created by Presidential Decree on 29 September 2005.
125
However,
the TBC did not start working on the mapping of the 1956 border between North and South until
January 2007.
126
The demarcation between north and south borders has still to be finalized.
127
The
fact that borders are still to be demarcated might be a source of instability for Southern Sudan.
The CPA establishes an Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) charged with the demarcation of the
Abyei area, which is defined “as the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kardofan in
1905”.
128
Once the Commission finished its works, the national government and the SPLM did not
agree on whether the ABC Commission exceeded its mandate in the demarcation of the area; they
decided to submit this dispute to an arbitral tribunal established under the rules of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA) on 7 July 2008.
129
The award does retain the conclusion of the ABC
Commission in respect to the northern and southern boundary lines of the Abyei area
130
and found that
the ABC exceeded its mandate in some other locations (eastern and western boundaries).
131
The
parties committed themselves to abide by and implement this decision.
132
One of the five judges of the 23
arbitral Tribunal noted that the demarcation of the Abyei area made by the Tribunal risks endanger the
access of nomadic people, such as the Misseriya, to the waters of the Bahr river.
133
3.2 Content of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
The arbitral tribunal, already mentioned indicated in its 2009 award on the delimitation of the Abyei
area that the CPA is not an international treaty but an agreement “between the government of a
sovereign state, on the one hand, and, on the other, a political party/movement” which “may – or may
not – govern over a sovereign state in the near future”.
134
The CPA is part of the constitutional laws of
Sudan
135
and Southern Sudan
136
Agreements concluded between a State and the proponents of the
independence of a territory may become “international agreements” when a new State is created.
137
The GoS and the SPLM/A signed the CPA on 9 January 2005. The two parties confirmed their
commitment to the following instruments previously agreed upon, which were integrated into the CPA:
the Machakos Protocol of July 22, 2002; the Protocol on Security Arrangements of September 25,
2003; the Protocol on Wealth-Sharing of September 25, 2003; the Protocol on Power- Sharing of May
26, 2004; the Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile States of
May 26, 2004; and the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei of May 26, 2004.
The 2002 Machakos Protocol provides the general principles of governance between the national
government and Southern Sudan and it states the right to self-determination through referendum for
the people of Southern Sudan.
138
At the end of the six year interim period an internationally monitored
referendum will determine the future status of the people of Southern Sudan. The referendum will
“confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the
Peace Agreement; or … vote for secession”.
139
The Power-Sharing Protocol contains norms on the
distribution of powers between the national government and the government of Southern Sudan and
includes the obligation to comply with multilateral human rights treaties to which Sudan is or becomes
a Party.
140
The 2004 Wealth-Sharing Agreement establishes the principles for an equitable sharing of common
wealth. The CPA creates a National Land Commission and a Southern Sudan Land Commission
charged with the resolution of land disputes.
141
A National Petroleum Commission is also put in
place.
142
Oil revenues are shared between the National Government and the Government of Southern
Sudan. Moreover, 2% of oil revenues have to be allocated to the States producing oil.
143
The CPA also
provides that the SPLM appoints “a limited number of representatives to have access to all existing oil
contracts”
144
and the sharing of non-oil revenues such as taxes.
145
3.2.1 CPA and water
The 2004 Power-Sharing Protocol establishes exclusive competence of the National Government on
“the Nile Water Commission, the management of the Nile Waters, transboundary waters and disputes
arising from the management of interstate waters between Northern states and any dispute between
Northern and Southern states.”
146
This is reiterated in the INC and in the ICSS.
147
The CPA lists the powers of the Government of Southern Sudan which include “[t]he co-ordination of
Southern Sudan services or the establishment of minimum Southern Sudan standards or the
establishment of Southern Sudan uniform norms” in a number of areas including provision of water
and waste management services.
148
The government of Southern Sudan has therefore the
responsibility in the provision of water services. The powers of Southern Sudan further include,
“[d]isputes arising from the management of inter-state waters strictly within Southern Sudan”.
149
This is
reiterated in the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan and in the Interim Constitution
of Southern Sudan.
150
Regarding Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, the CPA establishes that 24
the national and state governments have concurrent legislative and executive powers in projects on
water and waste management.
151
3.2.2 Post-referendum negotiations
On 23 June 2010, the NCP and the SPLM signed a Memorandum of Understanding on PostReferendum Issues and Arrangements.
152
A joint negotiation team composed of six members from
each side will conduct the negotiations on post-referendum issues.
153
The negotiations will be
facilitated by the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) and supported by IGAD, the
IGAD partners‟ forum and the UN.
154
The negotiations will be further supported by a joint technical
secretariat composed of six members that will coordinate and liaise with the Assessment and
Evaluation Commission (AEC). The AEC will provide administrative support to the joint technical
secretariat.
155
The parties agreed to cluster the post-referendum negotiations into four working groups:
citizenship; security; financial, economic and natural resources; international treaties and legal
issues.
156
Water is included in the third working group on financial, economic and natural resources.
All working groups will be composed of 3-5 negotiators from each side.
157

3.3 Other peace agreements
3.3.1 Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement
In addition to the CPA, the government of Sudan signed a peace agreement with the Eastern Sudan
Front Sudan in Asmara on June 19, 2006.
158
The Eastern Sudanese parties are continuing to accuse
the government of failing its obligations under the agreement; they are complaining that the
government should increase financial support to development in these areas.
159
An international
conference for rehabilitation and development of East Sudan is scheduled in Kuwait in December.
160
One of the priorities will be to increase funds in order to improve water and sanitation infrastructure.
3.3.2 Darfur peace process
After months of negotiations and pressure from the international community, the government of Sudan
signed the Darfur peace agreement with a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the
Justice and Equality Movement in Abuja in May 2006. The agreement did not succeed to bring peace
in Darfur and a new negotiation process is taking place. A joint mediation of the AU and the UN Chief
Mediator for Darfur is attempting to ensure an inclusive peace process in Darfur. Two framework
agreements have been signed under the auspices of the AU/UN joint mediation: one agreement has
been signed between the government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement and the other
one has been signed with the Liberation Justice Movement.
161
The joint mediation is currently
developing a comprehensive peace agreement and pursuing efforts to involve all parties to the
conflict.
162

3.4 A legal analysis of secession
Recent experience with the emergence of new States has highlighted that each case of secession has
its specific features. For example, while a referendum on the independence took place in Eritrea and
East Timor, the emergence of Slovakia and the Czech Republic was the result of the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia decided by vote of the federal parliament. In the case of Kosovo, the Serbian
government was of the opinion that the declaration of independence did not produce legal effects
neither in Serbia nor in the international legal order
163
and it requested an advisory opinion on the 25
legality of the unilateral declaration to the International Court of Justice.
164
While the Court did not
address the question of statehood of Kosovo, it advised that Kosovo‟s declaration of independence did
not violate any international law.
165
The drafting process of constitutional laws in States that secede
can take a few years. In Eritrea the referendum on independence was held in May 1993 and the
Constitution was enacted four years later (May 1997).
166
In East Timor the same process took about
three years (referendum in 1999, constitution enacted in 2002). The dissolution of Czechoslovakia
was the result of three years of negotiations between the constituent republics.
167
United Nations
organizations and other regional organizations play an important role in State building where new
States emerge. The UN is often tasked with the organisation and supervision of referenda on
independence (e.g. East Timor, Eritrea). The UN Security Council established the UN Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET) which exercise(d) legislative and executive functions. In addition, the UN and the African
Union established a mission to monitor the 2000 peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
168
The European Union established an international civil and security presence in Kosovo (known as
EULEX).
169
3.4.1 Separation of parts of the territory of a State
In the same way as each case of emergence of a new sovereign State is characterized by its own
distinctive features, legal responses and legal doctrine on secession are not uniform. A broad notion of
the term secession includes all forms of separation of States, where the predecessor State continues
to exist with a diminished territory and population.
170
International doctrine distinguishes between
various categories of separation that can be summarized as three types; secession in a strict sense,
separation with consent and dissolution.
Secession, in a strict sense, “is the creation of a new independent entity through the separation of part
of a territory and population of an existing State, without the consent of the latter”
171
(e.g. Bangladesh).
The predecessor State continues to exist. International law neither encourages nor prohibits peaceful
secession.
172
In cases of separation not linked to former colonies, State practice almost exclusively
precludes secession without the consent of the predecessor State as a legitimate way to statehood.
173
Bangladesh was probably the only non post-colonial sub-state entity that has been successful in
emerging as a new State without such consent.
174
In cases of separation of part of a territory with consent, the predecessor State also continues to
exist.
175
(e.g. dismantlement of the Soviet Union with exception of Baltic States, Russia inherited the
treaties and rights of the Soviet Union).
Dissolution takes place when the territory and population of a State splits and two or more new States
are formed. The predecessor State ceases to exist. (e.g. Czechoslovakia as a negotiated dissolution).
Separation of part of a territory of a State happens in general either by unilateral declaration of the
appointed or self-appointed authorities of that territory (e.g. Bangladesh, Kosovo, Abkhazia),
referendum, or based on negotiation (e.g. Czechoslovakia and in the case of the Soviet Union). A key
factor for the emergence of a „newly independent State‟
176
as a sovereign State and as member of the
international society of States is its recognition by other States. This recognition has constitutive
character with respect to the legal personality of a new State, provided existence at the same time of
all other necessary elements of a State (territory, population, and government in control of the former).
Entities such as Somaliland have the de facto appearance of independent States, but by the fact that
they have not been recognized, they do not constitute States de jure.
177
Where separation happens based on a negotiated agreement between the predecessor State and
successor State(s), international recognition of the new entity as a State does not pose problems in
practice. A key factor, for example, in the emergence of independent States of the former Soviet
Republics was the mutual consent of the constituent Republics to dismantle the Union.
178
Where 26
separation takes place based on unilateral declaration, State practice usually requires consent of the
predecessor State, or as in the special case of Yugoslavia, at a minimum, evidence of the expressed
will of the people to separate
179
.
3.4.2 Principles of international law to be considered in case of secession
State sovereignty. A state is considered to be sovereign in legal terms if it has a territory, a
population, and a government in control of the former, and has been accepted by a substantial
number of sovereign States as equal member of the international society of States.
180
Sovereign
States are equal in rights and de jure independent in the creation of internal (national) and external
(international) law. Sovereignty is the capacity to assert external independence from interference by
third parties in practice and law. Thus a corollary principle of State sovereignty is the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs of another State.
181
In legal terms, sovereignty describes the scope of
rights and duties of a state as a participant in the international society of states.
Territorial integrity. Territorial integrity is an element of State sovereignty. States must refrain from
the use of force threatening the territory of other States and they are prohibited from acquiring a
territory by force.
182
The principle of territorial integrity contributes to ensure stability and peace in
international relations
183
and is complemented by the obligation to respect the equality of rights
between States.
184
The principle of uti possidetis juris. The principle of uti possidetis juris originated in Central and
South America and was then applied in Africa. It involves the preservation of boundaries existing
under the colonial regimes.
185
In Africa, the boundaries of many States were drawn following this
principle with the hope of preventing boundary disputes at and after decolonization. In 1964, the
African Union adopted a resolution affirming the commitment of member States “to respect the
frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence”.
186
The principle of uti possidetis juris
is a general rule of international law.
187
It does not prohibit modifications of frontiers that are agreed
between States.
188
The right of people to self-determination. The right to self-determination is one of “the essential
principles of contemporary international law”.
189
While it is unanimously recognized that the principle of
self-determination has been applied to the creation of new States after colonization and foreign
occupation,
190
the relevance of this principle in other contexts is controversial. The existing
international practice illustrates that the principle of self-determination is not recognized as giving rise
to unilateral rights of secession.
191
It is limited to rights of self-administration and to the right of people
to dispose of natural wealth and resources.
192
According to Article 1.2 common to the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: “All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth
and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation,
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived
of its own means of subsistence”.
3.4.3 Succession to international treaties and transboundary waters
The doctrine of state succession is characterized by legal uncertainty. A number of academic theories
have been proposed, the content of which remains subject to doctrinal debate (e.g. theory of universal
continuity of treaties versus the theory of tabula rasa). State „succession in law‟ consists of any
change of sovereignty over a certain territory, where the new sovereign succeeds in the legal rights
and obligations of the old sovereign.
193
State practice with respect to succession is not coherent and
often determined not by legal but political considerations on a case to case basis.27
An international instrument governing succession into legal rights and obligations, the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, has been adopted on 23 August 1978 and
entered into force in 1996.
194
Some Nile riparian States have signed (Sudan)
195
and ratified (Egypt and
Ethiopia)
196
this Convention. The dichotomy of the theory of tabula rasa for colonies and that of
universal continuity for all other cases of State succession as stipulated by Vienna Conventions has
not been reflected in subsequent State practice.
197
The 1978 Vienna Convention contains some rules
of customary international law: rights and obligations relating to the territory, e.g. those establishing
boundaries or boundary regimes are not affected by States‟ succession and they therefore bind
successor States.
198
It has been argued that agreements relating to the use of international rivers could be included in the
category of treaties automatically binding successor States as they are considered by some as related
to the territory.
199
However, newly independent States have often declined to be bound by water
agreements concluded by predecessor States (e.g. Tanzania).
200
A distinction should be made
between rights and obligations concerning international rivers that are of territorial character and those
rights and obligations that concern the waters flowing in a river in their characteristics as a natural
resource. Established navigation rights are the equivalent to rights of passage over a State‟s territory
taking advantage of the specific surface texture of water; they are inherently linked to territory of a
State and therefore are not affected by succession. Automatic continuity of rights and obligations that
relate to water use as a resource use, such as water supply to non-riparian population would
constitute an ex ante restriction of sovereignty of the new State with respect to its right to dispose of
natural resources on its territory.
With respect to multilateral treaties signed by a large number of Parties continuation of treaty
obligations and succession does not require explicit or implied acceptance by other signatories, but
can be effectuated by notification to the depository. Succession into bilateral or plurilateral
201
treaties
generally requires acceptance by other contracting Parties.
202
3.5 Legal implications in case of separation of the Southern Sudan
3.5.1 Succession/continuation of international treaties
In case of successful separation and emergence as a new sovereign State, South Sudan will have to
decide on how to proceed on succession with respect to international treaties currently applicable in
the territory; e.g. (a) apply universal continuity by unilateral declaration of succession, or (b) review
each treaty and declare subsequently whether to be bound or not.
It has to be noted that whatever a newly independent State of South Sudan decides on this matter
does not guarantee that this decision is automatically accepted by other contracting Parties to
respective treaties; response to a unilateral declaration of universal continuity of international treaties
can be varied. According to international customary law, rights and obligations relating to territory
remain unaffected by succession. With respect to multilateral conventions, succession poses few
problems. Accession to these treaties can be effectuated by South Sudan by notification to the
depository. Accession is generally not contended by other contracting Parties, since in most cases the
objective of multilateral conventions is to unite as many States as possible under its geographic scope
of application (e.g. international human rights covenants, multilateral environmental agreements).
With respect to bilateral and plurilateral
203
treaties in force, where they do not include any provision
regarding State succession, a unilateral declaration of succession by South Sudan would need to be
accepted by other contracting Parties. For example, the occasion of the emergence of two new States
after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia has been seized by other contracting Parties as an opportunity
to renegotiate some of the former treaties; the US, Switzerland and Denmark decided on a case by
case basis whether succession into individual treaties was acceptable. Austria considered the tabula
rasa principle as applicable
204
Membership in international organizations usually requires the deposit 28
of candidature for membership and subsequent acceptance of the new candidate by the organization
(or its existing members).
3.5.2 Status of the Cooperative Framework Agreement
The CFA is open to signature and ratification to South Sudan should it emerge as a new sovereign
State. According to Article 40 the CFA, “open for signature by all States in whose territory part of the
Nile River Basin is situated” (Article 40). The same formula is reiterated in Article 41 on Ratification
and Accession to the treaty.
205
These provisions indicate an intention of the negotiating Parties that
any riparian State, including a new riparian State of South Sudan, can become a contracting Party of
the treaty.
Concerning membership of South Sudan in the joint management organisation, and before entry into
force of the CFA, membership in the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) of a new State is conditioned on
acceptance by current NBI member States. After entry into force of the CFA or in case South Sudan
becomes the 6
th
country ratifying the CFA, membership to Nile River Basin Commission (NBRC) is
determined by the entry into force of the treaty and its legally binding effect on the signatory parties.
According to Article 30, the NBRC becomes the legal successor of the NBI at entry into force of the
CFA. The potential situation where the NBRC is legally established with a smaller membership than
the current NBI is not regulated by the CFA. The CFA leaves a legal void with respect to succession in
NBI rights, obligations and assets of a smaller NBRC. Repartition of NBI rights, obligations and assets
should ideally become subject to negotiations between new NBRC member States and former NBI but
non-NBRC member States.
4 Key drivers in post referendum scenarios
4.1 Land and Resource-related Conflicts
Conflicts in the Horn of Africa are inter-related and engrained in regional and local natural resource
management. Insecurity issues threaten peace-building in the Southern Sudan and spillover into
neighboring states such as Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eastern DRC. Communities in Southern
Sudan face multiple types of violence stemming from local, national, or regional tensions.
206
The
causal factors for this include: a tense political setting, a highly militarized society in terms of access to
weapons, a low threshold before disputes turn violent, tribalism, religious issues and lack of
institutional capacity to provide security and to prevent, contain and solve conflicts.
207
Access to water
for pastoralists is also a primary determining factor of conflict. According to the ICG, by providing
pastoralist communities with improved water storage and alternative sources, their need to migrate
seasonally with cattle would be reduced substantially.
208
Recently, violence involving armed units has
decreased and inter- and intra-communal fighting has grown involving agro-pastoralists, nomads and
farmers.
209
Issues related to environmental degradation and climate change have also been
suggested as determining factors of the war in Darfur.
210
There is confusion over the implications of Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement/Army‟s (SPLM/A)
slogan „land belongs to the people,‟ a principle believed to be in the CPA even though it is vague on
how land is to be administered in Southern Sudan.
211
The Southern Sudan Land Commission has
been mandated to deal with land issues, but has faced enormous challenges fulfilling this mandate
due to a lack of funding and staff. The passing of the Land Act, 2009 in February has been a positive
development in this regard, but it is generally accepted that it needs further clarification and
interpretation.
212
Land and natural resource management issues are, however, only one set of factors
of many inter-related processes fuelling local violence in the Southern Sudan. Peace with its potential
for social and economic change and its typical expansion of state capacity increases the demand for
land and may increase the potential for initiating and exacerbating disputes over land and natural 29
resources in the Southern Sudan.
213
For instance, in the three contested areas of Southern Blue Nile
and Southern Kordofan (Nuba Mountains and Abyei), land grabbing by merchants and other investors
for the purpose of establishing mechanized farming schemes, combined with intensified disputes over
rights to grazing and farming land is one such example of how a context of peace-building and
economic development could increase or perpetuate conflicts of this nature.
4.2 Food (in)security
South Sudan requires irrigation to grow more food, as a huge percentage of its crops are raindependent. Food insecurity plays a direct role in exacerbating conflicts in Jonglei and elsewhere in
Southern Sudan. Due to large-scale shortages in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Warrap states, the World
Food Program recently resorted to air drops. According to the ICG, this is an expensive, unsustainable
response that amounts to return to civil war emergency conditions.
214
Almost 4,000 metric tons, at a
cost of nearly $6 million, have been delivered to twelve drop zones in Pibor, Pochalla, Akobo, Nyirol,
Wuror, and Ayod counties. This sizeable food deficit could result in greater competition for scarce
resources, and thereby increasing the potential for conflict.
215
Food insecurity has forced communities
in Akobo and Pibor counties to move beyond their normal territories in search of food. This increased
stress exposes individuals to further attacks. Scant rainfall and weak harvests mean the hunger gap –
the period between depletion of food stores and a new harvest –is extended by several months. When
this coincides with pastoralist migration in search of grazing land, the likelihood of tension increases
as demand for grazing areas increases.
216
Further strengthening trade routes to EAC appears to be an
ongoing strategy to increase food security including direct trade with countries like South Africa under
particular free trade agreements as determined by the EAC or the EAC-COMESA-SADC tripartite task
force.
4.3 Southern Sudan: where oil meets water and hydropower assets
4.3.1 Oil assets
Oil is vital for Sudan‟s economy. For South Sudan oil makes up 98 % of total revenues in 2010
217
and
65 % in Khartoum
218
. In 2008, according to the International Monetary Fund, oil represented 95 % of
Southern Sudan‟s export revenues
219
. The rapid economic growth of Sudan the last decade is
exclusively due to oil production and export
220
. About 75 % of Sudan’s known oil reserves of 6.3
billion barrels lie in the south
221
. The pipeline that pumps the crude oil to export stations and refineries
run through the north, which leaves the south dependent on the North to sell the oil. It is stated in the
CPA that oil related income should be distributed equally between North and South.
After the end of the first civil war, in the early seventies, opportunities to begin oil exploration in
Southern Sudan became possible. In 1974 the American oil company Chevron was granted a
concession in the south and in 1978 oil was discovered
222
. According to the peace agreement crafted
in Addis Ababa (1972) peace agreement, the GoS got rights to control oil exploration and production,
however GoSS were entitled to government profits on exports from the region and taxes from private
businesses. In the early eighties Sudanese president Muhammad Jaʿfar Numeiri began to redistribute,
re-draw and manipulate borders and territories in the South in an ongoing effort to side- step
outcomes of the peace agreement. An outcome of this was the Unity Province (referred to by GOSS
as Western Province) established as a shared asset between north and south. This and other
223
actions spurred animosity between South and North Sudan, catalyzing the formation of the SPLA and
the launch of the South´s armed struggle against the North. Oil fields under foreign operation were
targeted in fighting prompting the suspension of activities by Chevron and other international
companies. Consequently Khartoum focused its effort on securing oil producing areas to avoid similar
situations thus making oil resources central to the conflict as control over these areas provided levers
in subsequent negotiations
224
. 30
Since 1997, U.S. companies and citizens have been barred from conducting business in Sudan, and
Sudanese government assets in the U.S. have been frozen
225
. In absence of U.S investments other
countries from Asia, the Middle East and Europe have filled the vacuum, especially China. New
investments have enabled the development of Sudan‟s oil industry and related industries. China is
presently the largest investor in the country and more than 60 % of oil exports are destined for
China
226
.
The perceived weaknesses in the implementation of the CPA constitute fuel for conflict related to the
ownership of oil assets. Currently this process is concentrated to the oil rich Abyei region.
Implementation of borders was specifically expressed to be decided immediately as a consequence of
the signing of the CPA but the process was effectively blocked by the NCP
227
. As have the
establishment of an agreed Abyei Region Referendum Commission (an act signed by President Omar
Al Bashir in December 2009). The armed conflict in the region served as model for the hostilities in
Darfur by use of tribal militias
228
. Without Abyei’s oil, the south’s ability to economically sustain
independence would be much more difficult. Khartoum is actively seeking to keep control of southern
oil reserves without which the north would face severe economic problems
229
.
4.3.2 Hydropower and regional power markets
Power supply in southern Sudan is poor as consequence of neglect from the central government.
Most businesses have to generate their own power supply. Stand-by diesel generators are the most
common solution. Diesel is often transported at a high price from Khartoum by truck to provide for a
growing demand.
More than 80 % of Sudan‟s economically feasible hydropower potential has not been exploited to date
(2007)
230
. Southern Sudan has potential for hydropower installations ranging from large to small scale
structures. The greatest hydropower potential along the Nile River in Southern Sudan lies between
Nimule and Juba. The hydropower potential in Southern Sudan has been studied several times.
Assessments have shown that there are several sites that are feasible for hydro electric installations.
A comparably comprehensive feasibility study of South Sudan was carried out during the 1980s
(Bonifica S.p.A 1983) with aim to assess the hydro power potential in the area. The study further
explored the potential to cater to urban centers as well as future agricultural and industrial demands.
The study assessed the Bahr el- Jebel Hydro Electric Power (HEP) system including the sites of Fula,
Bedden Rapids, Lakki, and Shukoli to be developed in a two phased strategy. The HEP potential
estimated in the system was determined to be 1 045 MW with a production capacity of 7 230 GWh
annually. The first phase would involve Lakki dam as main electricity supplier of Juba and connected
towns. The estimated cost to develop a southern integrated energy system according to this approach
was estimated to approximately 2 billion USD, including a 1 400 km long transmission line to
Khartoum
231
. Besides power generation the dam systems would also yield benefits related to flood
control mitigating flood risk in the Sudd marsh lands with minimum loss to power generating
capabilities.
Assuming the possibility of regulations along the Albert Nile and storage in connections to Ugandan
lakes the second phase could be developed. The additional flow along the Juba/Nimule stretch the
mentioned measures would provide would allow an increase in capacity to approximately 1 525 MW at
an additional cost of 130 million USD
232
.
The study concluded that the Juba/Nimule stretch potentially has a surplus of hydropower and supply
widely exceeds southern Sudan demand for the foreseeable future. As such there are concrete
possibilities of the region becoming a local/regional exporter of electricity by interconnecting to other
power grids/pools. The major power transmission routs would then go in a north south direction from
Juba to the North and eventually connecting to the East African Power Pool (EAPP) and Uganda. At
the end of phase two an estimated 1 400 MW could be transmitted. The estimated cost of integrating 31
southern Sudan to the greater regional power market was estimated in the study to 600 million
USD
233
.
Table 1
Potential HEP sites
Large/medium scale HEP installations Capacity MW
Fula approx. 720 MW
Bedden Rapids (Juba) approx. 400 MW
Lakki 210 MW
Shukoli 210 MW
Mini-hydros
Kinyetti I – IV total of 3.5 MW (combined)
Yei I 3 MW
Sue 12 MW
Others along Kijo and Kaia, Yei and Sue rivers and small
tributaries
Not available
Source: Bonifica S.p.A 1983 and ACRES report 0411
4.3.3 The Jonglei diversion canal
The Sudd, one of the largest wetland areas in the world, has a very high evapotranspiration rate. More
than 50 % of the inflow is evaporated out of the Sudd swamps, resulting in less water availability in
downstream areas. This loss of water has since long been regarded a problem for both Sudan and
Egypt. Consequently Egypt, later joint with Sudan, developed ideas on increasing the flows to downstream areas. Plans for a diversion canal where developed during the decades after WWII and
construction started in 1978 but came to a halt as civil war ravaged Sudan the following decades. By
then 240 km of the planned 360 km had been completed. In 2008 Sudan and Egypt agreed to take up
construction again to finish the canal
234
.
While producing potential benefits to primarily Egypt and Northern Sudan the project has been
opposed by Southern Sudan as negative impacts from the project is estimated to affect areas locally
in Southern Sudan
235
. Local communities living around the canal risk being affected by the great
barrier the canal constitutes and it will potentially affect seasonal cattle migrations and raise new land
ownership issues among southern tribes
236
. GoSS officials have been stating their reservations
towards the project, calling for a revision of the project plans and greater dialogue between concerned
parties
237
. The Jonglei canal is mentioned as a contributing factor that ignited the last civil war. The
GoSS position clearly means that it is uncertain whether the project will actually go ahead
238
.
4.4 Tribal issues
Southern Sudan has 10 major tribal groups the largest being the Dinka (40%) and the Nuer (20%)
239
.
Tribal conflicts are not new among Nilotic
240
groups and other pastoral and nomadic communities
inhabiting the Nile region. Tribal conflicts in Southern Sudan are caused by competition for scarce
resources (grazing land, drinking water), cattle (used as currency
241
) and ethnic animosity. The civil
war between the North- and Southern Sudan intensified tribal violence. The war increased the 32
circulation of small arms in the region. The weak implementation of the CPA in the South and the
continued perceived inability of the GoSS
242
to provide services to different population groups have
kept conflicts going. Several sources
243
suggest increased and intensified tribal confrontations in
several southern areas, particularly Jonglei, Lakes, Unity, Mvolo, Mundri and East counties in Western
Equatorial and Warrap States. In 2009 approximately 100 separate tribal conflicts were reported
resulting in 400 000 new displaced people
244
.
The largest of South Sudan‟s 10 states, Jonglei, is a hot spot for tribal violence. Jonglei with 1.3 million
inhabitants is severely underdeveloped. It houses numerous ethnic groups that migrate in pursuit of
cattle, diminishing water resources and grazing areas. In the past, conflicts were mainly seasonal,
inter‐tribal/clan‐based, and often triggered by competition over resources
245
. During 2009 however, a
pattern of changes could be detected. Conflict was more prolonged than earlier years and did not
follow typical seasonal cycles
246
. The aggravated spiral of violence in Jonglei and other regions in the
latest years has several potential reasons. Virtually non-existent infrastructure, pervasive tribalism,
chronic food insecurity, un-resolved land disputes, under- developed justice systems as well as
perceptions of state bias are some of the more common reasons given for conflict
247
.
Fears of the North intervening in the tribal conflicts are not considered critical by the UNMIS (United
Nations Missions in Sudan), who consider local factors to be the key drivers behind conflicts.
248
. Local
and tribal identities outweigh national unity in Southern Sudan and the shared vision of an
independent Southern Sudanese state. Tribal identity and loyalty plays a dominant role in all aspects
of political life in the region
249
.
Tribal conflicts are also of a crossborder character as exemplified by the Ilemi- triangle. The Ilemi is
about 14,000 square kilometers and claimed by Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya. The Triangle is home to
five major ethnic groups; the nomadic Turkana in Kenya, the Didinga and Toposa in Sudan, the
Nyangatom, who move between Sudan and Ethiopia, and the Dassenach in Ethiopia
250
. The potential
presence of oil in the region has exacerbated tensions
251
.The Ilemi triangle holds potential for
increased instability between countries on the horn of Africa and peace in Southern Sudan is a prerequisite for peace in the triangle itself
252
”.
5 Hydropolitics and Post Referendum Scenarios
5.1 Outlook
Several scenarios have been developed by think tanks that look into the overall political economy of
referendum and the oil issue
253
. Our ambition is not to repeat these but instead look at the issue from
the point of view of hydropolitics taking into account the overall socio-economic context. The
transboundary water issues may not be of an immediate concern in the post referendum negotiations
but the link to electricity supply, food, trade and security are critical. A separation of Southern Sudan
from the North in 2011 is very likely to involve violence
254
. The knock-on effects of renewed largescale conflicts could be considerable for the rest of the Horn of Africa and Kenya, Uganda and Eastern
DRC in particular
255
.
Increased regional tensions would translate into more acute political divisions on the continent and
make the African Union‟s governance work more difficult. However, neighbouring countries are also
articulating their support in the media. Kenya’s Prime Minister Raila Odinga, for example, has called
on East African countries to support South Sudan for investment and stability. Kenya, East Africa‟s
biggest economy, is already showing evidence of increased trade and investment in Southern Sudan.
Kenya Commercial Bank has ten branch offices in Southern Sudan, while Equity Bank Ltd., Kenya‟s
top lender by customers, has four. Similarly, East Africa Breweries Ltd., Diageo Plc‟s Kenyan unit,
plans to construct a 700,000-hectoliter (18.5-million gallon) plant in Juba.
Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Egypt are therefore the most influential regional states, along with
Eritrea and Libya. If the referendum is held successfully, in accordance with the CPA and the Interim 33
National Constitution, and Khartoum endorses the process, recognition of a new Southern state
should prove relatively uncomplicated for the region and CPA signatories.
257
However, if the process
falters, particularly if the GoS attempts to manipulate, deny or delay the process or its result, regional
states and institutions will need to consider how best to respond to, and how to salvage the CPA and
the right of self-determination and to avoid a renewed conflict.
Representatives of Southern Sudan have also expressed the intention to join the EAC once the
January referendum has been concluded.
258
Southern Sudan has observer status in both the EAC and
COMESA. Increasing economic and political stability of upstream countries
259
enable them to develop
their water resources to meet national development needs.
260
They now have financial support, (from
both their own resources, and external donors such as the World Bank and China), that was not
available a decade ago.
261
However, several elections in the NELSB countries could affect regional
integration efforts and institutional development. The issue of Nile water has been used in electoral
campaigns in the Nile Equatorial Lakes region, in order to win voters with promises of water rights.
262
Cross-border trade and the benefits that can be derived between EAC and Southern Sudan are
particularly noteworthy. East African businessmen and potential investors are making preparations for
increased trade by sending food, consumer goods and construction materials into the region every
day.
263
In the 2009 Ugandan Bureau of Statistics Report, it was reported that Uganda informal crossborder sales alone into Southern Sudan reached more than USD 900 million in 2008, which is double
the 2007 figure and almost double the value of Uganda‟s exports to the European Union.
264
The fiveyear period of peace in Sudan and the relatively political stability in northern Uganda have been good
for Ugandan traders. The cross-border trade is facilitated by the ongoing re-construction and
development of the road connecting Juba to Uganda and the rest of East Africa. Should Southern
Sudan become independent, an increase in trade between Southern Sudan and Uganda is likely due
to the proximity to the greater EAC market. The driving distance from Juba to Kampala, Uganda, is
785 km while Khartoum, Sudan‟s capital, is almost the double distance.
265
Apart from the road connecting Juba to Uganda, several major proposed regional projects connecting
East Africa are noteworthy. These include a new sea port in Lamu, on Kenya‟s Indian Ocean coast; a
railway network updating existing lines and connecting Juba to Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia
(although the feasibility of this still needs to be ascertained due to the incompatibility of national rail
systems and the cost to change this); as well as an extension of the Trans-African Highway Network
linking South Sudan to Kenya‟s Mombasa port.
266
A proposal is also being discussed to construct a
1,400-km pipeline from Juba to the Lamu port, which could yield significant dividends and open up
greater Kenyan territory to economic development.
267
The pipeline is estimated to cost $1.5 billion. A
new pipeline would also offer an alternative to the existing export route, which runs roughly 1,600km to
Sudan‟s Red Sea port (Port Sudan, in the North), and thus reducing Southern Sudan‟s dependence
on Khartoum.
268
Socially and culturally, Southern Sudan has closer cultural ties to the EAC group of countries than to
the mostly Muslim Northern Sudan, even though tribal rivalry remains a key issue. The likely catalyst
in the East African region is therefore trade and infrastructural development of roads, trains and
energy development and interconnectors.
5.2 Four scenarios for Southern Sudan
It is our assessment that the referendum will take place on 9 January 2011 with the possibility of
delays. The political and media campaigns have started, the civic education activities are taking place
in several parts of Southern Sudan, and the registration process of voters was initiated on 15
November. A calendar with set milestones from November to January has been defined by the GoSS.
Preventive actions by the development partners to the NBI to mitigate the impacts of a potential post
referendum crisis to strengthen positive outcomes of an independence referendum will be critical
under all scenarios. 34
Security concerns are critical for all key states. Kenya has a strong interest in seeing the CPA
implemented successfully, particularly considering the key role it played in leading the regional
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process that resulted in the CPA.
269
Kenya
has a large economic stake in Southern Sudan‟s independence and plans to benefit from the
development of a considerable market and major infrastructure development in the South in particular
as a conduit for oil.
270
Kenya has long managed to support the South without being antagonistic to the
North.
Uganda has been the most vocal and open neighbouring country, about its support for Southern
Sudan‟s independence. This is because of Uganda‟s need for a stable buffer on its northern border, to
keep the Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency at bay and to prevent any encroachment
southwards.
271
As previously noted, trade has tripled in recent years with the South, which is now the
largest importer of Ugandan goods
272
. Although Uganda‟s official policy is to respect the CPA and the
will of the Southern people, some officials in Kampala are privately encouraging independence.
273
Egypt‟s position is clear in support of unity, for concern that secession could lead to instability in both
North and South Sudan, opening the door for extremist elements that could destabilise the region, just
as Khartoum hosted Osama bin-Laden, al-Qaeda and other extremist groups in the mid- and late-
1990s.
274
Given this stance, Egypt opposed the inclusion of self-determination in the CPA talks, rather
opting to promote its own initiative premised on unity. It has redoubled diplomatic efforts to prevent
partition, in part because it fears a new state – and an unstable one at that – could pose a threat both
to regional stability and its supply of Nile water.
275
Ethiopia has expressed its support of Southern Sudan, but due to the need to balance multiple
interests, it has remained neutral on the South‟s independence.
276
For example, Ethiopia provided
military support to the SPLM in the 1990s, to counter Islamist elements in Khartoum whose
destabilising activities posed a threat to Ethiopian and regional security.
277
Regional security still
remains Ethiopia‟s primary concern, largely as a result of the volatile situation in Somalia, the
continued confrontation with Eritrea and its own domestic fragility.
278
Our four scenarios are illustrated below:
1. Unity 2. Independence
with 1959
agreement
3. Independence
without 1959
agreement
4. Independence
and Wait and see
The 1959 Treaty between Egypt and Sudan is not the only contentious (water) treaty in case of
secession; it has been singled out because we consider it to be one of the major roadblocks with
respect to legal development and to development of the Nile water resources.
Scenario 1 – Unity
In case that the majority outcome of the referendum is Unity, then Sudan remains one country. In this
scenario, Southern Sudan is expected to get a more extended autonomy. Southern Sudan is likely to
strive for more extended responsibilities with respect to infrastructure, oil, energy and water assets.
The interim constitutions of the North and the South might possibly undergo some change and be
replaced with permanent constitutions (see Arts. 226.9 of the INC and 208.6 of the ICSS). Under this
scenario North and South Sudan will likely negotiate an internal allocation of the water share attributed
to Sudan under the 1959 agreement. The likelihood of this scenario is low as the current information
available points towards a referendum outcome that will result in secession. One possibility is that
unity is “forced” upon the South most likely to be accompanied by civil strife and major negative
regional implications
280
. 35
Scenario 2 – Independence and succession to the 1959 Agreement
If Southern Sudan secedes from North Sudan, it will become the 11
th
riparian of the Nile Basin. It is
located downstream of the Nile Equatorial Lakes region and has strong connections to the Eastern
Nile. The transition period until a new State is recognized, functional and a constitution is adopted
might take one or two years at best. If independence is accompanied by internal (armed) power
struggles in South Sudan, this period will take longer.
Under this scenario, one of the issues to be tackled is what would be the position of Southern Sudan
towards the 1959 Agreement? If Southern Sudan decides to succeed into rights and obligations of this
agreement, this would be a clear signal of alignment with the downstream riparians. If the North Sudan
and Egypt agree to this succession, water allocations under the agreement would need to be
renegotiated. It is unlikely that Egypt would accept a reduction of its allocated share. North and South
would have to negotiate within the current allocation to Sudan. The Fifth Article of the Agreement,
which requires a unified position in negotiations concerning Nile waters with any other riparian State,
would also apply to South Sudan. The requirement of a unified negotiation position would curtail South
Sudan‟s freedom in engaging in project with its upstream neighbours.
This alignment with the downstream riparians is likely to undermine South Sudan‟s ambitions to join
the EAC. Furthermore, the 1959 Agreement provides for the construction of water conservation
schemes in Southern Sudan. This is an implicit reference to the Jonglei canal project, a project which
is not very popular in the South. The likelihood of this scenario is therefore considered to be low.
Scenario 3 – Independence without succession to the 1959 Agreement
In a similar manner to Scenario 2, the length of the transition period to a functional independent State
will depend on whether the period is marked by international peace or on the intensity of internal
power struggles. With respect to succession to international treaties, Southern Sudan could follow the
Nyerere Doctrine; reviewing earlier treaties regarding their binding force. With respect to treaties
dating from before 1956, it could claim further that it was under colonial rule and that even after 1956 it
continued its struggle for political autonomy and independence.
In not accepting the binding force of the 1959 agreement, a possible sovereign Southern Sudan would
signal alignment with the upstream neighbours. It might further decide to sign and ratify the CFA, a
step that will most likely antagonise Northern Sudan and Egypt in particular if Southern Sudan
becomes the sixth country to ratify. The treaty States states in Article 42 that it shall enter into force
“on the sixtieth day following the date of the deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession
with the African Union”. In order to change this requirement, the treaty text needs to be reopened for
negotiation which is unlikely. The treaty does not limit signature to the ten States listed. Article 40
states that it is “open to signature by all States in whose territory part of the Nile River Basin is
situated”.
Scenario 4 – Independence and wait-and-see
Scenario 4 is the most likely scenario in the short-term. As the Nile issues are not amongst the most
pressing priorities in the post-referendum negotiations between North and South, the Government of
Southern Sudan will not be obliged to take a public position immediately. This also gives times to the
South to see the benefits, limitations and risks of all the options available. Keeping silent and not
compromising to any positions gives leeway to Southern Sudan, as a new midstream riparian, to opt
for aligning downstream or upstream at a later stage, it at all. In the meantime, Southern Sudan will be
able to observe how the CFA and the NBI processes evolve independently of its own actions.36
6 Appendix
6.1 A time line of political events
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
9 Jan 2005: Comprehensive Peace
Agreement between the Government
of Sudan and the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement signed.
1 Aug 2005: 9 July – Former southern
rebel leader John Garang is sworn in as
first vice president. South Sudan signs
its Draft Interim Constitution.
1 Aug 2005: Vice president and former
rebel leader John Garang is killed in a
plane crash. He is succeeded by Salva
Kiir.
Sept 2005: Power-sharing government
is formed in Khartoum.
June 2008: IGAD establishes office of
Special Envoy to Sudan on the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Oct 2008: Establishment of EACCOMESA-SADC Tripartite Task Force
14 May 2010: Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya
and Tanzania in agreement on the
opening of the Nile River Basin
Cooperative Framework for signature
for a period of one year until 13th May
2011
28 June 2010: Burundi’s presidential
elections. Nkurunziza is re-elected
unopposed for another five year-term.
1 July 2010: East Africa Common
Market comes into force (signed by
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and
Uganda)
4 August 2010 : Kenya held a Constitutional referendum on whether to adopt its new
Constitution.
27 Aug 2010: Kenya promulgates its new Constitution
11 Aug 2010: Rwandan Patriotic Front leader, Paul Kagame
re-elected as president in Rwanda’s presidential elections
that took place on 9 Aug.
31 Oct 2010: Tanzanian and Zanzibar’s
parliamentary and presidential
elections
6 Nov 2010: Tanzania’s Jakaya Kikwete
inaugurated as president for another
five-year term.
Jan 2011: Uganda’s presidential
elections expected to take place
9 Jan 2012: South
Sudan
Referendum
27 Nov 2011: DRC’s presidential
elections expected to take place.
Jan 2012: Envisaged Launch of
Tripartite FTA
Dec 2012: Kenya’s presidential
elections expected to take place
Sudan: April 2010
Presidential Elections
Sudan: Jul 2010- Jan 2011
Post referendum negotiations
Sudan: Jan 2011
Southern Sudan
referendum
Sudan: 2011
Southern Sudan
Independence?
Sudan: 2011-2012
Darfur peace
negotiations
Southern Sudan: April
2010
Presidential elections
Southern Sudan: June 2010
Memorandum of Understanding NorthSouth
Southern Sudan: Jul 2010- Jan 2011
Post referendum negotiations
Southern Sudan: November/December
2010
Registration of Voters Process
Southern Sudan: January 2011
Southern Sudan ReferendumIndependence?
Southern Sudan: July 2011
End of CPA Interim Period
Egypt: June 2010
Shaura Council Elections
Egypt: November 2010
Parliamentarian
Elections
Egypt: Mid- 2011
Electorial
Campaign
Egypt: September
2011
Presidential
Elections
Egypt: 2012
Status Quo or
change?
Ethiopia: June 2010
Parliamentary
Elections
Ethiopia: October 2010
Reshuffle of cabinets
Ethiopia: 2011/2012
Unresolved issues Eritrea
and Somalia
Kenya 2007-2008
Election crisis
Specific Events Sudan and Southern Sudan
Nile Region Events37
6.2 Colonial background and treaty time line
Burundi
281
Burundi achieved independence on 1 July 1962. The country
came under German East African Administration in 1899 until
it was occupied by Belgian troops in 1916. The League of
Nations mandated the territory of modern day Rwanda and
Burundi (then Ruanda-Urundi) to Belgium, and was turned
into a United Nations Trust Territory under Belgian
administration after World War II.
DR Congo
282
The area of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was under
Belgian colonial administration since 1885 until its
independence on 30 June 1960.
Egypt
283
British occupation and virtual inclusion of Egypt within the
British Empire lasted from 1882 until 1922, when the United
Kingdom unilaterally declared Egyptian independence. British
military and political influence continued until after World War
II, also due to the interest of the British Empire in access and
control over the Suez Canal.
Eritrea
Eritrea was colonized by Italy in 1885, and put under British
military administration in World War II. “In 1952, a UN
resolution federating Eritrea and Ethiopia went into effect.
284
In 1962, the area was annexed by and integrated into
Ethiopia.
285
The country gained independence in 1993.
Ethiopia
Ethiopia was an independent monarchy, with the exception of
a five year occupation by Italy (1936-1941) and until the
emperor Haile Selassie was deposed by a military
government (the Derg) in 1974. Opposition movements
ended the Derg government in 1991.
Kenya
286
Kenya became independent in 1963. The area formed part of
Britain‟s East African Protectorate established in 1895, and
officially became a British colony in 1920.
Rwanda
287
Rwanda (as Burundi) achieved independence on 1 July 1962
after a UN General Assembly resolution had terminated
Belgian trusteeship over the territory. Its previous colonial
history is similar to Burundi‟s. The people submitted to
German protectorate in 1899. The German‟s were
overpowered by Belgian troops in 1915. (For remainder of
colonial period see „Burundi‟.)
Sudan
Sudan achieved independence in 1956. Before then, the
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was effectively administered as a
British colony (1899-1956). A number of sources cite that
from 1924 to 1956 the British had governed the North and
South of Sudan as two separate entities.
288
The first NorthSouth civil war (1955-1972) erupted in Sudan on the eve of
independence; because the Khartoum-led government
reneged on promises to establish a federal State structure
and to provide regional autonomy to the South.
289
Tanzania
290
Tanzania achieved full independence on 9 December 1961.
Anglo-German agreements from 1886 and 1890 delineated
respective spheres of influence. Colonial control of Germany
over Tanganyika ended after World War I. Most of the
territory passed to British control under a League of Nations
mandate. After World War II, the entire area of Tanganyika
became a UN trust territory under British control.
Uganda
291
The country achieved formal independence on 9 October
1962. The area has started to come under British influence in
1888. An Anglo-German agreement of 1890 confirmed British
dominance over Kenya and Uganda; the Kingdom of
Buganda was integrated into the British protectorate in 1894.38
6.2.1 Treaty timeline
Date Parties to
Treaty
Name of Treaty
1891 Great Britain
Italy
Protocol between the Governments of Her Britannic Majesty and of his Majesty the King of Italy
for the Demarcation of their Respective Spheres of Influence in Eastern Africa
292
The treaty defines the territorial boundaries of the Italian sphere of influence, and enjoins the
Italian Government from initiating irrigation works on the Atbara which may alter the rate of flow
on the Nile.
1902 Great Britain
Ethiopia
Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia on the Delimitation of the Frontier between Ethiopia
and Sudan
293
The treaty defines the boundary line between Ethiopia and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. By this treaty,
Ethiopia accepts the obligation “not to construct and authorize construction of any structures on
the Blue Nile, Lake Tana or Sobat which would have the effect of obstructing the flow of their
waters into the Nile” except with prior agreement of the British and Sudanese Government.
1906 Great Britain
Congo
Agreement between Great Britain and the Independent State of the Congo, amending the
agreement signed at Brussels 12 May 1894
The treaty determines the boundary line between Belgian Congo and the Sudan. The
Government of Congo is enjoined to “construct or allow the construction of structures on the
Semliki or the Isango, or nearby, which would reduce the volume of water entering Lake Albert
except with the consent of the Sudanese Government.”
294
1906 Great Britain
France
Italy
Agreement between Great Britain, France and Italy Concerning Abyssinia
295
The three States agree to respect their individual interests and their common interest in
maintaining the integrity of Ethiopia. They agree inter alia to safeguard “the interests of Great
Britain and Egypt in the Nile Basin, and more specifically, with regard to the control of the waters
of this river and its tributaries”.
1925 Great Britain
Italy
Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and Italy Concerning the Obtaining of
Concessions for the Construction of a Dam over Lake Tana and a Railway Line Passing through
Abyssinia from Eritrea to Italian Somaliland
296
By this Exchange of Notes the United Kingdom and Italy commit to use good offices in
supporting each other‟s requests for concessions from the Ethiopian Government to build inter
alia a dam over Lake Tana to harness water reserves (UK interest) and a railway from Eritrea to
Italian Somalia (Italian interest). The UK, in the case that it obtains permission to build the dam
with the help of Italian good offices, commits to acknowledge “an exclusive Italian economic
influence in the western part of Abyssinia” and promises to support Italy in the process of
seeking such a concession from the Ethiopian government, under the condition that Italy
recognizes the former hydraulic rights of Egypt and the Sudan and does not engage to construct
structures on Nile sources, tributaries and effluents that may significantly change rates of flow on
the main river. This agreement by exchange of notes can be seen as a case of application of the
tripartite agreement of 1906.39
Date Parties to
Treaty
Name of Treaty
1929 Great Britain
Egypt
Exchange of Notes between Great Britain and Egypt in regard to the Use of the Waters of the
River Nile for Irrigation
297
Purposes At the time of conclusion of this agreement, the territories of Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania
and Uganda were under colonial control of Great Britain. The agreement is “essentially directed
towards the regulation of irrigation arrangements on the basin of the [1925] Nile Commission
Report”
298
which forms integral part of the agreement. The 1925 Nile Commission report outlines
seasonal water drawing rights for irrigation in Sudan. In its conclusions the Commissions states
that it “foresees that it will be necessary from time to time review the questions discussed in” its
report, and that it “has endeavoured to find a practical and workable basis for irrigation and to
foresee, and, as far as possible, to provide for any difficulty that may arise in the future.” In
addition to the findings of the Commission Report, the 1929 agreement grants representatives of
the Egyptian Irrigation Service in Sudan the liberty to cooperate with the Resident Engineer at
Sennar Dam to monitor discharges. Furthermore the parties agree that with the exception of prior
consent of the Egyptian Government “no irrigation or power works or measures are to be
constructed or taken on the River Nile and its branches, or on the lakes from which it flows, as
far as all these are in the Sudan or in countries under British administration, which would, in such
manner as to entail any prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either reduce the quantity of water
arriving in Egypt, or modify the date of its arrival, or lower its level.” Finally, as already expressed
in a note from 26 January 1925 (included in the 1925 Nile Commission Report), the British
government reconfirms in its response establishing the agreement of 1929 that it “acknowledges
the natural and historic rights of Egypt in the waters of the Nile”.
Upon independence, the Sudan stated that it rejected the continued binding force of the 1929
agreement,
299
and so did Tanzania within the two year period it gave itself in order to review the
binding force of colonial treaties by a Note of 4 July 1962
300
. The reference to the 1929
Agreement in the preamble of the 1959 Agreement between Sudan and Egypt on the full
utilization of the Nile Waters has been interpreted by some as evidence that Sudan has in fact
not renounced to the continued binding force of the 1929.
301
To the declaration of Tanzania,
Egypt responded that pending conclusion of new arrangements it considered the 1929 Nile
Waters Agreement as valid.
302
Kenya and Uganda, did not specifically contest the devolution of
the 1929 Agreement; yet, they both adopted declarations upon independence that those colonial
treaties “which cannot be regarded as surviving according to the rules of customary international
law as having terminated” after a period of two years since independence.
303
The continued
binding force of the 1929 Agreement remains until today a subject of discussion and
disagreement in legal doctrine as well as among governments.
304
1934 Belgium,
Great Britain
Agreement between the United Kingdom and Belgium regarding Water Rights on the Boundary
between Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi
305
The agreement defines water rights and use of rivers and streams which form part of the
boundary between the two territories or which flow from one to the other territory. The agreement
regulates water diversion and water use for mining operations, stipulating that where diversion
occurs, water shall be returned to the natural bed after use without substantial reduction in
volume. Water pollution by poisonous or noxious substances is to be avoided. Traditional fishing,
navigation and water use rights by riparian population of both countries are maintained on
contiguous stretches of the rivers. This agreement lapsed after independence of the territories
concerned.
306
1949/1953 Egypt
Great Britain
Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government on the
Construction of Owen Falls Dam
307
The notes from 1949 indicate that the agreement is concluded in the spirit of the Agreement from
1929. The objective of the Owen Falls Dam is to provide hydroelectricity to Uganda and to serve
Egyptian irrigation interests by creating a reservoir at Lake Victoria. Both governments cooperate
in the design and implementation. Tenders are issued by the Ugandan Electricity Corporation;
contracts are awarded after both Governments have communicated their consent. Egypt‟s
interests are represented by an Egyptian engineer present at the worksite during construction,
and an Egyptian resident engineer who controls flow of water once the dam is constructed
together with the Ugandan Electricity Corporation. The Corporation ensures that the operation of
the dam is “not prejudicial to the interests of Egypt in accordance with the 1929 Agreement. A
subsequent exchange of notes from 1952/53 concerns cost sharing arrangements and
compensation with respect to the construction and operation of the Owens Falls Dam.40
Date Parties to
Treaty
Name of Treaty
1959 Egypt
Sudan
Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic on the Full
Utilization of the Waters of the Nile
308
The agreement was prompted in part by Egyptian construction of the Sudd el Aali Reservoir at
Aswan and by the mutually perceived need of new hydraulic projects in order to make full use of
the Nile Waters. The two States agree that acquired rights up to the date of conclusion of this
agreement consist in 48 bcm per year for Egypt and 4 bcm per year for Sudan (First Article). The
two parties agree that Egypt constructs the Sudd-el-Aali and Sudan shall construct “the Roseires
Dam on the Blue Nile and any other works which the Republic of Sudan considers essential for
the utilization of its share, and including projects for the increase of the River yield (Para 1 and 2
Second Article; Third Article). The annual average natural River yield (AANRY) of water at
Aswan is estimated at 84 bcm (Para 3 Second Article). The two States agree to share the net
benefit from the Sudd el Aali reservoir (Net benefit = AANRY – acquired rights – average loss of
over-year storage) at the ration of 14 ½ for the Sudan and 7 ½ as long as the average river yield
remains in the limits of 84bcm. Paragraph 4 Second Article provides a calculation of what this
means in case the average yield remains at 84bcm and if average storage losses remain equal
to 10bcm; this means that 18.5 bcm shall be for Sudan, and 55.5 bcm for Egypt. If the average
yield increases, the increase is divided between the two in equal shares. In case of low years,
when low levels in the Sudd el Aali reservoir do not permit drawing of full requirements, the
Permanent Joint Technical Commission (PJTC) devises a faire arrangement to be followed by
both parties upon their approval (Para 1 (e) Fourth Article). The agreement between Egypt and
Sudan further provides that the two parties agree on a unified view ahead of any negotiations
with any other Nile riparian States and concerning Nile waters (Para 1 Fifth Article). If such
negotiations result in an agreement to construct works on the river outside of Egyptian and
Sudanese territory, the PJTC shall draw all technical details and supervise implementation of
technical arrangements (Para 1 Fifth Article). Egypt and Sudan also commit to adopt a unified
view in case other riparian States claim a share in the Nile waters; and if this results in the
allocation of water to another Nile riparian State, the allocated amount is deducted in equal parts
from the shares Egypt and Sudan have established by this agreement.
According to media outlets and reports, these provisions as well as questions concerning the
binding force of the 1929 Agreement and whether „acquired rights‟ of Egypt and Sudan should be
accepted by other riparian States have been the subject of disagreements among the Nile Basin
States with respect to Nile cooperation.
309
1977 Burundi
Rwanda
Tanzania
Uganda*
Agreement for the Establishment of the Organization for the Management and Development of
the Kagera River Basin
(Organization has been formally dissolved on 7 July 2004)
(1991)
**
Ethiopia/Sud
an
Egypt/Ugan
da
Agreement on peace and friendship between Ethiopia and Sudan
Agreement between Egypt and Uganda
Several sources cite two additional accords concluded in 1991;
310
1) Agreement on peace and friendship concluded between Ethiopia and Sudan. The legal nature of
the text is not certain; it has sometimes been qualified as a declaration. Provisions regarding
to the Nile concern the need for establishment of a joint technical commission, recognition of
“equitable entitlements to the uses of the Nile waters without causing appreciable harm to
one another”.
311
2) An Agreement between Egypt and Uganda in which the latter supposedly commits itself to
honour colonial agreements.
31241
Date Parties to
Treaty
Name of Treaty
1993 Egypt
Ethiopia
Framework for General Cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia
313
By this agreement the two parties agree that matters relating to the Nile should be discussed in
detail by experts and according to principles of international law. They agree to refrain from
activities related to Nile water which “may cause appreciable harm to the interests of the other
party”. They further agree on conservation and protection of Nile waters, cooperation in mutually
advantageous projects on the Nile, and on endeavouring “towards a framework for effective
cooperation among countries of the Nile basin for the promotion of common interest in the
development of the Basin.”
2003 Kenya
Uganda
Tanzania
Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin
Agreement between Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, concluded under the
auspices of the East African Community, in which the parties agree to cooperate on sustainable
development and management of the basin based on the concept of IWRM. The agreement
establishes the Lake Victoria Basin Commission.
(2010)*** Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework
314
See analysis in report.
*Joined the Organization in 1981.
**Treaties referred to in secondary literature, treaty texts not available.
*** Treaty opened for signature on 14 May 2010 until 13 May 2011
315
, not in force.42

Theme: Rubric. Blog at WordPress.com.

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 1,500 other followers

%d bloggers like this: